IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // #36 // SEPTEMBER 22 AUTHORS Ben Connable, PhD, is a senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University, and the senior research advisor to DT Institute. Ben is a retired U.S. Marine Corps intelligence officer and foreign area officer, as well as a former senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Ben received an M.A. from the Naval Postgraduate School and a PhD in war studies from King’s College London. James Sladden is a former Royal Marine, former RAND Corporation researcher, and a current PhD candidate in History at the University of Cambridge. In his capacity as a marine, a researcher, a high-risk advisor to news organizations, and as an OSCE and UN conflict monitor, he has deployed to Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Afghanistan, and Yemen. James received an M.A. with distinction in Applied Security Strategy from the University of Exeter.
CHACR The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR or the British Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
BATTLE STUDIES:
THE NEED FOR PRIMARY SOURCE RESEARCH
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XPERT conjecture on the changing character of war is easy to come by, but objective, evidence-driven analysis of the character of actual war drawn from recent and current conflicts is paltry. A gap in field research and collection exists and must be remedied. A significant challenge in producing analysis and military history is in dealing with gaps, the blank spaces left by the absence of sources. Concurrent or contemporary research is one important way of closing the gaps. Increasingly in contemporary wars, military learning is conducted through remote observation and is heavily dependent on unstructured video, photo, and audio recordings posted by participants. While remote observation and evidence gathering is important, to have constructive value it must be complimented by – and, we argue, framed by – field research centered on timely
interviews with participants. Field research adds essential context to historical narratives, and oral interviews place people back in the centre of the story, where they belong. Military and civilian defence leaders should acknowledge the shortcomings of remote approaches, fund structured battlefield research in Ukraine (and elsewhere), and re-evaluate the evidentiary basis for their understandings of the character of war. Many important military questions that need answering are presently ripe for study in Ukraine. Has the character of war truly changed? How can modern militaries fight and win while under constant aerial and electronic surveillance? Has armour, and perhaps even cannon artillery, been made redundant, or will traditional weapons continue on at the heart of modern combined arms formations? How can leaders adjust military training and education to meet the changing
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demands of war? More narrowly, Ukraine offers us the most panoramic view of Russian combat capabilities since the end of the Second World War. Given opportunities to answer these questions in Ukraine, and given the many billions of pounds of planned investment stimulated by this conflict, one might assume many Western researchers would be in the field vacuuming up primary source accounts. This appears to be an unsafe assumption. Some isolated efforts are occurring, notably reflected in a recent report published by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Such efforts are invaluable but surprisingly rare. Military organizations are certainly (yet quietly) gathering technical evidence – abandoned Pantsir S-1s, shattered remnants of Orlan-10 drones, et al. – but structured evidence gathering from the people fighting this war appears to be quite limited. Our colleagues in the research