CER submission to the British government’s integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy Ian Bond with Camino Mortera-Martinez and Luigi Scazzieri
1. What are the key opportunities, challenges, threats and vulnerabilities facing the UK now? (Submissions focusing on rapidly evolving areas such as science, technology, data, cyber, and space are particularly welcome.) 2. What are the key global and domestic trends affecting UK international policy and national security out to 2030, and how should the government prioritise its efforts in response to these? The key global and domestic trends till 2030, and the opportunities, challenges, threats and vulnerabilities arising from them Both man-made and natural trends will affect the UK’s national security in the next decade. Top of the list of man-made trends is China’s economic and military rise. Despite demographic and environmental problems, China’s global influence is likely to continue to grow over the next decade. Xi Jinping’s stated objective is to develop a “world class” military force that can “fight and win” global wars by 2049. China’s navy is now the largest in the world (Maizland, 2020). China’s ability to inflict economic damage on countries that it perceives as acting against its interests will continue to grow if the rest of the world remains dependent on China for critical goods and raw materials (Rogers et al, 2020). The relationship between China and the US has deteriorated, particularly under the Trump administration, which is seeking to reverse 30 years of economic integration. Trump’s sanctions on Huawei are designed not merely to dissuade US allies from installing Huawei equipment in 5G systems, but to cripple the firm completely. While his approach is unprecedented, there is cross-party consensus in the US that China is a threat that the US must confront. That is likely to lead to the US’s military and diplomatic footprint in Europe shrinking as resources shift to Asia. China is likely to respond to Trump’s economic warfare by intensifying its ‘Made in China 2025’ programme – acquiring more Western intellectual property, fairly or otherwise, while making it harder for Western firms to access the Chinese market (Wübbeke et al, 2016). If future US administrations continue Trump’s policies, the world will have to choose between belonging to America’s technological sphere of influence or China’s, unless another player, such as the EU, can use its regulatory influence to offer an alternative to both (Bradford, 2020). Decoupling would cause lasting economic damage to all parties, including the UK, diverting investment into inefficient import substitution based on geopolitics. Russia’s long-term decline will continue over the next decade, driven by serious demographic problems and reduced demand for hydrocarbons as the world transitions to a low carbon economy. Nonetheless, it will remain a significant military power, and will have the intelligence resources to run disinformation and influence operations against Western countries including the UK (ISC, 2020). Vladimir Putin is likely to remain in power for most of this decade and possibly longer. With the US more focused on Asia, he may see opportunities to destabilise his European neighbours and undermine NATO. China’s rise, America’s political dysfunction and Russia’s mischief-making are contributing to a global retreat of democracy: 2019 marked the 14th consecutive annual decline in global freedom (Freedom House, 2020). The UK was one of 25 established democracies that performed worse in 2019 than 2018.
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