‘Europe after th September 11 ’ revisited by Charles Grant
The attacks of 9/11 brought the major powers together. But that unity did not endure, and the world now risks division between the West and the authoritarian powers.
Photo from the launch of 'Europe after September 11th', London, December 11th 2001 (L to R) Jack Straw, Charles Grant, Nick Butler, Heather Grabbe, Steven Everts and Edward Bannerman
In December 2001 my colleagues and I published a CER report on how the world was responding to the atrocities of 9/11. The tone of ‘Europe after September 11th’ was gushingly optimistic: “The major powers have come together and committed themselves to fight international terrorism,” we wrote. “This alliance promises to be a constructive force in world affairs”. We noted several positive geopolitical developments. Some of them proved to be short-lived – and the West has endured a torrid two decades. But though down the West is far from out. The US had re-engaged with the world. George W Bush had started his presidency with a domestic focus, but found himself working with allies and the United Nations. However, he soon abandoned multilateralism and invaded Iraq. His successors sought to reduce American involvement in distant wars. But Joe Biden’s clumsy retreat from Afghanistan this summer probably does not signal a permanent shift to isolationism. He wants to refocus on China, and as long as the US sees itself as a power with global interests, it will struggle to avoid military interventions. The EU had strengthened its security cooperation. It did particularly well on internal security, soon crafting the European Arrest Warrant and boosting the role of Europol. More recently it has created a European border guard.
On foreign and defence policy the EU has new institutions, such as the ‘High Representative Vice President’, a quasi-foreign minister, the External Action Service, a quasi-foreign ministry and (so far unused) military ‘battle groups’. But the EU doesn’t have much more real authority in these domains than it did 20 years ago, when Javier Solana was its chief diplomat. “Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre, Putin has moved deftly to position Russia as a key ally of the West,” we noted. The Russian president wanted to get closer to the EU and NATO, and join the WTO. Vladimir Putin supported the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, including the deployment of US forces on former Soviet territory, while he was helpful at the UN and gave US forces access to Russian airspace. But Putin soon turned against the West. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ against the election of a proRussian president in 2004, Western support for Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 and Western criticism of Putin’s growing authoritarianism all contributed to this shift. China had used the crisis to improve its relationship with the US, backing it at the UN, sharing intelligence and offering cautious support for its military action. Twenty years on, China has become so strong – economically, diplomatically and militarily – that it sees little