TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
SEPTEMBER 2026 Vol. XXXVII, No. 9
Md. lawyers face another voice in attorney-client relationship: AI
Commentary: Court affirms importance of participation rights of child parties. Page 3
Maryland family lawyers Confront new voice in the Attorney-client relationship. Page 4
Thorny issues test bar amidst rising tide of ‘gray’ divorces. Page 7
Table of Contents Advocacy: State’s highest court 3 Child affirms importance of participation rights of child parties
Vol. XXXVII, No. 9 TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law 200 St. Paul Place Suite 2480 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Main Number: 443.524.8100
Story: Maryland family law 4 Cover attorney confront a new voice in attorney-client relationship: AI
Suzanne E. Fischer-Huettner Managing Director
6 In the News:
Kendyl Kearly Editor
Md. attorney’s lawsuit against judge overseeing his divorce should be thrown out, magistrate says
Patrick Brannan Managing Editor
7 In the News:
Thorny issues test bar amidst rising tide of ‘gray’ divorces
Contributing Writers Hope Keller
9 Monthly Memo
Maryland Family Law (ISSN 2373-7255) is published monthly (12 issues per year) by Bridgetower Media, 200 Saint Paul Place Suite 2480, Baltimore, MD 21202. The standard Digital+Print subscription is $478.80 per year. Periodicals postage paid at BALTIMORE, MD 21233-9998, and additional entry offices.
Child welfare law clarified in parental rights denial … Husband held in contempt for failing to pay wife $190,000 … Record supports decision terminating mother’s parental rights … Discovery orders in contempt proceeding not immediately appealable … Parental rights order remanded to consider fictive kin placement … MI court vacates in part and remands divorce, custody judgement
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10 Family Law Digest
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12 Full Text Unreported Opinions
Maryland Family Law Update is a review of events as they affect the practice of domestic relations in law in the state of Maryland published by The Daily Record, 200 St. Paul Place, Suite 2480, Baltimore, Maryland 21202. ©2026 The Daily Record Company, all rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced in any form without the express written permission of the publisher. The laws of every jurisdiction may differ, and the facts are capable of many interpretations. The contents of this publication are not to be construed as legal advice and should not be acted upon without consulting an attorney. Letters selected for publication are subject to editing. Letters from litigants in pending cases or their representatives will not be accepted for publication until after their cases have been finally decided. Address letters and comments to Editor, Maryland Family Law Update, 200 St. Paul Place, Suite 2480, Baltimore, Maryland 21202. Maryland Family Law Update and The Daily Record Company are owned by Bridgetower Media.
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66 Case Index
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
67 Topic Index
TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Child Advocacy
State’s highest court affirms the importance of meaningful participation rights of child parties In a landmark decision for Maryland’s children and youth involved in the child welfare system, the Supreme Court of Maryland recently issued its opinion in In re K.B., reaffirming a fundamental principle that advocates have long championed: Children have a right to meaningful participation in decisions that shape their lives. In re K.B.(“K.B.”), No. 60, Sept. Term, 2025, 2026 WL 2132934 (Md. July 24, 2026). At the center of the case is K.B., a teenager whose Child in Need of Assistance case concerned whether she should be placed into foster care and removed from her grandmother’s custody, where she had lived nearly her entire life. Prior to the start of a contested hearing, the juvenile court ordered K.B. removed from the courtroom. Her attorney objected to K.B.’s exclusion, arguing that K.B. was a party, wanted to attend, and that her participation was necessary. The juvenile court expressed a general belief that children under 15 should not be present during contested custody-related hearings, stating that K.B.’s attorney could speak on her behalf. The Appellate Court of Maryland upheld K.B.’s exclusion from the courtroom. On July 24, 2026, the court reversed the lower court ruling. Although the case was deemed moot because K.B. had been reunified with her grandmother, the Supreme Court recognized the broader significance of the issue and the importance of addressing the case on the merits. In doing so, the court solidified protections for Maryland children involved in dependency proceedings, sending a powerful message about the importance of procedural due process for child parties. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that K.B.’s exclusion violated her procedural due process rights and emphasized that child s parties possess TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
ERICA I.
LEMON
Child Advocacy independent due process rights, not merely a right to have an attorney speak for them. The court recognized “there is a baseline assumption that a child attends their CINA proceeding to assist counsel” and “the child’s presence is invaluable to their attorney.” The opinion established that prejudice is presumed when a child is improperly excluded from a CINA proceeding. Children can observe proceedings that affect them, comprehend decisions being made on their behalf, correct factual inaccuracies, provide context to their attorneys and contribute meaningful information in real time. This decision represents a significant advancement in recognizing children as active participants in matters that directly impact their lives. The juvenile court relied in part on its generalized view that children of K.B.’s age should not attend court due to the challenging nature of contested hearings. The Supreme Court found such reasoning was insufficient and held that any decision to exclude a child must be based on an individualized assessment of that particular child and the specific circumstances of the case. Before excluding a child over the objection of the child’s attorney, a court must carefully balance the child’s due process interests against any demonstrated risk that participation would be harmful to that child’s wellbeing. The court explained, “any exclusion must be narrowly tailored to the identified harm” and must be “no broader than necessary to protect the child party’s wellbeing — and must be supported by facts identified on the record.” The court identified a non-exhaustive list of potential factors to consider
in determining whether exclusion is appropriate. This individualized approach is critical because children are not monoliths. Youth involved in the child welfare system possess varying levels of maturity, resilience, comprehension, and lived experience. Many have navigated significant trauma, family disruption, and court involvement. Determining whether participation is appropriate requires attention to the unique circumstances of each child. Research and practice have demonstrated that children and youth are more likely to trust court processes, engage with services, and experience positive outcomes when they are meaningfully included in decisions affecting them. When young people are heard, they gain a sense of dignity, agency, and ownership over the process. When they are excluded, they can experience confusion, frustration and distrust. The child welfare system exists to protect children and promote their wellbeing. That mission cannot be fully realized without authentic youth engagement. In this case of first impression, Maryland’s highest court affirmed that children have a right to be present, heard, and to meaningfully participate. When courts decide where a child will live, who will care for them, and what their future will be, one principle must remain at the center of every proceeding: meaningful participation of the child is crucial. The In re K.B., opinion firmly enshrined that principle into Maryland jurisprudence, recognizing that children are not merely the subjects of child welfare proceedings, but rights-bearing participants whose meaningful participation matters. Erica I. LeMon is the Advocacy Director for Children’s Rights at Maryland Legal Aid.
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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Cover Story
Maryland family lawyers confront a new voice in the attorney-client relationship: AI
Submitted photo
Bianca Pinnock, a family law attorney with Shulman Rogers, had a client who, after consulting with an AI program, thought she could increase her settlement, but didn’t.
The Daily Record file photo
Michael DeHaven, a Towson attorney, has seen an increase in clients using artificial intelligence in the last year, especially the last six months.
By Lisa Burden Special to The Daily Record
Maryland family law attorneys are increasingly finding another voice in conversations with their clients — artificial intelligence. Clients are turning to ChatGPT and other artificial intelligence tools to research Maryland law, review settlement agreements, prepare discovery responses and get what one attorney described as a second legal opinion. The results can range from helpful starting points to incorrect statements of Maryland law — and, in at least one case, a costly decision by a client who relied on AI over the advice of her attorney. Bianca Pinnock, a family law attorney with Shulman Rogers, represented a wife in a financial dispute who received a settlement offer that Pinnock believed was better than what the client was likely to receive if the case went to court. Pinnock and her client discussed the offer extensively. The client then put information about the proposal into ChatGPT. The AI tool suggested that the client could receive substantially more. Pinnock declined to disclose the actual figures, 4
Submitted photo
Submitted photo
Ferrier Stillman, a family law attorney with Tydings, said she’s seen clients that have trouble distinguishing between legal advice they get from artificial intelligence vs. an actual attorney.
Mary Sanders, an attorney with Turnbull, Nicholson & Sanders, said one issue is that artificial intelligence platforms aren’t able to understand the laws that differ from state to state.
but offered a hypothetical example: If $500,000 had been on the table, ChatGPT was suggesting something closer to $3 million. The client wanted to counter at the substantially higher amount despite Pinnock’s warning that she didn’t believe a court would award anything close to it. The client nevertheless instructed Pinnock to make the counteroffer. Offended and taken aback by the counteroffer, the other side rescinded its earlier offer. The case continued toward trial, requiring additional preparation and legal fees, and eventually settled late on the night before trial — for much less than the client had originally been offered. So, Pinnock pointed out, the client lost some of the original settlement offer and her legal fees were higher because of the trial preparation costs. The experience illustrates a problem Maryland family law attorneys say they are encountering with increasing frequency: Clients are no longer simply searching the internet for information about divorce, custody and support. They are asking AI to analyze their individual circumstances and then comparing its conclusions with the advice of their attorneys.
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
Pinnock isn’t opposed to the technology, but she urges caution. For self-represented litigants, she said, AI could potentially improve access to justice when used appropriately. Clients might successfully use it for basic definitions or general information. But she doesn’t recommend that clients enter the facts of their case and ask an AI system to perform the legal analysis.
A second opinion from AI Towson attorney Michael DeHaven said he’s seen an increase in clients using AI over the past year, particularly during the last six months. Clients have run proposed agreements through AI or used the technology to research issues such as child support and then, based on the results, questioned the legal advice they received, he said. “There’s just a lot of what I’ll say is getting a second opinion through artificial intelligence instead of a second opinion from another lawyer,” DeHaven said. The technology has also made clients more inclined to second-guess how their cases are being handled, he said. DeHaven doesn’t object to clients seeking another opinion and sees legitTheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Cover Story imate uses for AI. He uses it to critique drafts of his work. But family law presents questions that can’t always be reduced to an AI-generated answer, particularly when children are involved. “How do you quantify best interest?” he said. “It’s not a one-size-fits-all.” Ferrier Stillman, a family law attorney with Tydings, is seeing something similar. “What I’m seeing is clients who ask AI for legal research or legal information, and then often can’t distinguish between that and actual advice from a family law attorney,” Stillman said. Stillman said she’s had clients who asked AI how their assets would be divided in a divorce and were told the answer was 50-50. She then had to explain that Maryland does not automatically divide marital property equally. AI can also fail to distinguish between marital and nonmarital property under Maryland law, she said. Part of the problem is how clients phrase their questions. “If you don’t know to tell ChatGPT, ‘Tell me what Maryland law is’ on any particular subject, AI would just give you a general answer,” Stillman said.
Maryland law — not generic law Mary Sanders and attorneys at Turnbull, Nicholson & Sanders have encountered similar problems. Sanders said family law varies considerably from state to state, creating a particular danger when consumers ask a general-purpose AI system a legal question and then assume the response applies in Maryland. In one instance, a client without minor children became convinced that she could receive use and possession of the family home for three years because AI told her that she could. The attorney had to explain that the provision of Maryland law upon which she was relying didn’t apply to her circumstances. Sanders also said fathers have come to the firm believing Maryland automatically gives fathers 50-50 custody. There is no such automatic preference, she said. Custody decisions depend upon the circumstances of the individual case. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
The result, Sanders said, is that lawyers can find themselves “fighting not only the other side” but also trying to convince their own clients that the information they received from AI is wrong.
When AI joins the drafting process Dana McKee, an attorney with Brown, Goldstein & Levy, has seen client use of the technology move beyond legal research and into the actual preparation of family law documents. In one case, McKee was negotiating a marital settlement agreement and sent a draft to her client for review. The client returned suggested revisions over several rounds. Some suggestions were appropriate. Others seemed odd, despite being written in language that mimicked the tone of the agreement, McKee said. McKee eventually asked where the proposed revisions were coming from. The client disclosed that he had uploaded the agreement to ChatGPT and was asking the program what should be included. That creates a problem beyond whether the AI’s recommendations are legally sound. An attorney who assumes the proposed changes actually reflect the client’s wishes could incorporate them without realizing that they originated with an AI system. In another case, McKee said, a sophisticated client with a legal background used ChatGPT to research an unusual issue and returned with a legal theory that AI suggested would produce the result he wanted. McKee’s own research showed that the AI response was close — but not close enough. The program had not identified the correct legal theory, terminology or outcome, she said. But the research did point the lawyers in a direction that ultimately helped them develop a different theory. “So, it’s not that reliable, but there is some usefulness to it,” McKee said.
AI use can increase costs for clients Lawyers are seeing clients use AI to produce work that can actually increase their legal bills.
Pinnock has encountered prospective clients arriving with motions they have prepared themselves. She tells them that reviewing the draft, checking its research and determining whether everything in it is accurate may take her more time than drafting the motion herself. AI is also affecting legal bills when the person using it is on the other side of a case. Pinnock said she’s handled cases in which self-represented opposing parties produce large numbers of motions. Some are procedurally improper, rely on incorrect law or repeat motions that have already been filed. Even when a filing has little merit, the represented party’s attorney generally must respond, increasing that client’s legal fees.
Confidentiality adds another concern What clients tell AI systems may present another problem for family law attorneys. Family law matters can involve extraordinarily sensitive information about finances, children, marriages and allegations made during contentious divorce and custody proceedings. Several of the attorneys said they warn clients against entering information about their cases into public AI or thirdparty AI platforms because that can create client confidentiality and discovery issues.
Your Google/AI search isn’t the same as my law degree Some of the problems that AI presents aren’t entirely new. Stillman noted that lawyers have dealt for years with clients who found information through Google and believed it applied to their cases. AI, she said, is a more extreme example. Stillman said she doesn’t tell clients they should never use AI. If clients want to research an issue, she’s willing to help them frame a more precise query. But she gives them a significant warning. “AI doesn’t have a law degree,” she said.
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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In the News
Md. attorney’s lawsuit against judge overseeing his divorce should be thrown out, magistrate says By Ian Round IRound@TheDailyRecord.com
A lawsuit by an attorney against a state judge who sanctioned him should be dismissed, a federal magistrate judge recommended Aug. 7. U.S. Magistrate Judge Timothy Sullivan wrote that Baltimore attorney Nathan Charles’ lawsuit against Montgomery County Circuit Judge Louis Leibowitz should be thrown out because federal judges don’t have jurisdiction to review the orders of state-court judges. Charles sued Leibowitz last October after the judge, who presided over some proceedings in his divorce, twice sanctioned him and warned him to control his anger after he threatened to sue a loan officer. Charles argued the orders and warnings violated his rights to free speech and due process because he hadn’t committed misconduct. Leibowitz ordered him to pay $23,680 in attorneys’ fees to his ex-wife for his appeal of another judge’s custody order, as well as $1,222 as a sanction for a contempt petition Charles had filed. The judge later withdrew the fine, and Charles withdrew the contempt petition. “(T)he sanctions were transparently imposed because the court disapproved of Plaintiff’s speech, tone, and criticisms,” his complaint stated. Charles, an immigration lawyer specializing in asylum cases, is representing himself in the lawsuit against Leibowitz. In a statement, he said he was “disappointed” in Sullivan’s recommendation and was a victim of “judicial gaslighting.” This is his second lawsuit against a judge arising from the divorce case; the first was against Montgomery County Circuit Judge Christopher Fogleman. Charles voluntarily dismissed that case shortly after he sued Leibowitz. The complaint against Leibowitz mentions several other judges, including Fogleman, but none are listed as defen6
Depositphotos
A lawsuit from an attorney against a Maryland judge who sanctioned him was dismissed by a federal magistrate.
dants. Charles has sought leave to add five of Leibowitz’s colleagues and three Appellate Court of Maryland judges but hasn’t been granted leave to amend his complaint. Through a spokesperson for the state judiciary, Leibowitz declined to comment. The Maryland Office of the Attorney General, which is representing him, also declined. U.S. District Judge Paula Xinis last month referred the case to Sullivan, the Maryland federal court’s chief magistrate judge, for a report and recommendation. Sullivan recommended that the case be dismissed and that Charles not be allowed to amend his complaint. He wrote that the lawsuit clearly ran afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents “state-court losers” from asking federal judges to review and reject judgments with which they disagree. He was not persuaded that the complaint raised legitimate constitutional issues that were separate from the divorce case. “During this case, the Plaintiff has endeavored to frame his case as one that involves independent and separate issues from that of the state court divorce and custody proceedings,” Sullivan wrote. “Yet it is apparent from his Complaint that he is asking this Court to review the
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
sanctions orders, find them unconstitutional, and enjoin Judge Leibowitz from imposing any similar orders in the future.” Charles stated that the courts had sanctioned him, severely restricted his custody of his children — to one weekend a month, supervised — and limited his ability to file motions despite not having found that he committed misconduct or was psychologically unstable. (The court restricted his ability to file motions because he had filed many “frivolous” ones.) He wrote that he complied with orders to attend therapy and anger management treatment but that the court “continued moving the goalposts without identifying any clinical finding, evidentiary basis, or attainable condition that would bring the supervision to an end.” “Every motion I have filed has rested on compelling, and often mandatory, legal authority,” Charles stated in an email. “The problem is not frivolous litigation. The problem is the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s persistent refusal to follow controlling law, even when that refusal harms the well-being of two young children. That is frankly disgusting.” TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
In the News
Thorny issues test bar amidst rising tide of ‘gray’ divorces Bridgetower Media Newswires
BOSTON -- The “gray divorce” that has become a staple of local family law practices demands that attorneys come up with solutions on issues ranging from retirement planning to ensuring the future care of adult children with special needs. In the recent story “Older Adults Are No Longer Staying in ‘Empty Shell’ Marriages,” the New York Times reported divorces involving spouses 50 and older have essentially doubled since 1990 and now make up nearly 40 percent of divorces in the U.S. Massachusetts lawyers are finding that reality reflected in their own caseloads. Boston family law attorney Grace C. Roessler said gray divorces currently constitute about half her practice. “I have seen an uptick in the amount of people over 50 getting a divorce — and certainly in my own caseload,” Roessler said. “They’ve increased over the last 13 to 14 years, that’s for sure.” Richard C. Bardi said he has been surprised by the number of gray divorces coming through his door. “I sometimes say to myself, ‘Why can’t you just put up with each other?’” the Boston lawyer said. “But I’m seeing an increasing number of people in their 60s and around retirement age.” Westborough’s Heather A. O’Connor is also encountering more cases of gray divorce, estimating that they comprise 15 to 20 percent of her firm’s practice. That’s a significant percentage given that the firm specializes in high-conflict divorce, and gray divorces tend to be less contentious. “We just had somebody who was 95 go through a divorce,” O’Connor said. “We’re definitely seeing them quite frequently.” TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Bridgetower media newswires
A rising tide of ‘gray’ divorces is presenting some thorny issues for the bar.
Why now? The majority of gray divorces Roessler sees typically involve longterm marriages. “But I’ve had my fair share of ‘quick,’ short-term marriages,” she added. “Maybe they’re second marriages for folks that haven’t worked out. Maybe somebody’s spouse passed away six years ago, they got remarried very quickly, and now they’ve been together for three years [and want out].” While it may seem counterintuitive that someone who has spent decades in a marriage would decide to end it late in life, given the emotional trauma and financial risk involved, O’Connor said she sees certain common threads in such decisions. “People will stick together for their kids, so they wait until they’re older because they don’t want [a divorce] to affect their children,” she said. “And divorce is more accepted now.” Or there’s the realization that time is short and people don’t want to live out the rest of their days in an unhappy home, O’Connor said. “I’ve had many people tell me, ‘I’ve
put up with this failed marriage just until my kids get out of college,’” Bardi said. Roessler has come to understand why so many clients choose that route. “People that are 50 feel like they’re 40. People that are 60 feel like they’re 50. And people are living longer. People are in better shape,” she said. “If the finances are in order and they have amassed enough wealth that they think, ‘I can split this baby in half and still live a fairly comfortable lifestyle,’ there are a lot of folks who are going to take that option in order to be free, in order to be more independent.” Oftentimes a stimulus for divorce comes from one spouse feeling that the other spouse is no longer making an equal contribution to the marriage because, for example, they took early retirement, she added. “And as much as a couple would say we always knew that so-and-so would take the early retirement package, that starts to create resentment on the part of the other person who may still be working at age 60 while the other one retired at 55,” Roessler said. On the flip side, she said a working parent may begin to feel resentment
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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In the News after the children have grown up and the spouse who took care of the kids for years now has all sorts of free time. “The other person feels they’re doing all the work because they’re still working,” Roessler said. “It’s sad, but when the attitude starts to creep in that ‘I’m doing more than you,’ in my experience that is where that first crack [in the marriage] forms.”
Division of assets Chapter 208, §34, governs how assets and debts are divided in a divorce. In a gray divorce, there are unique factors that could bear on what a court deems to be an “equitable” division of marital assets, Roessler said. While generally there is a presumption under the statute that there will be a 50-50 split of assets, there are certain factors in gray divorces that might tip that scale, one being the health of the parties. “You might have a situation where one of the parties has severe mental health issues to the extent that that person has been hospitalized,” Roessler said. “That all costs a lot of money. If that’s been part of the marital history where somebody has severe depression, is bipolar or both, that is going to potentially tip the scales against a 50-50 split, knowing that once this person gets divorced, they will likely continue to experience hospitalizations requiring significant funds up until the time they get into Medicare.” O’Connor noted that in divorce cases involving couples approaching retirement age, the home frequently is the principal marital asset. “Post-COVID, we’ve seen property prices skyrocket,” she said. “We might have [a couple] in a $1.5 million home with no mortgage. Homes are very emotional for people. [One of the spouses] might want to stay in that home, but they can’t actually financially afford that home in regard to a buyout, or even paying taxes on it.” Representing a client in a gray divorce entails an element of retirement planning: ensuring the parties have sufficient assets to cover future expenses for health care and/or long-term care facili8
ties, O’Connor added. “All of those things have to be taken into consideration, whenever anyone who is getting up there in age and getting close to retirement,” she said. “Especially if retirement is right around the corner, somebody could live for another 20 years and potentially come out on the very short end of the stick if it’s not done correctly.” Estate planning also comes into play. “We’ve had a number of cases where our older clients have either gone through or are in the middle of a divorce when one of the [parties] dies,” O’Connor said. “That can change things incredibly. So, you need to make sure as you’re going through [the divorce], you’re getting all the estate plans up to date. Everything that’s so important in any divorce becomes even more important when you’re dealing with someone who’s older in age.” While child custody generally isn’t an issue, Roessler said it is not unusual for people in long-term marriages to have adult children who are disabled. “Making sure that, at the end of the day, there’s enough money for that adult [special needs] child is going to be part of this conversation,” she said. “That means you’re not necessarily splitting [marital assets] two ways; you’re splitting it three ways.” In such an event, Roessler said provisions will need to be made for the continued funding of a third-party caretaker or long-term living facility. Those provisions might include taking out funds equally from both sides of the parties’ asset division to set up trusts for the child. Other issues arise when one of the spouses has been the adult child’s primary caretaker. “Number 1, is that going to be the sustained method of care for this child even if the parent is 75 years old? Do we have a backup plan for this?” she said.
Extended alimony? The Massachusetts Alimony Reform Act establishes a presumptive termination date for alimony when the payor spouse reaches full retirement age as de-
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
fined by the Social Security Act, which for most people is 67. While that acts as a presumptive ceiling, the Massachusetts statute also sets alimony duration according to length of the marriage. However, G.L.c. 208, §49(f)(1), allows a court to “set a different alimony termination date for good cause shown; provided, however, that in granting deviation, the court shall enter written findings of the reasons for deviation.” Bardi said an example of a particular problem involves situations in which a husband is the wage earner while the wife has taken care of the children. “If he’s older than her, he’s going to reach Social Security retirement age before she does, and he also may retire,” Bardi said. “Where is she going to get alimony from? So, you may have to consider a disproportionate distribution of the marital estate if the husband has greater earning potential, or the wife is relying upon the husband to support her.” According to Roessler, judges recently have been more aggressive in using Section 49 to extend alimony obligations for professionals such as doctors, lawyers and accountants. “They are betting on the fact that these folks are not going to retire at the retirement age of 67,” Roessler said. “They are preemptively setting different [alimony termination dates] and/or advising people at pretrial conferences that they would consider setting a different alimony termination date.” Roessler said judges have typically cited the health of the payee spouse as justification for extending the obligation to pay alimony. Years ago, Roessler represented a husband in a divorce case that involved a dispute over his ongoing obligation to pay alimony. The husband had retired at 62 pursuant to his employer’s mandatory retirement policy. “The judge did not find that persuasive and said, ‘Sir, your retirement age is 67. You’re only 62. You need to go out and get a job,’” Roessler recounted. “He was ordered to continue to pay alimony to his wife, who was also the primary caretaker of their adult disabled child.” TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
In the News
Monthly Memo Child welfare law clarified in parental rights denial
Record supports decision terminating mother’s parental rights
Parental rights order remanded to consider fictive kin placement
MINNEAPOLIS, MN — In a precedential opinion filed Aug. 31, the Minnesota Court of Appeals clarified application of the Minnesota African American Family Preservation and Child Welfare Disproportionality Act (MAAFPA). It affirmed the termination of a father’s parental rights with respect to three minor children. In May 2021, the father arranged to meet the children’s mother while attempting to see the children. During the encounter, he demanded money from her and took out a gun. After the mother drove to a gas station and attempted to contact police, the father followed her inside and shot her seven times. Two of the children remained in the vehicle nearby and were believed to have heard the gunshots. The mother suffered significant injuries but survived.
RICHMOND, VA — Where it was in the best interests of a 16-year-old female who is autistic, non-verbal and suffers from epilepsy to have her mother’s parental rights terminated, because of the mother’s intellectual limitations following a traumatic brain injury, the decision was affirmed. Angela Young appeals the circuit court’s decision to terminate her residual parental rights. The circuit court found that because of plaintiff’s intellectual limitations, she would be unable to ever substantially correct the conditions resulting in the neglect of K.Y., a 16-year-old female who is autistic, non-verbal and suffers from epilepsy. Plaintiff does not challenge the prior adjudication of abuse or neglect. Instead, she takes issue with the court’s termination of her parental rights because, she argues, there were other remedies to her intellectual limitations besides termination.
DETROIT, MI — Where a respondent’s parental rights to her four children were terminated, a remand must be ordered because the court did not properly consider one child’s placement with fictive kin. “Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her four children, K1, K2, K3, and K4, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (c) (i), and (j). A preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of K1, K2, and K3. With respect to K4, because the court did not properly consider this child’s placement with fictive kin, the order terminating respondent’s parental rights to this child is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further consideration of K4’s best interests. …
BridgeTower Media Newswires
Husband held in contempt for failing to pay wife $190,000 RICHMOND, VA. — Where husband argued that his wife did not establish that he owed her $190,000 under their divorce decree, this argument was rejected. The circuit court determined that wife’s testimony of nonpayment was more credible than husband, and this court was bound by that credibility determination. W. Graham Arader, III appeals the circuit court’s order finding him in contempt for not making monthly payments to Valli H. Arader under their 2001 divorce decree. Husband argues that wife’s testimony was too vague and uncorroborated to show $190,000 in missed monthly payments. “It is well established that the trier of fact ascertains a witness’ credibility, determines the weight to be given to their testimony, and has the discretion to accept or reject any of the witness’ testimony.” BridgeTower Media Newswires
TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
BridgeTower Media Newswires
Discovery orders in contempt proceeding not immediately appealable
BridgeTower Media Newswires
MI court vacates in part and remands divorce, custody judgement
COLUMBIA, SC — Family court orders barring discovery in a post-divorce contempt proceeding are interlocutory and cannot be immediately appealed, even when the requested discovery may be important to resolving a complex financial dispute. The South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, leaving him to challenge the discovery rulings after resolution of the underlying contempt proceeding. The parties divorced in 2020 under a marital settlement agreement that transferred to the defendant a 40% interest in an elder-care business along with its assets and liabilities. The plaintiff later filed a contempt action alleging the defendant violated the agreement by improperly attributing business income to him, shifting tax liabilities and continuing to use a credit card in his name for business expenses.
DETROIT — Where a default judgment of divorce has been challenged on appeal, the trial court failed to make the requisite findings to support its award of sole custody of the minor children to the plaintiff. Vacated in part and remanded. “Defendant appeals as of right a default judgment of divorce. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to set aside the default on the basis that defendant failed to establish good cause. Defendant further asserts that the trial court made insufficient factual findings on the issues of the equitable division of the marital property and child custody. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to set aside the default or in its division of marital property and debts. However, the trial court failed to make the requisite findings to support its award of sole custody of the minor children to plaintiff. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. …
BridgeTower Media Newswires
BridgeTower Media Newswires
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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Family Law Digest IN THE MATTER OF NICHOLAS MALLOY
IN RE J.B. AND B.B.
Guardianship; jurisdiction; death
Final judgment; non-final order; guardianship
No. 568, September Term 2025 Argued before: Zic, Kehoe, Eyler, James (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Zic, J.
No. 2348, September Term 2025 Argued before: Ripken, Kehoe, Sharer (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Sharer, J.
Filed: July 16, 2026
Filed: July 10, 2026
The Appellate Court vacated the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s judgment against a court-appointed guardian for an elderly man. The circuit court lacked jurisdiction to continue the guardianship proceedings following the elderly man’s death.
WAYNE O. COX II V. KIM D. COX Monetary award; equity; retirement accounts No. 223, September Term 2025 Argued before: Tang, Kehoe, Raker (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Kehoe, J. Filed: July 21, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s monetary award of 65 percent of the net equity in the marital home, vacant lot and condominium unit to wife; division of the parties’ retirement accounts and requirement that husband pay 75 percent of wife’s attorney’s fees.
ANDRE GODDARD V. TIMEKA LOCKLEY Physical custody; domestic violence; access No. 2425, September Term 2025 Argued before: Graeff, Leahy, Friedman, JJ. Opinion by: Graeff, J.
The Appellate Court dismissed father’s appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City’s order declaring “Father is no longer a party in this matter,” after father failed to file exceptions to the Department of Social Services of Baltimore City’s petitions for guardianship of two minor siblings, with the right to consent to adoption or long term care short of adoption, and its denial of father’s motion for reconsideration of that order. Neither order is a final judgment.
JEREMY MCCULLOUGH V. SHIANN PRICE MUHAMMAD Custody; evidence; sufficiency No. 2248, September Term 2025 Argued before: Wells, C.J; Graeff, Berger, JJ. Opinion by: Berger, J. Filed: July 10, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore City Circuit Court’s order, which concluded there was insufficient evidence to determine what custody arrangement would be in the minor child’s best interest. The only evidence that the circuit court had regarding father’s relationship with the minor was that they had not seen each other in two years and there was evidence of violence between father and mother.
Filed: July 10, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Frederick County Circuit Court’s order granting mother sole legal and primary physical custody of the minor child, with no specified access schedule until father made progress in therapy. The circuit court found the child had been exposed to domestic violence by father, and the record supports this factual finding.
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Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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Family Law Digest IN RE S.A. Permanency; visits; refusal Nos. 1755 & 2513, September Term 2025 Argued before: Leahy, Albright, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ Opinion by: Albright, J. Filed: July 9, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s orders changing the permanency plan goals, eliminating the trial home visit and permitting the minor to decline visits with mother on a visit-by-visit basis. The circuit court had substantial evidence that minor would not be safe in mother’s home.
CHASTITY JONES V. RONALD LIVESAY Extrinsic fraud; custody order; evidence No. 2170, September Term 2025 Argued before: Shaw, Zic, Eyler, Deborah (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Shaw, J. Filed: July 8, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Carroll County Circuit Court’s denial of a motion to reconsider and vacate a 2016 custody order. Although appellant contended that appellees committed extrinsic fraud by knowingly using a false P.O. Box address to bypass service on appellant, a return of service showed appellant was served with a summons, the custody complaint and the accompanying judge’s order on Oct. 29, 2015, and that appellant filed an answer on March 3, 2016, effectively waiving any objection she may have had.
ARMELLE S. FRANKLIN V. CRAIG ANTHONY OSBOURNE Modification; motion to dismiss; hearing No. 2055, September Term 2025 Argued before: Graeff, Leahy, Ripken, JJ. Opinion by: Leahy, J.
because mother did not respond to father’s motion (and thus did not request a hearing), Rule 2-311(f) empowered the court to resolve father’s motion to dismiss on the papers and without a hearing.
GRAYSON MAXWELL V. KIMBERLY MAXWELL Custody; child support; evidence No. 2034, September Term 2025 Argued before: Berger, Tang, Wright (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Berger, J. Filed: July 8, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Cecil County Circuit Court’s denial of father’s motion to vacate the court’s prior orders – regarding custody of the parties’ minor child and child support – because of alleged fraud, mistake or irregularity. Absent allegations of extrinsic fraud by mother in either the custody and visitation or the child support proceedings, the circuit court did not err by denying father’s motion to vacate.
KEVIN HENDERSON V. ASHLEY HENDERSON Enrolled judgment; extrinsic fraud; irregularity Nos. 2146, September Term 2025 Argued before: Nazarian, Arthur, Sharer (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Arthur, J. Filed: July 6, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s denial of husband’s motion to revise a protective order entered four years earlier. His assertions, if true, might establish that wife and her attorney persuaded the court to enter a judgment that was based on a false factual premise, but they do not establish the kind of extrinsic fraud that is required before a court may revise an enrolled judgment. And husband did not show that there was an “irregularity” within the narrow meaning of that term in Rule 2-535(b).
Filed: July 7, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of mother’s modification of custody request without a hearing. Because father’s motion to dismiss the request did not seek a hearing, and TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 9 (2026) Guardianship; jurisdiction; death
In the matter of Nicholas Malloy No. 568, September Term 2025 Argued before: Zic, Kehoe, Eyler, James (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Zic, J. Filed: July 16, 2026 The Appellate Court vacated the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s judgment against a court-appointed guardian for an elderly man. The circuit court lacked jurisdiction to continue the guardianship proceedings following the elderly man’s death.
This dispute arises from guardianship proceedings in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Following an initial guardianship hearing concerning Nicholas Molloy, the court appointed Verna Wright, appellant, as the guardian of Mr. Molloy’s person and Bryan Bishop, Esq., appellee, as the guardian of Mr. Molloy’s property. Shortly after the first status hearing, Mr. Molloy passed away. The court nevertheless proceeded with a second status hearing, held a disposition hearing, and entered a judgment against Ms. Wright in the amount of $83,438.03. Ms. Wright timely filed an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Ms. Wright presents two questions, which we have recast as one and rephrased as follows:1 Pursuant to § 13-221 of the Estates & Trusts (“ET”) Article of the Maryland Code (1974, 2022 Repl. Vol.), did the circuit court have jurisdiction to continue guardianship proceedings after Mr. Molloy’s death? For the following reasons, we vacate the court’s decision and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. BACKGROUND
In January 2024, Adult Protective Services (“APS”)2 petitioned the circuit court to establish a guardianship on behalf of Mr. Molloy, citing possible financial abuse by his attorney-in-fact, Ms. Wright.3 At the time, Mr. Molloy was 84 years old and had been diagnosed with Severe Major Neurocognitive Disorder due to Alzheimer’s disease. According to Ms. Wright, in 2023, Mr. Molloy asked her to provide him with full-time, in-home caregiving services, for which he agreed to pay Ms. Wright $5,000 per month. Ms. Wright’s counsel filed an answer to APS’ petition, averring that 12
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Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. there were no issues with her appointment as Mr. Molloy’s attorney-in-fact, that APS previously made no findings of financial abuse, and that Mr. Molloy was “content with the current arrangement. . . .” The circuit court held an initial guardianship hearing on May 17, 2024, during which Mr. Bishop raised concerns of financial discrepancies uncovered in his preliminary review of Mr. Molloy’s accounts. He stated that “in August [] 2023, Mr. Molloy either closed out or partially liquidated an investment account” in the amount of $185,000. The Department averred that Ms. Wright then deposited the same amount into a joint account, and over a nine-month period, the joint account dwindled in size to $22,000. Although Mr. Bishop “ha[d] some documentation from Ms. Wright” to validate expenditures made from funds in the joint account, he “need[ed] a lot more” to understand how the remaining amount spent during this period—or approximately $163,000—was used to cover Mr. Molloy’s expenses. The court ultimately appointed Ms. Wright the guardian of Mr. Molloy’s person and Mr. Bishop the guardian of his property, and scheduled a status hearing to revisit Mr. Bishop’s concerns. At the first status hearing on September 3, 2024, Mr. Bishop told the circuit court that Ms. Wright provided him with “more bank records, [and] more information” including “receipts and [her] handwritten notes regarding paying sitters and care providers[,]” but that he was still “about $40,000 short” of understanding “how all the cash was spent.” He requested more time to parse through Mr. Molloy’s financial records and to collect any additional missing receipts from Ms. Wright. The court then scheduled a second status hearing; however, on September 8, 2024, Mr. Molloy passed away. Mr. Molloy’s court-appointed counsel filed a “Suggestion of Death” approximately 40 days after Mr. Molloy’s passing and requested that the guardianship be terminated.4 At the second status hearing on November 4, 2024, Mr. Bishop stated that he “ha[d] not received anything else from Ms. Wright in terms of additional expenses or additional receipts or additional documents to . . . understand [the financial] discrepancy” he had identified at the first status hearing. Ms. Wright told the court that she believed Mr. Bishop’s audit omitted certain expenses because, after Mr. Molloy’s death, she did not “go through everything [Mr. Bishop gave her] to see what was missing.” The court instructed Ms. Wright to submit documentation to Mr. Bishop, told her not to open Mr. Molloy’s estate,5 and set a date for a disposition hearing. At the disposition hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment against Ms. Wright, finding: [W]ith the deficit of $22,950.75 and with the fact TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
that this [c]ourt does not believe that Ms. Wright earned nor deserved the $5,000 in a [monthly] stipend that she was paying to herself which would come to a total of $45,000, while the [c]ourt does not believe this is a hundred percent of everything that is missing because there’s just too much that this [c]ourt can’t follow a trail on, the [c]ourt is confident that at a minimum that Ms. Wright should reinstate the estate, should reimburse the estate of Mr. Nicholas Molloy in the amount of $67,950.75. And so the [c]ourt therefore will instruct that a judgment be entered . . . against Ms. Wright in that amount and that that judgment begin to earn interest at the legal rate. On the hearing sheet, the court increased the judgment amount against Ms. Wright to $83,438.03. Ms. Wright filed a motion to alter or amend, which the court denied. She then noted the instant appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When an action has been tried without a jury, [we] will review the case on both the law and the evidence.” Md. Rule 8-131(c). “[W]here the order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, [the reviewing c]ourt must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392 (2002) (quotation omitted). Importantly, because questions regarding jurisdiction are treated as questions of law, we “review de novo whether a trial court interpreted a jurisdictional statute correctly.” Pilkington v. Pilkington, 230 Md. App, 561, 581 (2016) (citation omitted). DISCUSSION
I. The Circuit Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Continue The Guardianship Proceedings After Mr. Molloy’s Death. A. The Parties’ Arguments We first address the threshold jurisdictional issue raised by Ms. Wright. Citing to Battley v. Banks, 177 Md. App. 638 (2007), Ms. Wright contends that the circuit court’s decision to continue the guardianship proceedings after Mr. Molloy’s death exceeded the scope of the court’s statutory authority in ET § 13-221(b)(2). Ms. Wright also asserts that Mr. Bishop, as Mr. Molloy’s guardian of property, abrogated his duty to petition the court to terminate the guardianship per Maryland Rule 10-710(b). In response, Mr. Bishop argues that the circuit court did not err in continuing guardianship proceedings after Mr. Molloy’s death because, “[a]lthough Mr. Molloy died, the court still wanted the audit to be completed[.]” Mr. Bishop also asserts that “[a]ll that was being attended to [at the second status hearing and disposition hearing] was the finalizing of the audit[,]” and therefore, that “[i]t was appropriate for [the] court to continue the matter as to finalize this issue[,] which it TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
had initiated.” Mr. Bishop does not cite to any legal authority for these contentions. B. Legal Framework Central to this appeal is whether the circuit court had jurisdiction, pursuant to ET § 13-221(b)(2), to continue guardianship proceedings after Mr. Molloy’s death. When interpreting a statute, “[o]ur goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature and we begin that exercise by reviewing the statutory language itself.” Comptroller of Maryland v. FC-GEN Operations Invs. LLC, 482 Md. 343, 379 (2022) (quotation omitted). The plain meaning of the statute’s language is read “as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.” Id. (quotation omitted). Moreover, “[i]f the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written without resorting to other rules of construction.” Id. at 379-80 (quotation omitted). Applicable here, ET § 13-221(b)(2) provides that “[a] guardianship proceeding shall terminate on[] . . . [t]he death or presumptive death of the minor or disabled person[.]” We discern no ambiguity in this language: upon the death of a ward, the guardianship must terminate. It follows from the plain meaning of this provision that, by operation of law, a court’s statutory jurisdiction to continue guardianship proceedings dissolves after a ward dies. See Barnes v. State ex rel. Pinkney, 236 Md. 564, 574 (1964) (citations omitted) (recognizing that “the word ‘shall’ of itself demonstrates a mandatory intent unless the context indicates otherwise”). Furthermore, the plain meaning of ET § 13-221(b)(2) is consistent with the general purpose of guardianship proceedings, which is “to protect those who, because of illness or other disability, are unable to care for themselves.” Matter of Meddings, 244 Md. App. 204, 220 (2019) (quoting Kicherer v. Kicherer, 285 Md. 114, 118-19 (1979)). The protective purpose of guardianship proceedings necessarily becomes moot after the ward’s death.6 We also briefly address Ms. Wright’s reliance on Battley to guide the circuit court on remand. In Battley, this Court held that the circuit court did not have authority to permit a guardian to pay himself “commissions from the former guardianship account before turning over that account to” the personal representative. 177 Md. App. at 655. This particular holding, however, was abrogated in 2010 by House Bill 328, which amended ET § 13-214 to permit a “guardian to pay from the guardianship estate all commissions, fees, and expenses of the guardianship before the balance of the guardianship is paid out to the personal representative or other person entitled to it.” Comm. Note to Md. Rule 10-710(f); 2010 Md. Laws, ch. 545. Thus, a person entitled to compensation may be paid the balance before the matter is transferred to the appropriate Orphans’ Court, but ET § 13-214 as amended does not affect Battley’s determination that “all [of a] ward’s property becomes the assets of [the] decedent estate[.]” 177 Md. App. at 651. As explained above, given the plain meaning of ET 13Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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221(b)(2), we hold that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to continue the guardianship proceedings following Mr. Molloy’s death. We are nonetheless troubled by the notion that Mr. Molloy’s death halted investigation into alleged financial abuse by one of his court-appointed guardians. At oral argument before this Court, Ms. Wright’s counsel conceded that additional legal proceedings may not be barred. For example, the Statute Against Financial Exploitation (“SAFE Act”), enacted by the General Assembly in 2021 and codified at ET §§ 13-601–609, “creates a civil cause of action through which a victim of financial exploitation, or a representative of such a victim, may file a civil lawsuit to obtain compensatory damages and other relief from the exploiter.” Bailey v.
Happer, 268 Md. App. 618, 625 (2026) cert. denied, Pet. No. 16, slip op. at 2, 2026 WL 1587483, at *1 (Table). Thus, despite our vacatur here, additional legal avenues may be available to further examine any possible financial abuse. CONCLUSION
We hold that, as a matter of law, ET § 13-221(b) terminates guardianship proceedings upon the ward’s death. Accordingly, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to continue guardianship proceedings following Mr. Molloy’s death.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.
FOOTNOTES
1
Ms. Wright phrased the questions as follows: 1.
Did the [c]ircuit [c]ourt err in failing to recognize the ward’s valid power of attorney, and in continuing the guardianship proceedings after the ward’s death?
2.
Did the [c]ircuit [c]ourt err in entering judgment against Ms. Wright by rescinding her contractually earned wages of $45,000, then adding it to the judgment amount and for failing to provide credit for actual expenses incurred on behalf of [Mr. Molloy]?
2
APS is a program within the Prince George’s County Department of Social Services (“Department”). See Adult Services, PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND, available at https://perma.cc/KTQ4-CST3.
3
The Department averred that, on December 1, 2023, Helen Campbell, who was in a relationship with Mr. Molloy and was designated as his attorney-in-fact, made a referral to the Department alleging financial exploitation of Mr. Molloy by Ms. Wright. On the same day, Mr. Molloy signed a “Supplemental Durable General Power of Attorney[,]” which declared Ms. Wright to be his attorney-in-fact.
4
Neither Mr. Bishop nor Ms. Wright petitioned to terminate the guardianship within the 45-day timeline prescribed in Maryland Rule 10-710(b).
5
Ms. Wright is also the personal representative of Mr. Molloy’s estate.
6
Indeed, after a ward’s death, a “fiduciary shall file a petition requesting the court to terminate the estate.” Md. Rule 10-710(b). The court must then enter a show cause order. Md. Rule 10-710(g). As we read this Rule, the show cause requirement functions to force prompt resolution of disputes to termination. The absence of a show cause order does not revive guardianship proceedings that have otherwise become moot by operation of law.
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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 9 (2026) Monetary award; equity; retirement accounts
Wayne O. Cox II v. Kim D. Cox No. 223, September Term 2025 Argued before: Tang, Kehoe, Raker (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Kehoe, J. Filed: July 21, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s monetary award of 65 percent of the net equity in the marital home, vacant lot and condominium unit to wife; division of the parties’ retirement accounts and requirement that husband pay 75 percent of wife’s attorney’s fees.
Appellant, Wayne O. Cox, II (“Dr. Cox”), appeals from the Judgment of Absolute Divorce issued by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on March 20, 2025. In the Judgment of Absolute Divorce, the court granted Appellee, Kim D. Cox (“Ms. Guyton”),1 a monetary award, divided the parties’ retirement accounts, and ordered Dr. Cox to pay 75% of Ms. Guyton’s attorney’s fees. Dr. Cox presents three questions for our review: 1. Whether the circuit court erred in awarding a monetary award to [Ms. Guyton] in the amount of $559,676.86 that includes amounts equal to 65% of the net equities of the parties’ real property. 2. Whether the circuit court erred when it ordered [Dr. Cox] to pay 75% of [Ms. Guyton’s] legal fees. 3. Whether the circuit court erred in its division of [Dr. Cox’s] military retirement accounts and requiring [Dr. Cox] to pay the cost of [Ms. Guyton’s] survivor benefits through [the Federal Employee Retirement System (“FERS”)] and the military Survivor Benefit Plan. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the trial court did not err and thus we affirm the judgments of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The parties married on March 29, 1991. During their marriage, Dr. Cox served in the Marines, reaching the rank of Lieutenant Colonel before his retirement on May 31, 2013. During Dr. Cox’s military service, the parties moved TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. frequently depending on where he was posted. Ms. Guyton was primarily involved with taking care of the parties’ three children,2 but she was also active in officers’ wives clubs and held part-time jobs. After he retired, Dr. Cox began receiving military retirement payments as well as Veterans Affairs (“VA”) disability payments, and obtained civilian employment with the Federal government. In 2017, Ms. Guyton began working full time. The parties separated in 2022, but continued living together. In November of 2023, Dr. Cox filed a complaint for wrongful detainer, resulting in Ms. Guyton being evicted from the marital home. Ms. Guyton filed for divorce on December 6, 2023. A merits hearing was held on October 7, 2024. Ms. Guyton testified that Dr. Cox was financially abusive. According to Ms. Guyton, the parties had a joint checking account early in their marriage, but Dr. Cox closed that account and began putting his paychecks in a separate account, claiming that Ms. Guyton was not responsible with money. He then gave her $500 each month to use for household groceries, gasoline, and clothing for herself and the children. “Whatever I needed, he told me to use it out of that money. And if I spent more than that, too bad.” If Ms. Guyton needed additional money, Dr. Cox would tell her to get a job. When childcare was needed to allow Ms. Guyton to work, Dr. Cox told her that expense needed to come out of her own paycheck. In 1994, Dr. Cox stopped giving Ms. Guyton an allowance “because he said [she] was ungrateful.” Ms. Guyton then maintained parttime employment, earning between $109 every two weeks and $150 every week. Ms. Guyton “struggle[d] with making payments on everything” and amassed “severe credit card debt because that’s what [she] was living on.” In 2010, Dr. Cox put a $100,000 down payment on the marital home, using money he had saved from his paychecks. In 2011, Dr. Cox purchased a vacant lot for $59,000 in cash, using “[s]avings from [his] military pay.” As mentioned above, Ms. Guyton began working full-time in 2017 and testified that her yearly salary at the time of the merits hearing was $117,000. Dr. Cox’s yearly salary from employment was $153,336. He also received $6,026 per month in military retirement and $4,078.99 per month in disability payments through the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. The parties owned multiple pieces of real property. A timeshare in Las Vegas, Nevada and a house in Slidell, Louisiana were jointly titled. The parties agreed that these properties would be sold and the equity divided between them equally. The remaining properties were titled solely in Dr. Cox’s name. These properties consist of the marital home Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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in Brandywine, Maryland, a vacant lot adjoining the marital home, and a condominium unit in Salisbury, Maryland. The parties agreed that these properties were marital assets, and agreed on their fair market values. The parties disagreed concerning what percentage of Dr. Cox’s military retirement benefits should be considered marital property. Ms. Guyton argued that it was 100% marital, and Dr. Cox argued that it was only 95% marital because he enlisted in the Marines prior to the marriage. Dr. Cox testified that he was on active duty for short periods prior to the marriage, beginning in 1988. Ms. Guyton testified that Dr. Cox’s active duty service did not begin until 1992. In addition to the parties’ testimony, several documents related to Dr. Cox’s military service were admitted into evidence, which we shall describe in more detail below. Dr. Cox asserted for the first time on the day of the merits hearing that his PenFed Credit Union checking account was entirely non-marital. He testified that he opened the account in December 2023,3 and the only money deposited in the account was his VA disability payments, which the parties agreed are not marital income. He admitted that the initial funds used to open the account were from his USAA Federal Savings Bank checking account, into which deposits had been made from both marital and non-marital sources. However, he asserted that the amount of the initial funds for the PenFed account, $7,905.02, was equal to the last two disability payments deposited into the USAA account, thus making those funds directly traceable to a non-marital source. No PenFed bank statements were admitted into evidence. The court rendered its decision from the bench on December 5, 2024. It relied on the documentary evidence to conclude that the portion of Dr. Cox’s active duty service that was used to calculate his retirement pay started after the parties married, making his military retirement pay entirely marital. The court also determined that the funds in Dr. Cox’s PenFed account were entirely marital property, due to the $7,905.02 check coming from an account that was “hopelessly commingled.” The court then valued the marital property, primarily relying on values the parties agreed to in their 9-207 joint property statement, and thoroughly addressed the factors found in Md. Code Ann. (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 8-205(b) of the Family Law Article (“FL”) before issuing a monetary award. We set out below the court’s findings under the statutory factors: I did have an opportunity to generally go over the factors, and I will indicate that in the -- first off, looking at number one, contributions, monetary and non-monetary, well, it’s obvious that both of them had some financial contributions to the family. Certainly the husband had quite a bit more financial contribution, but there were other contributions by the wife, including maintaining the home, helping with the kids, I guess supporting Mr. Cox while he moved up in his career, relocating several times to different locations, putting her career on hold, and the like. So I do find that there 16
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are significant contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, from both of them. And then there is the value of all the property. And so I’ll just refer again back to the 9-207 statement, and then I have to consider the economic circumstances of each party. And I do recognize that there is a large disparity in income between the two of them. Certainly, Mr. Cox makes far more money between his retirement, his military pay, his disability pay, and potential income as opposed to the flat income that Ms. Cox has. And then the circumstances that contribute to the estrangement of the parties, well, irreconcilable differences between the two of them, is what led to the breakdown over a number of years. No doubt, largely related to the finances of how the finances were handled, how each other felt in the marriage, where they believed they stood, and the fact that clearly there was a view that they were not on equal footing. The duration of the marriage was 33 years. And then I considered the age of each party. I considered the physical and mental condition of each party. There was no testimony that the wife had any disabilities about her, so I found her to be in good health. However, there was testimony from the husband where he provided a string of, I guess, physical ailments that he has that has been identified through the military as disabilities for the purpose of calculating disability pay. So while he does have a number of things that could be technically called disabilities by and through the military, the [c]ourt does not find that any of them prevent him from living his daily life, moving about, working, going to church, or anything like running a business or, you know, anything like that. And then there is, I took into consideration the marital property, what little joint marital property there was, with largely most of it in the name of the husband. . . . And then I have to take into consideration the contribution by either party to property owned -- acquired between them. And I’ll go back to the findings that I made of financial and monetary, and non-monetary contributions. Both of them have contributed financially. There have been purchases of varying properties and things within the home, which surely included some portion of Ms. Cox’s income. But looking at at least the sample bank statement I have, things are so intermingled. I mean, you can’t tell from what, and certainly her money was used to do other things in the home, which freed up his money to purchase things. So that’s kind of how that may work. And then the award of any alimony, again as I noted before, right now Ms. Cox is getting $1,500 per month, and the agreement is that she’ll TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
continue to get that $1,500 per month until the other benefits happen to kick in. . . . And so having gone through those factors as I’m required to, now, I have to state that in looking over this case, and looking at the 9-207 statement, and looking at the [USAA account statements], I have to say that I have never seen a more inequitably divided marriage that has been going on for 25 years during my time on the bench. The husband has maintained complete control over all major assets, either by way of separate bank accounts, by way of having property titled individually just in his name. And frankly, from the view of this [c]ourt, all while basically kind of throwing a few crumbs in the direction of the wife during the course of the marriage. It’s no doubt a case of, in my view, financial abuse, which, based on the uncontroverted testimony, had to result in some level of emotional abuse as well on Ms. Cox. The court calculated the monetary award of $559,676.86 by granting Ms. Guyton 65% of the net equity of the real properties titled solely in Dr. Cox’s name and 50% of the remaining marital property.4 The court also ordered that Dr. Cox be responsible for the cost of the survivor benefits through both the FERS and Dr. Cox’s military retirement. Dr. Cox noted this timely appeal. DISCUSSION
I.
Monetary Award
In Maryland, the division of marital property between the parties must be fair and equitable. Brewer v. Brewer, 156 Md. App. 77, 105 (2004). Such division need not be equal. Id. This division may lead to a transfer in ownership of property or a monetary award to adjust the equities. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 519 (2008); FL § 8-205(a)(1) (“[T]he court may transfer ownership of an interest in property . . . , grant a monetary award, or both, as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property[.]”). [A] trial court may grant a monetary award after a three-step venture: first, the trial court identifies the marital property; second, the trial court determines the value of the marital property; and third, the trial court makes an award if it determines that distribution of the marital property according to title would be inequitable. Ledbetter v. Ledbetter, 255 Md. App. 1, 2 (2022). Determinations of whether property is marital and the value of marital property “are both factual questions that we review for clear error.” Sims v. Sims, 266 Md. App. 337, 353 (2025) (citing Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 521). The court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and the “ultimate decision to grant a monetary award, as well as its amount, for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 354 (citing Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 521). Dr. Cox presents two arguments which challenge the court’s monetary award. First, he argues that the court abused its discretion by awarding Ms. Guyton 65% of the net equity in TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
the marital home, vacant lot, and condominium unit. Second, he argues that the court’s finding that the PenFed account was marital property was clearly erroneous. We shall address these issues in reverse order. a. PenFed Account Dr. Cox argues that the court erred in finding that the initial deposit into the PenFed account was marital property.5 He notes that the court’s finding was based on various transfers that resulted in the VA disability payments being “mixed . . . in with all the other marital property,” but “[t]he bank account reflecting transfers . . . was the USAA . . . account and not the PenFed checking account.” FL § 8-201(e)(1) defines “marital property” as “the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage.” Excluded from this definition is property “acquired before the marriage,” “acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party,” “excluded by valid agreement” or “directly traceable to any of these sources.” FL § 8-201(e)(3). “The party seeking to demonstrate that particular property acquired during the marriage is nonmarital” has the burden to “trace the property to a nonmarital source.” Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 95 Md. App. 265, 283 (1993). Although this Court has stated that “[n]onmarital funds might rest with marital funds in a bank account for several days without commingling[,]” the funds must still be “directly traceable to a nonmarital source.” Id. at 284. “‘Directly traceable’ is not synonymous with ‘attributable.’” Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md. App. 180, 187 (1990). Where there is “no attempt to keep . . . non-marital income separate from . . . marital income” such that it can be directly traced, the funds are deemed commingled and therefore entirely marital property. Id. at 186–87. Here, the PenFed account was created during the marriage, meaning Dr. Cox had the burden of proving it was non-marital. The only evidence presented was statements from the USAA account, a check for $7,905.02 written from the USAA account and deposited into the PenFed account, and Dr. Cox’s testimony. This evidence supports the court’s conclusion that the initial deposit into the PenFed account was not directly traceable to a non-marital source. The USAA account was regularly funded using Dr. Cox’s VA disability payments as well as his military retirement and paychecks. Although the amount of the check used to open the PenFed account was equal to the amount of Dr. Cox’s two previous VA disability payments, the disability payments had been in the USAA account for several weeks when the check was written. During that time, many other deposits and withdrawals were made. Thus, although the $7,905.02 check could be considered attributable to the VA disability payments, there was no way to trace those funds directly. Further complicating the court’s ability to trace the source of the funds in the PenFed account was Dr. Cox’s failure to provide any bank statements from PenFed. The only evidence indicating the source of the additional deposits into that account was Dr. Cox’s testimony, which the court found to be “less than credible.” See Coviello v. Coviello, 91 Md. App. 638, 655 (1992) (“[T]he trier of fact is not bound to accept Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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the testimony of any witness even if it is uncontradicted.”). Thus, even if the court could have traced the check used to open the account directly to a non-marital source, there was insufficient evidence to trace those funds after the check was deposited. b. Monetary Award Dr. Cox next argues that the court abused its discretion by granting Ms. Guyton 65% of the net equity in the three properties titled solely in Dr. Cox’s name. He argues that the court placed too much weight on the income disparity between the parties and failed to consider that Ms. Guyton is five years younger than Dr. Cox and that he is a disabled veteran. “The purpose of the monetary award is to correct any inequity created by the way in which property acquired during the marriage happened to be titled.” Reichert v. Hornbeck, 210 Md. App. 282, 360 (2013) (quoting Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 349 (1995)). In determining the amount of the monetary award, the court must consider the statutory factors contained in FL § 8-205(b). These factors are: (1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made; (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the age of each party; (7) the physical and mental condition of each party; (8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both; (9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety; (10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and (11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both. FL § 8-205(b). After considering these factors, the court’s determination of the amount of the monetary award is discretionary. A discretionary “ruling will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling. Instead, the decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.” Augustin v. Duncan, 269 Md. App. 656, 678–79 (2026) (cleaned up) (quoting McAllister v. McAllister, 218 Md. App. 386, 400 (2014)). 18
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Here, the court explicitly discussed most of the factors and how they impacted its view of the equities. The court explained that it did not believe that dividing the real property equally would be equitable due to the current and historic financial disparity between the parties. In making this determination, the court considered the full financial picture, not merely income from employment. Furthermore, aside from three of the five pieces of real property owned by the parties, all other marital assets were divided evenly. The monetary award itself included the value of Dr. Cox’s bank accounts, totaling over $39,000. The court also ordered that various retirement accounts, totaling over $500,000, and the value of the jointly owned real properties be divided evenly between the parties. The parties did not agree on the value of the jointly owned real properties, but the lowest valuation indicated on the 9-207 Statement was $195,000. All together, the marital property that was distributed in the Judgment of Absolute Divorce was valued at $1,571,632.59. Between the monetary award and the division of retirement accounts and real property, Ms. Guyton was awarded $910,461.32, or 58% of the total marital assets. This percentage is more in line with Wasyluszko v. Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. 263, 282–83 (2021), in which this Court found no abuse of discretion in a 54/46 split of marital assets, than it is with cases such as Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 522 (vacating monetary award granting one party “almost 90% of the value of the marital property” without adequate explanation), or Long v. Long, 129 Md. App. 554, 577 (2000) (vacating award of “less than 20 percent of the marital assets to Wife” where the trial court’s analysis of the factors weighed in favor of Wife). The court made findings concerning the factors Dr. Cox emphasizes in his brief—the age of the parties and Dr. Cox’s disabilities. He does not argue that the court’s findings were clearly erroneous. Instead, he primarily requests that we reweigh the factors, giving these facts more weight than the court determined they deserved. We decline to do so. See Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 507 (1993) (“The application and weighing of the factors is left to the discretion of the trial court.”). The court’s decision was thoroughly explained based on the FL § 8-205(b) factors and was neither “well removed from any center mark imagined by [this C]ourt [nor] beyond the fringe of what [this C]ourt deems minimally acceptable.” See Augustin, 269 Md. App. at 679 (quoting McAllister, 218 Md. App. at 400). The court did not abuse its discretion. II. Division of Military Retirement Benefits a. Marital Portion Dr. Cox argues that the court erred in concluding that the entirety of his military retirement constituted marital property. He asserts that there was evidence indicating that a portion of his retirement benefits was based on military service he completed prior to the marriage. We review a court’s determination of whether property is marital or non-marital for clear error. Sims, 266 Md. App. at 353 (citing Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 521). In doing so, we “give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
judge the credibility of the witnesses[,]” Md. Rule 8-131(c), and to “weigh the various . . . documents each party brings to court[,]” Long, 129 Md. App. at 566. “On review, we ‘assume the truth of all evidence tending to support the findings of the trial court, and . . . simply inquire whether there is any evidence legally sufficient to support those findings.’” Id. at 566–67 (alteration in original) (quoting Skrabak v. Skrabak, 108 Md. App. 633, 650 (1996)). Dr. Cox testified that he began basic training on May 23, 1988, which was his first day of active duty. After three months of basic training, he was in reserves until early June 1990, when he went to Officer Candidate School. He graduated Officer Candidate School in August of 1990 and returned to reserves. Ms. Guyton testified that Dr. Cox was in basic training while they were still dating, but also stated that he did not enter active duty until 1992, after they were married. She at one point testified that Dr. Cox enlisted in 1992. Several documents were admitted into evidence relating to this issue, in addition to the parties’ testimony. The Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty (“Form DD-214”) indicated that Dr. Cox’s active duty started on January 31, 1992, and ended on May 31, 2013, when he retired. His “net active service this period” was 21 years, 4 months, and 3 days. It also provided that Dr. Cox had zero days of “prior active service.” His “total prior inactive service” was listed as three years, eight months, and five days. A letter from Defense Finance and Accounting Service was also admitted, which stated that Dr. Cox’s total service time was 25 years and 8 days. It calculated his retirement pay, however, based on 21 years, 10 months, and 17 days of eligible service time. There was no indication in the letter of the dates during which the eligible service time accrued. Dr. Cox also provided three documents representing orders to report for training and a release from training that pre-dated the marriage. An additional document indicated that he was ordered to report for active duty on July 17, 1992. There was no evidence or testimony indicating what type of military service is included as eligible service time for calculating retirement pay. In determining that Dr. Cox’s military retirement was
entirely marital, the court relied primarily on Form DD-214, which “shows that his active duty service started at some point after they were married.” The court further concluded that “the training was not included in the active duty that is used to calculate the retirement.” Without evidence clearly indicating that Dr. Cox’s retirement pay was calculated based partly on service that occurred prior to the marriage, the court did not err in relying on the dates indicated on Form DD-214 to find that Dr. Cox’s military retirement pay was entirely marital. b. Survivor Benefits Dr. Cox’s military retirement benefits include the option for survivor benefits, which pay a certain percentage of the regular payments received by Dr. Cox to designated survivors after his death. There is a fee associated with these benefits that is paid monthly. The court determined that Dr. Cox should pay this monthly fee.6 The court explained its reasoning for allocating this cost to Dr. Cox: “With respect to the survivor benefits, looking at the disparity in income and looking at, I think, what she’s lost financially over all these years, I find it more than equitable that you continue to pay the premium for the survivor benefits. I certainly find that you can afford it.” Dr. Cox notes that Ms. Guyton would be able to afford to pay the fee, and that the survivor benefits are solely for Ms. Guyton’s benefit. He therefore contends that the court abused its discretion by ordering that he pay the fee rather than Ms. Guyton. A trial court has discretion to allocate the cost of survivor benefits. Potts v. Potts, 142 Md. App. at 471–72; cf. Pleasant v. Pleasant, 97 Md. App. 711, 729 (1993) (“A determination that the cost of the survivor annuity is to be borne in full or in part by the employee is neither an abuse of discretion, nor an award of non-marital earnings.”). Here, the court explained its reasoning for the allocation of costs, based on “the disparity in income[,]” “what [Ms. Guyton has] lost financially over all these years,” and Dr. Cox’s ability to pay the costs. The court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Dr. Cox to pay the cost of the survivor benefits.7
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
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FOOTNOTES
1
Appellee was restored to her former name, Kim Denise Guyton, and therefore, we will address her as “Ms. Guyton” in this opinion.
2
One child is deceased. The other two are emancipated by age.
3
Dr. Cox initially testified that he opened the account in December of 2022. Based on his other testimony and the documentary evidence, it appears that he simply misspoke.
4
This amount was subject to change if the real properties were sold within four months of the judgment of absolute divorce, replacing the parties’ agreed fair market value of the properties with the actual net proceeds of the sale.
5
The court found that the entire balance of the PenFed account, $13,971.07, was marital property. However, Dr. Cox only challenges the court’s finding as to the $7,905.02 initial deposit.
6
The court also ordered that Dr. Cox pay the survivor benefit fee associated with his FERS benefits. Although the “Questions Presented” portion of Dr. Cox’s appellate brief mentions the FERS survivor benefits, he does not make a separate argument concerning these benefits in the “Argument” section of the brief. Because of this, and because the court did not make separate findings concerning the FERS survivor benefits cost, we shall consider both retirement plans’ benefits together.
7
Dr. Cox also argues that the court erred in ordering him to pay 75% of Ms. Guyton’s attorney’s fees. His argument for vacating this award is based solely on his separate arguments concerning the monetary award. See Sims, 266 Md. App. at 390 (“[W]here we vacate . . . a monetary award, alimony, or child support, we shall also vacate the attorney’s fees award.”). Because we affirm the court’s monetary award, we also affirm the attorney’s fees.
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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 9 (2026) Physical custody; domestic violence; access
Andre Goddard v. Timeka Lockley No. 2425, September Term 2025 Argued before: Graeff, Leahy, Friedman, JJ. Opinion by: Graeff, J. Filed: July 10, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Frederick County Circuit Court’s order granting mother sole legal and primary physical custody of the minor child, with no specified access schedule until father made progress in therapy. The circuit court found the child had been exposed to domestic violence by father, and the record supports this factual finding.
This case involves a child custody dispute between Andre Goddard (“Father”), appellant, and Timeka Lockley (“Mother”), appellee, regarding their children, Z. and A.1 On December 16, 2025, the Circuit Court for Frederick County issued an order granting Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of A., but the Court declined to provide a parenting time schedule for A. and Father. The court ordered Father to pay Mother monthly child support, support arrearages, and a portion of attorney’s fees, as well as half of the children’s Best Interest Attorney’s fees. On appeal, Father lists five issues for our review,2 which we have consolidated and rephrased into the following questions: 1. Did the circuit court err in granting Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of A., without granting Father access? 2. Did the circuit court err in its child support calculation? 3. Did the circuit court err in ordering Father to pay attorney’s fees to Mother and the children’s best interest attorney? For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and Mother are the parents of Z., born in June 2008, and A., born in February 2014.3 From the time Z. was born until she was approximately four years old, the parties did not live together. Father began co-parenting with Mother TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. when Z. was four years old. The parties were never married. They moved in together and lived with their children from 2013 to 2022, at which time Father evicted Mother from the family home. On March 5, 2022, Mother filed a petition for protection from domestic violence. She alleged that Father pushed his shoulder into Mother’s chest and she fell. On March 7, 2022, Father filed a Petition for Custody, requesting primary physical custody and joint legal custody of A.4 Father alleged that Mother was fiscally irresponsible and unable to provide a stable home for A. during the school year, and she had removed A. from the state without Father’s knowledge or consent on numerous occasions. On March 14, 2022, the court entered a final protective order by consent, without Father admitting the allegations in the petition or a judicial finding of abuse. The protective order was in effective through May 13, 2022. On March 23, 2022, the parties filed a joint motion, requesting the court to appoint a Best Interest Attorney (“BIA”) for the minor children. The parties requested a particular person as the BIA, but the court appointed a different person. The court ordered that the cost of the BIA would be paid by the parties, and the parties were to make an initial contribution of $3,000 toward the BIA’s fees. On April 15, 2022, Mother filed a counter-complaint, seeking sole legal and primary physical custody of A. and asking the court to order Father to pay child support. Mother alleged that Father had not played an active role in A.’s life and regularly denigrated Mother in front of the children. On April 18, 2022, the court granted the parties’ joint motion to consolidate the custody matter of Z., transferred from Washington County, with the case involving A. On April 26, 2022, the court granted the parties’ joint motion to reconsider the person appointed to serve as BIA and assign the person they suggested. The court ordered the parties to make an initial contribution of $3,000 towards the BIA’s fees, and that the costs of service would be paid by the parties, “the exact apportionment to be determined at a later date, after a hearing thereon, if necessary.” On August 5, 2022, Mother filed a motion to compel discovery, alleging that Father failed to adequately respond to her interrogatories and request for documents. Mother made various requests for relief, including compelling Father to respond, enforcing any and all sanctions, preventing Father from introducing evidence related to her request, and ordering Father to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees. Father opposed the motion, alleging that it failed to comply with Maryland Rule 2-432(b)(2) because it did not list the discovery request, what Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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response was given, and the reason why discovery should be compelled. On August 30, 2022, the circuit court denied Mother’s motion to compel discovery. I. Pendente Lite On September 1, 2022, a magistrate judge held a pendente lite hearing. Mother sought primary physical custody, with Father having supervised visitation, and child support. Father sought joint legal and physical custody. Based on the testimony, the magistrate found that Father had been verbally, physically, and/or emotionally abusive to Mother and the children. She found Mother to be a fit parent, whereas Father’s fitness was “questionable in light of his abusiveness towards [Mother] and the kids.” Although both parties were sincere in their requests, Father was aware of the children’s desire not to see him and did not give any consideration as to the underlying cause. The magistrate considered the children’s preference, which was to not see Father. The magistrate found that the parties lacked the ability to communicate and reach decisions together. Mother had a good relationship with the children, whereas Father’s relationship was significantly damaged. The magistrate recommended that Mother have sole legal and physical custody of the children and Father have therapeutic supervised visitation (“TSV”). Father and Mother filed separate exceptions to the magistrate’s recommendations. They subsequently filed a joint motion to withdraw their respective exceptions. On December 12, 2022, the court entered an amended pendente lite consent order awarding Mother primary physical custody of the children and Father weekly TSV. On January 26, 2023, the court issued a consent order for Father to participate in therapeutic supervised visitation at the Mental Health Association-Supervised Visitation Center “for the purpose of improving relationships within the family for the benefit of the parties’ minor child(ren).” II. Motions On February 23, 2023, the BIA filed an interim petition for attorney’s fees, requesting $10,990.40 as of January 21, 2023. The petition noted that Father paid the BIA $1,500 on May 24, 2022, and Mother made multiple payments totaling $4,543,60. The BIA requested that the court enter an order requiring the parties to pay her the remaining balance of $4,946.80. On March 21, 2023, the court ordered the parties to be jointly and severally liable to pay the BIA’s attorney’s fee. On May 28, 2024, the parties filed a joint motion to postpone the custody merits hearing set for May 29 and May 30, 2024. The motion alleged that the parties had agreed on specific interim access provisions and were close to some resolution in the matter. The court granted the request and set the matter for a two-day custody merits hearing after May 1, 2025. On July 9, 2024, the court entered a Consent Order providing that, on an interim basis, Mother would have primary physical custody of the children, and the parties 22
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would have joint legal custody, with Mother having tiebreaking authority. The court ordered Father to have TSV with the children once a week, and the BIA and the therapist would determine a progressive physical access schedule for Father on an interim basis. Father was to pay Mother child support of $2,408 per month. III. Merits Hearing On June 11, 2025, the court began the merits hearing. The BIA requested that the court speak with the children in chambers. Father objected, stating that the children had been controlled, trained, and mentally poisoned by Mother for three years, and it could be inferred that parental alienation had taken place. The BIA stated that the children wanted their voice to be heard, and she had repeatedly requested that Father reach out to the children, but he declined and refused to reach out to the children. Father alleged that Mother did not take the children to therapy, and he brought that up with the BIA, “[s]he was very ambivalent” and “[n]ever actually [took] action to make sure that the children follow the standard.” After hearing from the parties, the court found that it was appropriate to meet with the children, given their ages. During opening statements, Father requested a graduated schedule over a period of a year, until the parties reached shared custody, with a “two to three schedule” for A. and custody with Z. to be left at her discretion. Father also requested joint legal custody and attorney’s fees. Mother requested sole legal and primary physical custody, with Father having no access. Mother stated that, if the children’s therapist thought it was in their best interest to see Father, then the parties could work towards a graduated schedule in the future. Mother requested discovery sanctions and attorney’s fees, stating that Father’s “behavior and his failure to produce required documents, drove up the cost of litigation, and create[d] unnecessary hardship.” Mother alleged that, in 2022, Father was ordered to pay medical expenses, but he had failed to do so. The children’s BIA argued that Father should not have access at that time, and the children should continue to participate in therapy. A. Father Father testified that, before COVID, he would leave for work as Mother and the children were waking up, and he would return home between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. Mother would help the children start and finish their homework, and Father would double-check it when he came home. Father made financial decisions for the family, and Mother provided for the family domestically. Mother was responsible for taking the children to the pediatrician. In the two years leading up to the eviction, there was zero history of violence between Father and Mother. In mid2021, Father travelled to Japan for work for eleven weeks. A month after Father returned from Japan, the parties began discussing living separately. Father testified that “[t]he environment in the house got extremely toxic to the point TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
where [he] actually moved out of the master bedroom to downstairs.” Father stated that the instability was going on for years before the trip, but the trip was the final catalyst for the relationship. From approximately November 2021 to January 2022, Father lived in the basement and Mother lived in the master bedroom. Father testified that, when Mother learned that she was going to be served with the eviction notice, she accused him of assault. He testified to the events leading up to the protection order and related criminal charges. In March 2022, the parties were discussing A. possibly needing glasses, Mother approached him as he was walking to the kitchen sink and threatened him. When he tried to get out of the kitchen, his right shoulder made contact with her right shoulder, and she fell on the floor. When she fell, Mother stated, “why’d you push me” and Father stated, “nice try. What are you doing this for?” Father “was trying to end that conversation by saying, I will take care of it. I will take [A.] to the optometrist . . . . that I did not need [Mother] to do this, and this was the crux of the aggression.” Father believed that the trigger to the incident in the kitchen was that Mother kept asking for the children’s health insurance card, but he declined to provide it because “the agreement” was that Father would take care of the medical appointments moving forward. Father took away the shared flexible spending card that covered extraordinary medical expenses in February 2022 because Mother “ha[d] been a wild card.” When the eviction occurred, the parties agreed that the children would stay in the family home with Father. After the eviction notice was served, Father left the family home for 60 days, and the parties set up visitation between the children and Father. After 60 days, Father was supposed to move back into the family home and start a 2-2-5 schedule with Mother living at another location.5 When Father returned, however, Mother and the children were not living in the family home. After the pendente lite order, Father’s access with the children was contingent on therapy visits. At his first therapy visit, the therapist told Father that he did not need to return until the children had their own therapy visits. Father stopped receiving notifications for payment, which led him to believe that no therapy was happening. Father completed the intake process required to begin therapeutic supervised visits with the children. Father admitted into evidence records from Mental Health Association (“MHA”) where the parties were supposed to begin therapeutic supervised visits. On December 19, 2023, in response to Father’s subpoena, the Director of Family Support Services stated that Mother “was initially scheduled for an administrative intake on 02/03/23. However, [Mother] cancelled her appointment on 02/02/23. We have had no contact with [Mother] since that date.” According to the MHA records, Mother contacted MHA on December 22, 2023, to schedule an administrative intake, which she completed on January 2, 2024. Father would send messages through the communication app that parties were required to use, but he was ignored. He texted Z. but he received no response. He tried to verify the legitimacy of the number at mediation, but the BIA told him not to talk to the children as “part of the process of healing.” Father testified that the period between when the TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
BIA told him not to talk to the children to when she told him he needed to speak with them was three years. Father believed that Z. “always got a privileged position” with him, noting that Z. had the bigger room and got “the best of everything.” To Father, the only difference between his children was that A. is the younger child, and he would carry her more. Father physically disciplined Z. once, with Mother’s agreement. They both wanted to discipline Z., but they could not agree on the type of discipline. The next day, they agreed on Z. receiving lashes with the belt, but they disagreed on who should give them to her. At first, he insisted that Mother physically discipline Z., but she declined, so Father gave Z. “[l]ashes with a belt.” Mother was not present when Father physically disciplined Z. Afterwards, Mother had “buyer’s remorse.” Although A. never received lashes with the belt, she received “a slap across the butt more than her older sister.”6 On cross-examination, Father admitted that the parties did not make any agreements about the custodial schedule for the children after he returned from Japan. Father decided that he was going to handle all medical appointments and refused to provide Mother the insurance cards when she asked for them. This led to the incident in March 2022, which occurred in front of the children. Mother, through counsel, played a video of the incident for the court, during which Father told Mother, in front of A. to “[g]o fuck yourself. Get out!” and “[s]hut the fuck up.” Father testified that he was constantly reaching out to his children, but the messages between him and the children, which were admitted into evidence, showed that he reached out once every four to six months. After 2024, Father did not initiate any communication with Mother on the communication app, not even to ask how the children were. Father did not follow-up with Mother after he received medical receipts from her for the children. At the time of the hearing, Father had not paid his 70% of the children’s medical expenses as required by the July 2024 order. Father did not provide any information regarding his 2024 or 2025 income until the first day of the merits hearing. As of June 6, 2025, Father’s year-to-date gross pay was $90,821.64. In his 2023 financial statement, Father listed his gross pay per month as $7,523. Based on his 2023 W-2s, however, his gross pay for 2023 was $137, 210, with an average of $11,434 per month. B. The Children Over Father’s objection, the court spoke with the children separately in chambers.7 The court provided the following summary on the record: I think -- and I think both girls would feel this way -- I think both of them would like their father to be proud of them. I think their perspective is, they feel like their father has been very, not proud of them, and has more focused on their faults throughout their childhood, and they wish that things had been different. Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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I think both of them would like to have their perspective validated in terms of how they perceive things happened in their childhood. They both talked about troubling episodes from their childhood. They have seen fights between mom and dad. They’ve seen some altercations. They have been afraid because of those altercations. Neither one of them at this point, is really seeking out a relationship with dad. They are both very anxious. I think they were anxious to seeing dad here present at the courthouse. They are both aware that their father thinks that their mother is influencing them. [Z.] especially wanted to stress that her thoughts are her own thoughts. I will note at the same time, though, that during those conversations, things came out and things that the kids know about, are things they should not know about, and should not have been discussed with them, near them, with, in any way, around them. They have too much knowledge of the Court system, and what’s going on. They should be kept separate from that as much as possible. I didn’t ask either one of them point blank exactly what it is they wanted. I asked them what things would make them feel safer and ask them things of that sort. They didn’t really have a good plan in terms of what things would look like for them. * ** [Z. is] very protective of her younger sister and she wants to make sure that her younger sister is always safe. Emotionally, mostly, emotionally safe. There may be some physical fear as well. I think both of them shared that they had witnessed incidents of physical violence, and that did make them afraid. Neither one of them really disclosed -- the belt incident, for instance, did not come up. They didn’t disclose anything about fear for themselves physically so much as emotionally and fear for their mother. And [Z.] was clear that she did not want her mother to feel responsible for being in this position. So I think they feel a little bit of -- really [Z.] does -- feels a little bit of protectiveness of her mom. On the last day of the hearing, the BIA advised that A. wanted to speak with the court again. Father objected, stating that the BIA was attempting to redo the interview because “the children didn’t say what she wanted them to say.” The BIA stated that she did not know what A. wanted to say to the court, but she believed that it was appropriate for the court to speak with A. again because A. was more comfortable at that point than she was before the first interview. The court spoke with A. via Zoom and provided the following summary: So [A.] advised she did get to see dad last Thursday at that meeting at Dr. Abromson’s office. It was, in some ways, an empowering meeting for her; in some ways, it was disappointing. She felt 24
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proud of herself that she was able to get off of her chest the feeling she had been having, and how she felt about things. She was disappointed. She had thought her father would apologize to her. She had thought that he would listen to her, and that it would be more of a back-and-forth discussion. Instead, she felt that she was not heard. She was concerned that he was looking down at his phone from time to time. She suspected he was, perhaps, recording the session or otherwise that he was distracted. She was disappointed because she felt her father spent time yelling at Dr. Abromson and [the BIA], blaming other people, interrupting, having very raised voice. Although she acknowledged she may have raised her voice at some point, she cannot recall. But she said her father had done that. She did not find her father to be necessarily truthful. She believed that some of his statements about trying to have contact or work on a relationship with them were not necessarily honest, specifically with respect to [Z.]. She did not find his statements to be necessarily truthful about trying to make contact with [Z.] and keep up a relationship with [Z.]. There were statements about that dad acknowledged he had been driving by the house, in efforts, perhaps, that he tried to have a relationship by doing that. She repeated some of the things that mom had said: That he kept insisting that he has notes; I have notes; that dad said he couldn’t say what he needed to say; he didn’t have time to say what he needed to say in the 30 minutes. Blaming the court, blaming mom. Saying that mom was poisoning them. Accusing that [Z.] must have blocked him from her phone. Accusing folks of putting words in their mouth. She did acknowledge that dad expressed a desire for her to come back to the house, and he said that he still has her room up; it’s still set up. But she described him as being defensive and not being able to take any ownership for his faults in where the relationship was. * ** I asked her, and she was adamant, that she does not want to spend time with her father at this time. I asked, I said, would you be willing to do one of -- if your dad worked on some things between now and when you came back, would you be willing to do another meeting like this with Ms. Elise and your dad? And she indicated an unwillingness to do that. I said, well, what could your dad do, or what could I tell your dad that he could, perhaps, do to make this relationship better and put you in a place where you could do that? And she really indicated that she felt like her dad needed to work on her dad’s issues. She had been really hoping for an apology, some acknowledgment, of what her perspective is of TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
what she has experienced. And she felt that he is not in a place that he can do that at this time. So she feels that he needs -- that she doesn’t see a point or a purpose in having those types of meetings, if she doesn’t feel as though she’s being heard. When she came out there with, kind of, an open heart and being vulnerable and being able to express her perspective of the relationship. C. Mother Mother testified that the parties met in college in approximately 1999, and they broke up because Father “displayed some violent activities.” They got back together six years later, and Mother moved in with Father in approximately 2007. Mother found out she was pregnant with Z., and when she told Father, he reacted negatively. Mother moved in with her mother. When Z. was four, Mother reached out to Father. Mother and Father started going on dates, and after six months, Mother and Z. moved in with Father. Between the time the parties moved in together and the time when A. was born, Father had good and bad days. On a good day, Father was not yelling or blaming Mother for something. On bad days, Father would get angry, and if something did not go his way, he would punch walls. Before they moved in together, Father would do anything for Z., but afterwards, Father was short with Z. When A. was born, Mother stated that their relationship was “a little bit better.” When Z. was approximately six, Mother told her to stop climbing on top of the counters, but Z. persisted. Father became upset and called Z. upstairs. Mother heard Z. screaming, and when she entered the room, she saw Father “whipping” Z. with a belt. Mother blocked Father and ended up getting hit by the belt. Z. had welts, and Mother had one on her arm. When Z. was approximately seven, Mother asked Father to help Z. with her homework while Mother was attending to A. upstairs. Mother heard Father screaming and telling Z. that she was “so stupid” and “not college material.” When Mother came downstairs, she saw Z. crying, and Mother yelled at Father. Father left, stating “don’t you ever ask me to f[***]ing help you again.” Father would apologize, but he would say that he reacted that way because of something Mother did. Mother believed that Z. was scared to be near Father because Z. would try to avoid him by going to her room when he came home. Mother believed that Father cared more for A., but he started getting aggressive and mean towards A. When A. was in second grade, she came in second place at a track meet and Father told her, “if you didn’t have that big belly, and you weren’t so fat, maybe you could come in first next time. You need to start working out with me.” One time, when Mother was cooking, Father grabbed a nearby cookbook and hit her “upside the head with it” because the food was not how he told her to make it. Mother pushed him back, and Father pushed her against the wall and pinned her arm up. Mother told him that the children were TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
watching, and he let her go. Mother did not call the police. Father apologized and said that he would not have reacted that way if Mother had not put seasoning in the food. Shortly before the parties separated, Father would tell Mother to get out of the house, and if she left with the children, he would call the police and tell them that she kidnapped the children. Mother was scared because she did not want anything to happen to the children. Father would tell A. that if she did not listen to Father, she would “be homeless just like your mom. I’m going to make sure that she’s homeless.” At one point, Father told Z. that their relationship was broken, and he asked her how she was going to fix it. When Z. was 13, Father asked Z. if she wanted to know about his sexual relationships. Father also told Z. that she was not good enough for gymnastics, and she was not “Olympic material.” At the beginning of 2022, A. started complaining about headaches, and Father would make her sit down to play video games, stating that his attorney told him that he had “to do activities with them, and she’s going to sit here, and she needs to play.” The next week, Mother received a call from A.’s teacher, stating that A. needed glasses. Mother requested the insurance information from Father, but he refused to provide it and told her to get away from him. Mother set up A.’s vision appointment and paid out of pocket for the visit and A.’s glasses. When Father found out that A. had glasses, he became angry and aggressive. Father shoved Mother, and she fell down. Mother quickly got back up because she wanted to show the children that she was not scared of him because they would start to become scared of him. At the time of this incident, A. was in the living room and could see what happened. After this incident and the comments Father made to Z., Mother did not feel safe, so she called the police. Mother also called Father’s parents and asked if the children could stay with them because the children were crying. Mother testified to the following: So I called his parents to let them know . . . that we were on our way. Then he called, and he was, like, I’m calling the cops and saying that you kidnapped them. His parents live in West Virginia. So we ended up . . . [at] his parents’ house. And they were -- he was on the phone with them screaming, and they was on speakerphone. And then the kids walked in -- well, we walked in. And he was, like, you better not let them in. Tell them to get back. And if -- he said, if you -- if you let them in, you will never see them again. So at that -- that point, the kids got -- they would just started bawling. And then his -- he was talking to his stepdad. And then his dad -- stepdad just hung up the phone on him. Following this encounter, Mother filed for a protective order. Father then gave her an eviction notice. Mother did not have the financial means to move out at that time, so a family friend helped her get a realtor. Mother eventually found a place to rent, and the landlord offered an option to purchase the house, which she did. When Mother left the family home, the children went with her. At the time of the hearing, Mother was struggling financially. Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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During the children’s first visitation with Father, the children refused to get in the vehicle with Father. Mother had to physically put A. in the car with Father. Z. refused to have visits with Father. When A. would return from her visits with Father, she was often crying. A. had approximately three visits with Father. After that, the children refused to see Father and had not seen him since May 2022. Mother would tell the children that they needed to speak with Father, but they refused. She did not tell the children not to call Father or prevent them from making or taking phone calls to or from him. When Mother told A. that Father was going to send an app for A. to communicate with him, A. got upset and stated that she would not respond. Father never sent any text or link. Z. suffers from scoliosis and arthritis. In 2022, Father was covering the children’s health insurance. In 2023, Mother received a call, informing her that the children’s insurance has been cancelled. Mother reached out to all the attorneys in the case and requested a notice stating that the insurance was cancelled, so she could get the children insurance, but Father refused to provide the letter. Mother’s company did not allow her to add the children to her current policy without the cancellation notice. Mother could not continue to send the children to medical or therapeutic appointments without insurance. She was not able to take the children to therapy because she did not have enough money. Mother began paying for the children’s health insurance between 2023 and 2024. Mother paid extraordinary medical expenses for Z.’s medical conditions. In 2024, Z. got braces. Both children wear glasses, which Mother paid. Mother sent Father screenshots of all of the children’s medical expenses through the family communication app. Mother could see that Father read the messages through the app. In 2025, Z. started driving and completed a private driver’s education class, for which Mother solely paid. Mother financially operated in the negative every month to cover her and the children’s expenses. Mother’s balance on her credit cards was approximately $45,000. Prior to the last day of the hearing, the children’s therapist facilitated a meeting between Father and the children. When Mother picked up the children, the children were sad. They said that Father was rude and had not changed. During the visit, Father was yelling and pointing at the therapist and the BIA. Mother was not invited to the visit. The children saw Mother’s parents two to three times a year and spent one weekend a month with Father’s parents. Mother was concerned that Father would be mentally and physically abusive to the children if given access. Mother requested reimbursement of attorney’s fees, noting that Father “stated that he’s going to hire all women to take the kids from me. And he stated that he doesn’t care; he’s going to make sure I lose the little bit of money that I have, and I’m going to be homeless.” D. Father’s Rebuttal On rebuttal, Father testified that, when Mother became pregnant with Z., the parties were not living together. Mother 26
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was staying with him at his apartment, and it was not a constant living arrangement. When Mother told him she was pregnant with Z., his response was: “I need to make sure that this child is mine.” When Mother refused to provide Father with confirmation, Father asked her to leave his house. Father’s paternity was confirmed through testing by the time of Z.’s first birthday. Four years later, Mother contacted Father, requesting Father’s help and stating that Z. had a medical condition. Father had already decided that, since he had proof that Z. was his child, he wanted Z. in his life, and the parties got back together. Father stated that Mother’s testimony about Z. climbing on the cabinets was false. The only time Father disciplined Z. was when Mother caught Z. watching pornography, and the parties discussed the discipline for an entire day before Father disciplined Z. Father testified that he never hit Mother as he was beating Z. As for the recent therapy session with the children, Father felt that the meeting was in bad faith because he expected to hear from his children, but “not to unpack 4 years of pain in 20 minutes.” A. did not directly ask Father to apologize, and the children’s therapist instructed him not to respond until the children were finished speaking. Father did not record the session and was not playing on his phone. Father stated that it was “impossible” for the children not to have been ready to have a therapy session with him from 2022 through 2024 if “everybody was doing what they’re supposed to be doing.” IV. BIA’s Final Petition for Fees On December 1, 2025, the BIA filed a final petition for fees, stating that, from February 1, 2023, to November 21, 2025, she had performed 66 hours of service in this case, and her fees, plus legal assistant fees, totaled $22,635.15. Subtracting payment of $904.35 from Mother, the parties owed the BIA $21,730.80 in final attorney’s fees and costs. The BIA attached a statement of fees to the petition. On December 11, 2025, Father filed an opposition to the BIA’s final petition, requesting the court to deny the petition or substantially reduce the fees awarded. Father alleged the following: (1) the petition was procedurally defective because it was filed after trial ended without a request to reopen the matter; (2) the fees were unreasonable, and the BIA failed to provide sufficient information for the court to determine reasonableness; (3) the BIA failed to fulfill her statutory duties; and (4) the BIA failed to maintain independence as required by Maryland law. V. Court’s Ruling On December 12, 2025, the court issued its ruling on the record. The court noted that the parties had reached a stipulation with respect to Z., with Mother having sole physical custody of Z., and Father’s access being at Z.’s discretion. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
With respect to custody of A., the court noted that there was a new statute codifying many of the child custody factors listed in Montgomery County Department of Social Services v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406 (1977), and Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986). The court considered a combination of all the factors in reaching its decision. The court began by addressing credibility. It did not find Father to be credible, noting two examples: (1) what he said occurred when Mother told him she was pregnant with Z. and when he finally acknowledged that he was the father; and (2) his story about disciplining Z. with a belt. With respect to physical custody, the court addressed the statutory factors listed in Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law (“FL”) § 9-201 (2025 Supp.). In regard to stability and the foreseeable health and welfare of the children, the court noted that Father evicted Mother, which required change for the children, but Mother became the stability for the children. Father did not always act within the children’s best interest, but Mother ensured frequent contact with Father’s family, and she attempted to facilitate parenting time between Father and the children. The parties did not have a history of sharing rights and responsibility regarding the children, and Father was not involved in Z.’s life until she was almost five years old because he needed time to process it. Father seemed out of touch with the children and did not even know A’s grade in school. The court found that Father kept “putting the blame on someone else or the responsibility on someone else to involve him.” The court took into consideration Father’s lack of relationship with his family, specifically as it related to his mother, who he did not speak with because she continued to be involved in Z.’s life when Father was not. With regard to the children’s physical and emotional security and protection from exposure to conflict and violence, the court noted that Father agreed that he lashed Z. with a belt. The court found that Father was not credible in his testimony that Mother agreed with his action. The court found that the children were exposed to domestic violence by Father. In determining the children’s development needs, the court found that Mother had been the parent who fostered the children’s physical safety, emotional security, positive self-image, interpersonal skills and intellectual and cognitive growth. The court noted that Father “underestimates or has a lack of understanding of how the fact that he really voluntarily chose not to have a role in [Z.]’s life for five years would have an impact on her emotional security, her positive self-image.” With respect to whether the parent places the child’s needs above the parent’s needs, the court found that Father placed his needs over the children’s needs from the beginning, starting by failing to take affirmative steps to discover if he was Z.’s father and just waiting until Mother reached out to him. The court noted that, when A. needed glasses, Father unilaterally decided not to provide Mom with the health insurance flexible spending card. At therapy, Father showed an inability to see the children’s perspective and was more concerned with his status as a father and defending himself. In its determination of the parties’ ability to protect the children from negative effects of any conflict between them, TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
the court found Mother to be credible when she testified that Father told her to “get the f[***] out of his house” and “to shut the f[***] up” in front of the children. The court found that there was “a lot of toxicity” between Mother and Father. It did not find Father “100 percent responsible for that,” but the children had aligned with Mother.8 The court noted that Z. was almost 18 and A. was almost 12. The court found no prior agreement existed regarding custody. It listed as another example of Father’s lack of credibility his testimony that there was an agreement that the parties would share custody, but then finally admitting that there was never any agreement and that was just what he thought should happen. The court found that there was a void in the parties’ communication as they had only sporadically used the communication app. The parties did not show an ability to co-parent without disrupting the children’s social and school life. The court took into consideration the children’s preferences, but it did not consider them over any other factor. The court stated the following: This is a case where dad’s asking for shared physical custody of [A.], when it’s very clear that she’s nowhere near in a position that that would be the case. And he has continued to kind of insist on that arrangement. Although then as trial went on, he was agreeable to ramping it up to that. But that really has been his position is that he should have 50 percent custody of her. And so it gives me a lot of pause with respect to insight and realistic expectations and ability to understand where your girls are and what their needs and desires are such that it would be able to take the court out of the equation. The court stated that Father needed “to work on himself prior to having a healthy relationship with either of the” children. The court expressed concern about dads outright refusal to consider therapy for himself. He just decides he doesn’t need it. And he’s not going to do it. I’m concerned about his lack of true engagement at the one joint therapy session that had occurred. When asked if he offered an apology, he says, I am still the father. My vulnerability in front of my children was extremely sensitive to me. I am still the parent, but I couldn’t unpack all of this in 20 minutes and that he had to still create the boundary of being a father and a parent. The court noted that there was a lack of follow-through by Mother with completing the intake for TSV and taking the children to therapy. There were large gaps in between therapy sessions, and Mother “did not put forth the commitment that she should have put towards the relationship between the girls and their father.” With respect to legal custody, the court found that the parties did not have a good track record of being able to communicate. It found that Father had been aggressive, there had been domestic violence, and Father had taken “decision type actions” that were not in the children’s best interest, Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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such as failing to provide Mother with the health insurance cancellation letter. The court awarded Mother primary physical and sole legal custody of A., noting that the parties had agreed with respect to custody of Z. The children were to continue to attend therapy, with a focus on working on the children’s “issues with their father.” The therapist would determine if it would be helpful to include Father in the therapy sessions. The court declined “to pass a parenting time schedule with [A.],” stating that this could “be revisited if progress is made with dad individually and then therapy that involves both [A.] and Dad.” At that point, however, visits with Father before the children worked through those issues would not be helpful. For child support, the court stated that it looked at the May 1, 2025 paycheck that Father submitted as evidence of his income, which consisted of 19 weeks. The court stated that, extrapolating that amount indicated earnings of $228,298 a year, or $19,025.84 per month. The court found that Mother made $5,931 per month. The court ordered child support in the amount of $3,200 a month for 2025, with a total of $38,400 owed in 2025. For 2024, the court found that Father made $189,728.93, or $15,810.74 per month, and Mother made $5,931 per month. For 2024, the court ordered child support to be $2,920 a month, for a total of $35,040 in arrears. For 2023, the court found that Father made $11,434 per month, and Mother made $4,580 per month, resulting in child support of $2,230 a month, for a total of $26,760 in arrears. For 2022, the court found that Father made $12,464 per month, Mother made $4,580, and child support should have been $2,500 a month, with arrearages of $22,500 for nine months. The total child support that should have been paid from April 1, 2022 to December 30, 2025 was $122,700. The court ordered child support, beginning January 1, 2026, in the amount of $3,300 per month, with arrears payments of $300 a month, for a total of $3,600 per month. As for extraordinary medical expenses, the court divided these costs, with 75% paid by Father and 25% paid by Mother, and it ordered Father to pay $4,626.89 for his share through November 1, 2025. As discussed infra, the court ordered Father to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees pursuant to FL § 12-103. On January 9, 2026, the court addressed the BIA’s final petition for attorney’s fees in a written order. It found “the attorney’s fees to be fair, reasonable and necessary based upon the Best Interest Attorney’s experience in these matters and reputation in the legal community.” The court ordered that the parties shall be jointly and severally liable to the BIA for $21,730.80, crediting Mother $904.35 in previous payments. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review In reviewing child custody determinations, we employ three interrelated standards of review. Velasquez v. Fuentes, 262 Md. App. 215, 227 (2024); see also Gillespie v. Gillespie, 28
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206 Md. App. 146, 170 (2012). We review factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard, and we review matters of law de novo. Kadish v. Kadish, 254 Md. App. 467, 502 (2022); In re R.S., 470 Md. 380, 397 (2020). The ultimate conclusion of the court based on sound legal principles and factual findings that are not clearly erroneous we review for an abuse of discretion. Id. Where there is no clear error, we will uphold the court’s findings unless there is an abuse of discretion, meaning that “no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,” or the court acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 62526 (2016) (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312 (1997)). Discretion is vested in the circuit court because it sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and “is in a far better position than is an appellate court, which has only a cold record before it, to weigh the evidence and determine what disposition will best promote the welfare of the minor.” In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003). The above standards of review also apply to monetary awards. See Kaplan v. Kaplan, 248 Md. App. 358, 385 (2020) (standard of review for child support awards); Henriquez v. Henriquez, 185 Md. App. 465, 475-76 (2009), aff’d, 413 Md. 287 (2010) (standard of review for attorney’s fees). II. Custody Father contends that the court abused its discretion and committed legal error by denying him access to A. without a finding of actual or likely harm. Father argues that, under Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204 (1998), “access restrictions require a factual showing of actual or potential harm and a clear nexus between the harm and the restriction.” Father also alleges that the court improperly relied on credibility disputes concerning Z. to resolve custody and access for A. without adequately analyzing A.’s best interest. Mother contends that the court correctly ruled that it was in A.’s best interest for her to have primary physical and sole legal custody. She argues that “the court found that the children had been abused by [Father] and had been exposed to his abuse of” her. Mother asserts that, because the court did not make an express determination that there was no likelihood of future abuse, “the court had no other choice” but to deny Father access. Mother argues that the circuit court appropriately addressed credibility concerns when addressing what was in A.’s best interest. “Decisions as to child custody and visitation are governed by the best interests of the child.” Gordon v. Gordon, 174 Md. App. 583, 636 (2007). In determining the best interests of the child in custody disputes, the court may consider the following factors: (1) stability and the foreseeable health and welfare of the child; (2) frequent, regular, and continuing contact with parents who can act in the child’s best interest; (3) whether and how parents who do not live together will share the rights and responsibilities of raising the child; TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
(4) the child’s relationship with each parent, any siblings, other relatives, and individuals who are or may become important in the child’s life; (5) the child’s physical and emotional security and protection from exposure to conflict and violence; (6) the child’s developmental needs, including physical safety, emotional security, positive self-image, interpersonal skills, and intellectual and cognitive growth; (7) the day-to-day needs of the child, including education, socialization, culture and religion, food, shelter, clothing, and mental and physical health; (8) how to: (i) place the child’s needs above the parents’ needs; (ii) protect the child from the negative effects of any conflict between the parents; and (iii) maintain the child’s relationship with the parents, siblings, other relatives, or other individuals who have or likely may have a significant relationship with the child; (9) the age of the child; (10) any military deployment of a parent and its effect, if any, on the parent-child relationship; (11) any prior court orders or agreements; (12) each parent’s role and tasks related to the child and how, if at all, those roles and tasks have changed; (13) the location of each parent’s home as it relates to the parent’s ability to coordinate parenting time, school, and activities; (14) the parents’ relationship with each other, including: (i) how they communicate with each other; (ii) whether they can co-parent without disrupting the child’s social and school life; and (iii) how the parents will resolve any disputes in the future without the need for court intervention; (15) the child’s preference, if age-appropriate; and (16) any other factor that the court considers appropriate in determining how best to serve the physical, developmental, and emotional needs of the child. FL § 9-201.9 Although “a parent has a fundamental right to raise his or her own child,” this right is not absolute, and “the best interests of the child may take precedence over the parent’s liberty interest in the course of a custody” or visitation dispute. Boswell, 352 Md. at 219. Visitation may be restricted or denied when a court finds, based on the evidence, that actual or potential harm to the children may occur. Id. at 22728. Applying a best interest standard, courts have “denied visitation in situations involving sexual abuse, physical abuse, and/or emotional abuse by a parent.” Id. at 221. In cases involving abuse, FL § 9-101 applies. “[I]f the court has reasonable grounds to believe that a child has been abused or neglected by a party to the proceeding, the court shall determine whether abuse or neglect is likely to occur if custody or visitation rights are granted to the party.” FL § 9-101. The court is required to deny custody or visitation rights “[u]nless the court specifically finds that there is no likelihood of further child abuse or neglect,” although “the court may approve a supervised visitation arrangement TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
that assures the safety and the physiological, psychological, and emotional well-being of the child.” FL § 9-101(b). When deciding custody or visitation issues, the court is required to consider “evidence of abuse by a party against . . . the other parent of the party’s child . . . [or] any child residing within the party’s household, including a child other than the child who is the subject of the custody or visitation proceeding.” FL § 9-101.1(b). “If the court finds that a party has committed abuse . . . the court shall make arrangements for custody or visitation that best protect: (1) the child who is the subject of the proceeding; and (2) the victim of abuse.” FL § 9-101.1(c). Father argues that the circuit court abused its discretion because the record did not establish that Father abused A. Section 9-101 of the Family Law Article, however, establishes a presumption “‘that a child’s best interest is not served by placing the child in the custody of someone with a history’ of child abuse or neglect.” Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 193 (2020) (quoting In re Adoption No. 12612 in Cir. Ct. for Montgomery, 353 Md. 209, 238 (1999)). Section 9-101.1 “obligates the court, when it receives evidence of a party’s history of violence against certain household members, ‘to give due consideration to such violence in determining what is in a child’s best interest.’” Id. at 199 (quoting In re Adoption No. 12612, 353 Md. at 237). Evidence “of any domestic violence within the home, including the abuse of adults and other children” is a relevant consideration, “whether or not those victims are related to the child whose custody or visitation is at issue.” Id. at 193 (quoting In re Adoption No. 12612, 353 Md. at 236-37). This is based on “the greater likelihood, statistically demonstrated, that violence directed against others, including adults in the home, will eventually be directed against [the children] as well.” Id. at 194 (quoting In re Adoption No. 12612, 353 Md. at 237). Here, the circuit court found that A. had been exposed to domestic violence by Father. The record supports this factual finding. There was evidence that Father hit Z. on her bottom with a belt, which resulted in welts, Father told Mother “get the f[***] out of his house” and to “shut the f[***] up” in front of the children, and there was a physical altercation between the parties, which was captured on video and admitted into evidence. The court found that Father had been aggressive and took actions that were not in the children’s best interest. The court also noted the emotional harm that Father had inflicted on the children and A.’s firm desire not to spend any time with him. We defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations, as the trial court “has the opportunity to gauge and observe the witnesses’ behavior and testimony during the trial.” C.M. v. J.M., 258 Md. App. 40, 58 (2023) (quoting Barton v. Hirshberg, 137 Md. App. 1, 21 (2001)). The court was in the best position to assess the evidence and determine what disposition would best promote the welfare of A. In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 586. Although it would have been better practice for the court to make a specific finding that Father had abused A. emotionally and others in the household physically, “the court need not articulate every step of the judicial thought process in order to show that it has conducted the appropriate analysis.” Gizzo, 245 Md. App. at 195-96. The court recited, in its ruling, instances of the emotional and physical harm that Father had Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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inflicted on Mother and the children. To the extent that Father contended otherwise, the court found that his testimony was not credible. On this record, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in finding that it was in the best interest of A. for Mother to have primary physical custody of A. and Father to have no specified access schedule until progress was made in therapy, at which time the issue could be revisited.10 III. Child Support Father contends that the circuit court erred in its child support calculations. He argues that the court calculated his 2025 income to be $228,298 based on 19 weeks of earnings, but the paystub evidence that he cited showed biweekly income of $7,568.47, or $3,784.23 weekly, which amounts to an annual income of $196,780.05. Mother disagrees, as do we. Family Law § 12-204 sets forth child support guidelines. In determining child support, a court must determine the income of each party. John O. v. Jane O., 90 Md. App. 406, 419-20 (1992). The amount owed by each parent is adjusted in proportion to each parent’s income minus expenses, such as childcare, health care, and medical expenses. FL § 12-204 (a), (e), (g), (h). A party’s “actual income” includes salaries, wages, commissions, and bonuses. Fl § 12-201(b)(3). A court’s determination of a parent’s actual income is a factual finding, and as such, “[i]f there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings . . . , those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous.” St. Cyr v. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. 163, 180 (2016). The record here reflects that the court calculated Father’s income as $228,298 based on the evidence supplied by Father. The court divided the amount Father made from January 1, 2025 through May 17, 2025, as indicated on his May 23, 2025 paycheck, by the number of weeks up until that point and multiplied his average weekly income by 52 weeks. The year-to-date total up until May 17, 2025, reflecting 19 weeks, was $83,416.60. Using these numbers, Father had a weekly income of $4,390, a monthly income of $19,024.84, and a yearly income of $228,298. Based on this evidence, we cannot conclude that the court erred or abused its discretion in calculating Father’s income for 2025 as $228,298. IV. Attorney’s Fees Father contends that the court abused its discretion in ordering him: (1) to pay $8,000 of the $33,518.81 in attorney’s fees incurred by Mother; and (2) the parties to pay $21,730.80 to the BIA. As explained below, we disagree.11 A. Mother’s Attorney’s Fees An award of attorney’s fees in the context of custody and visitation proceedings is governed by FL § 12-103. That statute provides, in pertinent part, that the court may award to a party costs and counsel fees after considering: “(1) the 30
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financial status of each party; (2) the needs of each party; and (3) whether there was substantial justification for bringing, maintaining, or defending the proceeding.” FL § 12-103(a), (b). Substantial justification “is measured by the issues presented and the merits of the case.” Davis v. Petito, 425 Md. 191, 202 (2012). The court has “significant discretion in applying the factors” set forth in § 12-103(b), but the failure to consider those factors constitutes legal error. Ruiz v. Kinoshita, 239 Md. App. 395, 438 (2018). Nevertheless, the court does not need “to recite any ‘magical’ words so long as its opinion, however phrased, does that which the statute requires.” Horsely v. Radisi, 132 Md. App. 1, 31 (2000) (quoting Beck v. Beck, 112 Md. App. 197, 212 (1996)). Here, the court specifically noted the factors it was required to consider. With respect to the financial resources and needs of the parties, the court found that Father was “in a superior financial position” to Mother. Although Mother had some money in savings, it was insufficient to cover her counsel’s fees, and Mother had “been kind of operating --doing this by herself for a great deal of the time.” With regard to substantial justification, the court noted that Father’s discovery failures made trying the case much more difficult and costly for Mother, and Father’s position with respect to custody was one “he knew or should have known was unrealistic.” After considering the bills provided and Mother’s counsel’s affidavit, the court ordered Father to pay Mother $8,000 of the $33,518.81 in attorney’s fees she incurred. Although FL § 12-103 “does not expressly mandate the consideration of reasonableness of the fees, . . . evaluation of the reasonableness of the fees is required.” Sczudlo v. Berry, 129 Md. App. 529, 550 (1999). In Lieberman v. Lieberman, 81 Md. App. 575, 601-02 (1990), this Court guided trial courts to consider the following four factors in determining whether the amount awarded for attorney’s fees was reasonable: “(1) whether the [award] was supported by adequate testimony or records; (2) whether the work was reasonably necessary; (3) whether the fee was reasonable for the work that was done; and (4) how much can reasonably be afforded by each of the parties.” Accord Fitzzaland v. Zahn, 218 Md. App. 312, 333 (2014). A court’s discretionary decision to award counsel fees is afforded deference on appeal. Lemley v. Lemley, 109 Md. App. 620, 633 (1996), cert. denied, 344 Md. 567 (1997). Here, as indicated, the court looked “at the ordinary factors of labor, skill, time and benefit” when reviewing Mother’s counsel’s fees. After reviewing the requisite factors, the court ordered Father to pay Mother $8,000 of the $33,518.81 she incurred in attorney’s fees. Based on the record here, we perceive no error or abuse of discretion. B. Best Interest Attorney’s Fees Father also contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding the BIA $21,730.80 in fees. He asserts multiple errors, including that the court did not make “a meaningful reasonableness determination,” did not address Father’s objections that the BIA provided limited services and insufficient fee justification, and failed to determine TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
whether the BIA “fulfilled the independent role Maryland law contemplates.” Mother disagrees, as do we.12 Section 1-202(a)(l)(ii) of the Family Law Article authorizes the court to appoint a BIA to represent the minor children. Section 1-202(a)(2) provides that the court may “impose counsel fees against one or more parties to the action.” In considering whether to award counsel fees for a BIA, the factors set forth in FL § 12-103(b) are relevant to the analysis. Meyr v. Meyr, 195 Md. App. 524, 555 (2010). As Father acknowledges, however, if the court has already considered those factors, it need not restate them in the analysis of BIA fees. See id. at 554. Father suggested in his opening brief that the court erred in failing to consider his objection to the fees on the ground that the BIA filed her request after the case had closed without moving to reopen. In his reply brief, however, he acknowledges that “a BIA may submit a fee request after trial if the parties have an opportunity to challenge reasonableness.” Here, Father had the opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the BIA’s request. Father alleged that the
BIA “did not present an itemization that explained why more than $21,000 in fees was reasonable given the limited services reflected in the case.” Although the court did not hold a hearing on the BIA fees, as the BIA notes and Father concedes, no one requested a hearing. See Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. 146, 179 (2012) (“A hearing is not always required before a court determines the apportionment of fees.”). Moreover, the record shows that the BIA’s petition for fees was supported by 12 pages of itemized charges, which included a brief description of the task, date associated with the task, rate and time spent, and total amount per task. Based on the record, the court found the BIA’s fees to be “fair, reasonable and necessary based upon the Best Interest Attorney’s experience in these matters and reputation in the legal community.” We perceive no abuse of discretion in the court ordering the parties to be jointly and severally liable for the BIA’s fees. Accord Van Schaik v. Van Schaik, 200 Md. App. 126, 138 (2011) (“Given the discretion accorded by [FL] § 1-202(a)(2) . . . we see no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in imposing joint and several liability on the parties for [the BIA]’s outstanding fees.”).
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
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FOOTNOTES
1
In the interest of privacy, we refer to the minor children using initials.
2
Father presented the following questions: 1.
Whether the circuit court abused its discretion and committed legal error in denying Appellant access to A.G. and conditioning any future contact on therapy, where the record contained no finding of abuse, no evidence of actual or likely harm to A.G. from contact with Appellant, and no specific findings adequately connecting the access restriction to the child’s best interests.
2.
Whether the circuit court erred by relying on credibility disputes concerning matters involving Z.G. to deny Appellant custody or access as to A.G., where Appellant’s evidence of parental fitness as to A.G. was otherwise uncontradicted and the court’s order did not adequately analyze the relevant custody factors as applied to A.G.
3.
Whether the circuit court erred in calculating Appellant’s child support obligation by using an incorrect annualized income figure for 2025 that was inconsistent with the paystubs in evidence.
4.
Whether the circuit court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Appellee where the record did not support the court’s finding that Appellant lacked substantial justification, where the court relied on an asserted discovery failure despite the denial of Appellee’s motion to compel and the absence of discovery sanctions, and where the required statutory analysis was not adequately supported by the evidence.
5.
Whether the circuit court erred or abused its discretion in awarding $21,730.80 in attorney’s fees to the Best Interest Attorney where the record did not permit a reasonableness determination and the court failed to address Appellant’s objections that the BIA provided limited services, submitted insufficient fee justification, and did not fulfill the independent role contemplated by Maryland law.
3
The parties stipulated that Mother would have sole physical custody of Z. and all access between Z. and Father would be at Z.’s discretion. Mother’s custody of Z. is not being challenged in this appeal.
4
At the time of Father’s petition, there was a controlling Washington County custody order pertaining to Z.
5
Father testified that Mother agreed to this arrangement through her original attorney via email.
6
Legal custody and child support for Z. remained at issue.
7
Father’s counsel objected to Z. being interviewed because the parties already made an agreement as to physical custody of Z. In the alternative, Father requested for the court to question Z. only regarding legal custody. Father’s counsel argued that it would be prejudicial for the court to interview the children together and requested that the interviews be separate. The court spoke with the children separately.
8
The court stated that it did not find that Mother had estranged or alienated the children, noting that they may see Mother “more as the victim in the case.”
9
In 2025, the Maryland General Assembly enacted Family Law (“FL”) § 9-201(a) (2025 Supp.), which lists sixteen factors for a court to consider when making a custody decision to ensure that the decision is in the child’s best interest. This statute codified many of the Taylor and Sanders factors, see Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986), Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406 (1977), and it became effective October 1, 2025, 2025 Md. Laws Ch. 484, while the merits hearing was pending.
10 If Father takes steps to show that he is ready to have a positive relationship with A., he can ask the court to modify custody based on a material change of circumstance. 11 Mother contends that the court acted within its discretion when determining to award her attorney’s fees, but she argues that the court was required by statute to “shift” all of her attorney’s fees when it found Father to be without substantial justification. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law (“FL”) § 12-103(c) (2025 Supp.). Mother, however, did not file a cross-appeal, and therefore, we will not consider this contention. See Walston v. Sun Cab Co., 267 Md. 559, 564 (1973) (“Even if a judgment or decree is prejudicial to an appellee, such prejudice will be disregarded by this Court if there was no crossappeal filed by the appellee. Moreover, such appellee cannot obtain any affirmative relief by way of reversal, amendment or modification of the judgment or decree under review.”). Accord Kunda v. Morse, 229 Md. App. 295, 302 n.4 (2016) (limiting review to questions presented by appellant when appellee failed to file a notice of a cross-appeal). 12 The BIA filed an amicus brief stating that the court properly awarded her fees based on her three and a half years of work in this case.
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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 9 (2026) Final judgment; non-final order; guardianship
In re J.B. and B.B. No. 2348, September Term 2025 Argued before: Ripken, Kehoe, Sharer (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Sharer, J. Filed: July 10, 2026 The Appellate Court dismissed father’s appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City’s order declaring “Father is no longer a party in this matter,” after father failed to file exceptions to the Department of Social Services of Baltimore City’s petitions for guardianship of two minor siblings, with the right to consent to adoption or long term care short of adoption, and its denial of father’s motion for reconsideration of that order. Neither order is a final judgment.
In March 2025, the Department of Social Services of Baltimore City (“Department” or “DSS”), appellee, filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City petitions for guardianship of two minor siblings, J.B. and B.B., with the right to consent to adoption or long term care short of adoption.1 After Eric B. (“Father”), appellant, failed to file exceptions, the circuit court issued an order, declaring, “Father is no longer a party in this matter.” The court subsequently denied Father’s motion for reconsideration of that order. Father noted this appeal, challenging those rulings.2 The Department included in its brief a motion to dismiss, asserting that the order from which Father appeals is interlocutory and that no appeal lies from it. We agree and shall dismiss the appeal. We shall also take the Department’s suggestion and briefly state our views on the procedural question at issue in contemplation of potential continuing litigation in these cases. BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are not relevant to the procedural issue raised in this appeal, and we therefore shall not present a lengthy recitation of them. Our focus will be on the relevant procedural facts. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. On January 24, 2023, J.B. and B.B. were placed in foster care, where they have remained until now. Three months later, they were declared to be children in need of assistance (“CINA”). During the prior proceedings, Father had been represented by Daniel Gross, Esq. On March 13, 2025, the Department filed in the circuit court petitions for guardianship with the right to consent to adoption or long term care short of adoption, which, if granted, would result in the termination of Father’s (and Mother’s)3 parental rights (“TPR”). On the same date, showcause orders were issued to both parents, advising that their parental rights could be terminated, directing them to file timely notices of objection, and advising them of their rights to counsel. Also on the same date, summonses were issued to the parties and counsel, including Mr. Gross, directing them to appear at a scheduled Zoom hearing on May 5, 2025. On May 5, the virtual hearing was held before Magistrate Neeta Kataria. Father did not appear, but Mr. Gross did. After counsel for the Department informed the court that “there have been no entry of appearances or objections filed in this case[,]” Mr. Gross explained that he would not “object to a postponement” and “would like to speak with [his] client[.]” Department counsel averred (not entirely correctly) that “[M]other was personally served on April 23rd” and that Father had been served by the sheriff, who had not yet filed an affidavit of service.4 The court set a new hearing date of June 11, 2025. Mr. Gross assured the court that by then he would know whether he was going to represent Father in these cases, and Department counsel assured the court that by then both parents’ thirty-day periods for filing notices of objection would have expired. On June 11, a Zoom hearing was held before Magistrate William Gyauch. Mr. Gross was not present, nor had he entered an appearance in these cases. Department counsel informed the court that the sheriff had, indeed, served Father in Case No. 590 but that it was still “in the process of having [F]ather served for [B.]B.’s case [Case No. 591].”5 Father joined the hearing and was informed by the court “that he will need to contact the Public Defender’s Office regarding counsel.”6 The court scheduled a pretrial Zoom hearing date of July 16, 2025. The following day, on June 12, 2025, Father was served in person with the petition and show-cause order in Case No. 591. The affidavit of service was filed several weeks later. On July 16, a scheduling hearing was held via Zoom before Magistrate Gyauch. Mr. Gross was present but had not yet entered his appearance in the cases. Father was not present. Mr. Gross informed the court, mistakenly, that he was present Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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“on behalf of [I.F.,]” who is not a party in either case. The court, in consultation with the attorneys, set dates for the status conference, the settlement conference, production of records, and a guardianship merits hearing. On July 28, 2025, the Department attempted to serve the petitions and show-cause orders on Mr. Gross by certified mail, return receipt requested, as provided under Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article (“FL”), § 5-316(c)(2)(ii). Two weeks later, the Department filed an affidavit of service, but the return receipt was unsigned. On August 25, 2025, the court convened a status hearing before Judge Robert Taylor. Mr. Gross was present; Father was not. Department counsel noted that Mr. Gross “has actually not filed an entry of appearance” and that “Father likewise has not filed an objection.” Department counsel further declared that, “[F]ather is not a party[,]” “[h]e hasn’t filed an objection[,]” and “his time has run.” The court asked Mr. Gross whether he agreed, and Mr. Gross replied, “I have no representations, Your Honor.”7 The court declared its agreement with Department counsel, stating, “Time for an objection has long past due. Absent some extenuating circumstances [Father] has consented [to guardianship and termination of his parental rights] by operation of law.” The court excused Mr. Gross from the hearing, and it subsequently issued an order, stating, Father’s CINA attorney Daniel Gross was present. Father has not filed an objection, and his counsel has not made an entry of appearance under these TPR matters. The time for [F]ather to object has expired. Father is no longer a party in this matter. Two more Zoom hearings were held before Judge Charles Blomquist without Father’s participation. Then, on October 29, 2025, Jeffrey Dier, Esq., entered his appearance in the cases. A few weeks later, on November 15, 2025, Mr. Dier filed notices of objection on Father’s behalf. In response, the Department promptly filed motions to strike what it deemed late objections. Attached to the motions to strike were affidavits of service on Father, prior court orders (including the August 25th order declaring that Father’s time for filing notices of objection had expired and that he was no longer a party to the cases), and affidavits of service on Mr. Gross, including the unsigned delivery receipts. On November 19, 2025, at a Zoom hearing before Judge Blomquist, the following colloquy took place: THE COURT: So just help me understand. I think there was an order issued by Judge Taylor in the case that already recognized that no objection had been filed by [Father], so why am I even hearing this? MR. DIER: Well, Your Honor, do you want me to -- you want me to chime in? I mean I am filing a response to that motion which I just received the other day. But generally speaking there was -- there’s several issues involved here. One is that [Father] -- there’s no proof of service for [Father] for J.[B.]’s case. There’s no required affidavit of service by the private process server. The Department -- I’m not sure exactly who filled it out, 34
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but there’s a data entry sheet of some kind, but no required affidavit of service on him for that child. Additionally, the Juvenile Court attorney at that time for the -- for [Father], he was not actually served with the -- with the petition show cause order and notice of objection is required under the law. There was apparently delivery to his -- the lobby of his -- the large building that he works in. He never -- he’s advised me he never received the documents. He didn’t sign for them as required under the law. THE COURT: So, Mr. Dier, I mean I appreciate all that recitation, but I am looking at an order that’s dated 8/25/2025 signed by Judge Taylor in which he says in the order the time for [F]ather to object has expired. Father is no longer a party in this matter. *** MR. DIER: . . . The issue of service of actual jurisdiction of the court is called -- is under -- falls under fraud, mistake or irregularity can be raised at anytime. So this issue can be raised even on appeal for the first time. So, you know, I’m raising it now. But the lack -- the lack of notice and due process falls under mistake or irregularity so I’m raising it now. I mean if -- if Ms. Witlen[8] wants to go ahead with this case and have an appeal that could take, you know, very long, she’s welcome to do that, but -- but that’s the basis. I can raise this before the Circuit Court at anytime. That’s the law. *** MS. WITLEN: Thank you. Your Honor, in my motion to dismiss obviously I attached nine different exhibits. Father personally appeared at a hearing. He was served by the sheriff. It wasn’t private process service. It was the sheriff’s department. The sheriff’s department filed a civil intake data sheet in which it states that they served [F]ather. After Mr. Dier objected and raised this issue the Department was able to coordinate with the Department of Safety and Corrections to obtain an affidavit of service which I uploaded today which verifies that Mr. -- or Sergeant McCaskill actually did serve [F]ather on the date that the civil intake sheet is dated. Additionally, Your Honor, Mr. Gross who was the CINA attorney appeared at -- personally appeared at three different TPR hearings. At no point in time did he raise that there was a mail issue. The Department does not believe that Mr. Dier has standing to raise a mail issue with Mr. Gross’s office with no affidavit attached. I am prepared to move forward with this case. The court also has to look at the best interest of the child and this case has now been dragging on because [F]ather has not objected and there are court orders in which he has been deemed to be not a party for lack of objection. There is no TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
affidavit supporting, Your Honor. There’s been no tendering of an individual saying that there was fraud, mistake or irregularity. Mr. Dier doesn’t have standing to do that. THE COURT: Well, again, help me understand the [e]ffect of the August 25th order. Why am I being asked to review Judge Taylor’s order? This is not a recommendation from a magistrate. This is an order from a sister judge. I’m not an Appellate Court. I mean I guess, you know if he wants to he could take an interlocutory appeal or he’s going to have to wait until the conclusion of the -- the termination of parental rights. I’m not sure that’s in the best interest of -- of the children or the parents, but that would be -- I’m not sure I have the ability to hear this matter. Am I wrong? MS. WITLEN: Are you asking me, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. MS. WITLEN: I believe that the -- I believe that no appeal was filed to Judge Taylor’s order from August 25th. THE COURT: Wouldn’t it be more appropriate to go back to Judge Taylor for a motion to reconsider? MS. WITLEN: I don’t have any issue with that, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yeah. I mean I -- I mean I’m not sure how it got in front of me except I’m the termination of parental rights judge. So at this point I’m going to go ahead and dismiss Mr. Dier’s -- Mr. -- I’m dismissing his objection. I’m not sure I have the ability to do that because you can’t object to something -- he’s not a party, so. Later that same day, Judge Blomquist issued an order, declaring: Judge R. Taylor’s 8/25/25 order ruled [F]ather had not filed a timely objection and was not a party to the matter. The Motion to Strike the late objection filed by Jeffrey Dier, Esq., submitted by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS), is hereby deemed MOOT, as the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the matter. On December 9, 2025, Mr. Dier filed (on Father’s behalf) a motion for reconsideration of Judge Taylor’s August 25th order. Attached to that motion were the Department’s affidavit of service on Mr. Gross, including a copy of the unsigned mail receipt; a copy of the court’s August 25th order; and an affidavit from Mr. Gross, averring, among other things, that his office is located in “a large multi-story office building comprised of hundreds of virtual work spaces”; that “the lobby receives hundreds of pieces of mail a day”; that he has “experienced serious challenges receiving mail that is addressed to [him]”; that he “never received or signed for” the petitions, show-cause orders, or notice of objection forms in this case; that he “never received” information regarding “deadlines for filing objections to the petitions”; and that he “did not intend to or enter” his appearances on Father’s behalf “[f]or purposes of any” TPR proceeding “involving his children.” TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
After the Department filed a response to Father’s motion for reconsideration, requesting that it be denied, the court, on December 22, 2025, issued a memorandum opinion and order denying Father’s motion for reconsideration. In part, the court stated: In [Father’s] motion to reconsider, he does not dispute that Mr. Gross was in fact served with the show cause order via certified mail. Mr. Gross claims that he did not personally see the document because of problems with the internal distribution of mail in his office building. This is not the Department’s problem. Nothing in Section 5-316 requires the Department to ensure that the properly served attorney actually reads his mail. Such a burden would be impossible to meet. More to the point, nothing about the failure of Mr. Gross to promptly read his mail prevented [Father] from filing a timely objection to the TPR action. It may well be that Mr. Gross did not see the show cause order in this case, as he attests in his affidavit. Nonetheless, service was effectuated when it was delivered to his address of record via certified mail, return receipt requested. It is obvious, moreover, that Mr. Gross was well aware of the TPR action before he was actually served with the show cause order. Father then noted this appeal. DISCUSSION
Motion to Dismiss With narrow exceptions, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), § 12-301. Section 12-301 “does not define finality, but instead leaves it to [the Supreme] Court to determine what makes a judgment ‘final.’” Metro Maint. Sys. S., Inc. v. Milburn, 442 Md. 289, 297 (2015). To be a final judgment, “a ruling must ordinarily have the following three attributes”: (1) it must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy[;] (2) unless the court acts pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602(b) to direct the entry of a final judgment as to less than all of the claims or all of the parties, it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties; (3) it must be set forth and recorded in accordance with Rule 2-601. Id. at 298. Initially, we note that the only order at issue in this appeal is the December 22nd order9 denying the motion for reconsideration of the prior August 25th order because the notices of appeal were filed on January 5, 2026, well beyond thirty days after August 25, 2025. Md. Rule 8-202(a) (requiring that a notice of appeal “be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken”). In any event, neither the August 25th order nor the December 22nd order has any of the attributes of a final judgment because neither order is, in fact, a final judgment. Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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As the Department points out, the December 22nd order did not finally adjudicate the grant of guardianship of the minor children and, therefore, “was an order ‘that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties to the action’ and ‘not a final judgment.’” (Quoting Md. Rule 2-602(a)(1).) Nor did the order invoke Rule 2-602, which requires that the court “expressly determine[] in a written order that there is no just reason for delay” before it may certify an otherwise non-final judgment for appeal. Md. Rule 2-602(b). Nor did the order comply with Rule 2-601, which requires, among other things, that the clerk “enter a judgment by making an entry of it on the docket of the electronic case management system used by that court along with such description of the judgment as the clerk deems appropriate.” Md. Rule 2-601(b) (2). The Supreme Court of Maryland has set forth “only three exceptions” to the final judgment rule. Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615 (2005). Those are: “appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute;” “immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602” (which we already have ruled out); and “appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine.” In re C.E., 456 Md. 209, 221 (2017) (cleaned up). There is no statutory right of appeal from the December 22nd order. Although CJP § 12-303(3)(x) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order “[d]epriving a parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order[,]” application of that provision is ruled out because that exception has been narrowly interpreted as to not apply to an order, such as that in this case, that neither alters immediate custody of a child nor materially changes a permanency plan. See C.E., 456 Md. at 224, 226-27 (holding that “a juvenile court’s order waiving a department’s obligation to provide reasonable reunification efforts, while leaving a custody order and permanency plan unchanged, does not deprive a parent of care or custody of a child” and is therefore not immediately appealable). The collateral order doctrine is a “legal fiction” that permits immediate appeals from “orders that would otherwise not be appealable at the time they are entered.” Md. Bd. of Physicians v. Geier, 451 Md. 526, 554 (2017). There are four requirements that an interlocutory order must satisfy for the collateral order doctrine to apply: (1) the order must conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) the order must resolve an important issue; (3) the order must resolve an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action; and (4) the issue would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment. Id. at 546. At minimum, the December 22nd order does not satisfy the fourth requirement. The issue (whether the circuit court properly determined that Father had waived
his objections) would be reviewable after the circuit court’s final disposition of the Department’s guardianship petitions. Because “[e]ach of the four elements . . . must be satisfied” for the collateral order doctrine to apply, Spivery-Jones v. Receivership Est. of Trans Healthcare, Inc., 438 Md. 330, 360 (2014), we conclude that the December 22nd order does not qualify as a collateral order. In sum, no immediate appeal lies from the December 22nd order, and we therefore grant the Department’s motion to dismiss. Additional Guidance on Remand We shall up take the Department’s suggestion10 and briefly discuss the merits of the circuit court’s ruling, to provide guidance following remand to that court as these cases proceed. In doing so, we recognize that what we say here is only dictum. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (stating that an appellate court “may decide” an issue not properly before it “if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal”); see also Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 170 (1994) (discussing merits of important issue despite dismissing the appeal). “Promptly after a petition for guardianship is filed under this Part II of this subtitle, a juvenile court shall issue a showcause order that requires the party to whom it is issued to respond as required under the Maryland Rules.” FL § 5-316(a). “On issuance of a show-cause order as to guardianship of a child, a petitioner shall serve the order on . . . each living parent’s last attorney of record in the CINA case[.]” FL § 5-316(b)(2). Service on an attorney under FL § 5-316 “shall be” either by “personal service” or “certified mail, . . . return receipt requested[.]” FL § 5-316(c)(2). In the instant case, the only evidence that service was made on Father’s last attorney of record in the CINA case was a return receipt. Conspicuously missing from that return receipt was the attorney’s signature, thereby rebutting the presumption that he was served. (In addition, the attorney filed an affidavit in the circuit court, declaring among other things that he “never received or signed for” the show-cause orders or related documents in the cases; that he “never received the information contained in the petitions”; and that he “did not intend to [nor did he] enter [his] appearances on behalf of” Father in the TPR proceedings and therefore “did not have access to the MDEC information” on the cases.) We have held that the failure to serve notice on the last attorney of record in a CINA case, in strict compliance with the requirements of statute and rule, tolls the thirty-day period for a parent to file a notice of objection in an ensuing guardianship case. In re Adoption/Guardianship of Genara A., 152 Md. App. 725, 736 (2003). Applying that holding here, we are constrained to agree with the Department that the circuit court erred in its ruling that Father’s notices of objections, filed November 15, 2025, were untimely.
APPEAL DISMISSED. CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS ASSESSED TO APPELLANT.
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TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
FOOTNOTES
1
As the Department acknowledges in its brief, the effect of granting those orders would be to terminate the parental rights of the children’s biological parents. Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article (“FL”), § 5-325(a).
2
Father raises two claims in his brief. First, he asserts that the juvenile court erred in finding that he was deemed to have consented to the petitions because service was defective, thereby depriving the court of personal jurisdiction over him. Second, Father asserts that the CINA attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
3
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
4
In Case No. 590 (J.B.’s case), the Department submitted a Civil Intake Data sheet appearing to state that Father had been served in person on April 10, 2025. On November 19, 2025, the Department filed an affidavit of service attesting to that fact. In Case No. 591 (B.B.’s case), Father was served in person on June 12, 2025, more than five weeks after the May 5th hearing.
5
Department counsel further explained that the Department was forced to rely upon the sheriff to serve the parents rather than its usual process server “because there was a safety issue.”
6
The court also confirmed Father’s correct contact information, including his phone number, address, and email address.
7
As the Department points out in its brief, “only 28 days had passed since the Department had mailed the show[-]cause orders and petitions to Mr. Gross,” but “Mr. Gross did not correct the Department or inform the court he had not been served with copies of the show cause orders and petitions.”
8
Sarah Witlen, Esq., was counsel for the Department.
9
The order was issued December 17, 2025, but was not docketed until December 22, 2025. The memorandum opinion and order are not docketed in Case No. 591, even though its caption contains both case numbers; and furthermore, notices of appeal are docketed in both cases. The Department refers to this order as the “December 17, 2025, Order.”
10 We commend the Department for adopting a position on appeal contrary to that taken in the circuit court. As we explain, we agree with the Department’s new position.
TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 9 (2026) Custody; evidence; sufficiency
Jeremy McCullough v. Shiann Price Muhammad No. 2248, September Term 2025 Argued before: Wells, C.J; Graeff, Berger, JJ. Opinion by: Berger, J. Filed: July 10, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore City Circuit Court’s order, which concluded there was insufficient evidence to determine what custody arrangement would be in the minor child’s best interest. The only evidence that the circuit court had regarding father’s relationship with the minor was that they had not seen each other in two years and there was evidence of violence between father and mother.
Appellant, Jeremy McCullough (“Father”) and appellee, Shiann Price Muhammad (“Mother”) share one child, (“M.M.”) born in March 2022. In May 2023, Father filed a Complaint for Custody in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Mother did not respond but filed a Motion to Vacate Order of Default in July 2023 claiming she had not been served and requesting the circuit court to allow her to file an answer and counter complaint. In October 2023, the circuit court granted Mother’s motion. Mother failed to participate in the custody action further. On November 20, 2025, after two hearings at which Father was the only party present, the circuit court concluded that it had insufficient evidence to make a custody determination and denied Father’s Complaint. This appeal followed. On appeal, Father presents four questions for our review, which we have consolidated into one and rephrased as follows:1 I. Whether the circuit court erred in denying Father’s Complaint for Custody after concluding there was insufficient evidence to make a custody determination. For the following reasons, we affirm. BACKGROUND
On May 30, 2023, Father filed a Complaint for Custody (“Complaint”) in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking primary physical custody and sole legal custody of M.M. The Complaint provided that the custody arrangement 38
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. requested was in M.M.’s best interest because of Mother’s “mental unpredictability” and “chronic homelessness” leading to instability for M.M. Further, Father claimed that Mother had kidnapped M.M. from their shared home. A writ of summons was issued on June 23, 2023. Both the Complaint and writ of summons listed Mother’s address as being in Baltimore City (“Baltimore address”). On June 27, 2023, Father filed an affidavit of service providing that Mother was personally served that same day by a thirdparty at the Baltimore address.2 Thereafter, Mother filed a Motion to Vacate Order of Default on July 18, 2023. Therein, Mother claimed she was not properly served and that Father’s affidavit of service was erroneous. According to Mother, she had not lived at the Baltimore address since February 2023 because she was “forced to relocate due to threats of physical [and] actual bodily harm (domestic violence) at the hands of” Father. Mother listed her address as a church in Rosedale, Maryland (“Rosedale address”). Finally, Mother requested that the circuit court allow her to file an answer and counter complaint. On July 31, 2023, Father filed a Request for Order of Default based on Mother’s failure to file an answer. Subsequently, on August 15, 2023, Father filed a response to Mother’s Motion to Vacate Order of Default, asking the circuit court to dismiss the motion for Mother’s alleged failure to serve him. Further, Father contended that Mother’s motion was premature because an order of default had not yet been issued. The circuit court granted Mother’s Motion to Vacate Order of Default on October 24, 2023, and added the Rosedale address as an address of record for Mother.3 Mother did not file either an answer or counter complaint. On March 29, 2024, Father filed a request to reissue the writ of summons using Mother’s Rosedale address. The writ of summons was reissued on April 22, 2024. On April 26, 2024, Father filed an affidavit of service signed by a third party attesting that Mother was personally served on April 26, 2024 at her Rosedale address with the May 30, 2023 writ of summons and the Complaint. After Mother did not respond, Father filed a second Request for Order of Default on June 25, 2024, which the circuit court granted on August 28, 2024. A hearing was held on April 4, 2025. Mother failed to appear. At the hearing, the circuit court heard testimony from Father and Mother’s first cousin, Towanda Fleming (“Ms. Fleming”). Because insufficient evidence was provided, the circuit court reset the custody hearing for November 20, 2025. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
On April 7, 2025, the circuit court entered an Order for Custody Evaluation and Mental Health Evaluation of both Mother and Father to be conducted by the Medical Services of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (“Court Medical”). Thereafter, Father was evaluated by Court Medical. Mother cancelled her appointment with Court Medical on three separate occasions. A Court Medical evaluator did, however, briefly speak with Mother via telephone. Based on the brief phone conversation with Mother, the evaluator reported that Mother had been living in various residences in New York. Further, Mother reported Father as her abuser and indicated that she needed to “escape” him. The evaluation submitted by Court Medical provided that Father told the evaluator that Mother is an “unmedicated schizophrenic” and reported that, although his relationship with Mother had been “okay” in the beginning, they eventually began to argue consistently and, therefore, ended their relationship. Further, Father told the evaluator that he had not seen M.M. or had contact with M.M. or Mother since 2023. Father expressed concern to the evaluator that Mother’s homelessness and unstable living situation did not provide sanitary living conditions for M.M. Regarding Father’s mental health, Court Medical concluded that Father’s “performance on the mental status examination was adequate, suggesting no major cognitive impairments.” Further, during the evaluation Court Medical administered the Brief Symptom Inventory which measures psychiatric symptoms. The results were determined to be invalid because Father answered all test items the same. Ultimately, Court Medical concluded that, “[g]iven that both parties, and the child in this case were not evaluated, a formal recommendation of custody/visitation may not be made.” A subsequent hearing was held on November 20, 2025, at which Mother did not appear. The trial court first asked about M.M.’s birth certificate: THE COURT: . . . I know at the last hearing when I had you back in April, you said you signed an Affidavit of Parentage as it relates to you all’s child, is that correct? [FATHER]: Um -THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this. Have you seen your child’s birth certificate? [FATHER]: I have in my home and she had [taken] it away, because they gave me a copy at the hospital. THE COURT: Okay. Are you listed as this child’s father? [FATHER]: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: But you don’t have a copy of it? [FATHER]: Correct. THE COURT: Have you ever gone -[FATHER]: I believe I made another copy. I’m going to check through my papers. If not, there’s a place right around the corner I can -THE COURT: Get a copy? [FATHER]: Yes, yes. Thereafter, the circuit court read the Custody Evaluation and admitted it into evidence. The circuit court then discussed the procedural history, noting that although an Order of Default was entered against Mother and Mother failed to appear at the April 4, 2025 hearing, the circuit TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
court referred the matter to Court Medical “due to concerns regarding mental health,” “concerns of violence between the parties,” and “concerns regarding [Father] himself saying that he had not seen [M.M.] in two years.” The circuit court next discussed its findings of fact based on both hearings: [Ms. Fleming] testified [on April 4, 2025] that [Mother] is not fit to have custody, because she says, she needs help. That the last time she saw [Mother] was in 2023. That [Mother] provides false addresses in a way to avoid being located. This Court inquired whether or not there was any emergency petitions filed on behalf of [Mother] and [Ms. Fleming] was unsure. The Court know[s] that it is about to and did -- was able to locate, based on the testimony and information, that there had been prior abuse between the parties. While [Father] testified no. There were two interim protective orders issued by the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City. One in January of 2021, that was ultimately dismissed in that same year. The temporary [protective order] was dismissed, it didn’t go further than that. And the other one was an interim protective order that was issued in January of 2023. And because the Petitioner, [Mother], failed to appear, it was dismissed when it came in for a temporary protective order and did not move on from there. Due to the tender age of the minor child, my understanding is the minor child was born in 2022 and it is now 2025. She is three-yearsold. [Father] has not seen her, again, for at least two years. [Father’s] testimony was that the minor child and [Mother] left around May of 2023. The circuit court concluded that, based on the limited information that’s been provided by Court Medical, based on the testimony from [Father], based off the little information that was told to Court Medical from [Mother], this Court, unfortunately, can not [sic] issue a decision as to what is in the best interest of the minor child in this case. Because the evidence in this case is deficient. ... While I don’t have an actual birth certificate to show that [Father] is indeed this child’s father, so I will start with that, even though he testified that he signed an affidavit of parentage, that he did see his name on the birth certificate, that he may have it. I still don’t have sufficient enough evidence in order to make a best interest finding based on the allegations of -- based on the history between [Father] and [Mother]. [Mother] allegedly indicating that she is now in the State of New York, not in the State of Maryland. The information provided to this Court is insufficient at this time in order for me to make a custody determination that would be in the best Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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interest of the three-year-old, especially based on [Father’s] request, is for this Court to give him full physical or primary physical and sole legal custody of a child that he has not seen in two years. Thereafter, Father indicated that his witness, Ms. Fleming, was in the lobby and was prepared to provide video evidence of Mother “confessing that [Father] never abused her and that she made it up.” Additionally, Father contended that Ms. Fleming had text messages from Mother “saying that she wants to burn down the house and . . . a whole lot of things that was just unbelievable.” The circuit court then asked Father whether he had contacted Child Protective Services (“CPS”) regarding Mother. Father responded that he had, but that CPS had failed to “call [him] back.” The following then transpired: THE COURT: This case, I will tell you, it’s delicate. Because again, this is a child that you have not seen in two years. While I -- and ultimately it is what is in this child’s best interest. And the information that is before me as to what is in this child’s best interest is very limited at this point. [FATHER]: I mean, what information that I can provide or show (inaudible 12:38:35). THE COURT: I can’t give legal advice. [FATHER]: Okay. THE COURT: Okay? [FATHER]: Okay. THE COURT: [Father]. The only people who can would be we have two pro se attorneys here. You can talk to them and they can provide you legal advice on what steps to do and what to do. . . . The circuit court then explained that, based on what Father suggested Ms. Fleming would testify to, there would still be “insufficient information to make a custody determination.” The circuit court, therefore, denied Father’s Complaint for Custody. Father filed a timely appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a circuit court’s child custody determination “utilizing three interrelated standards of review.” Kadish v. Kadish, 254 Md. App. 467, 502 (2022) (citing In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003)). As the Supreme Court of Maryland has explained: [W]e point out three distinct aspects of review in child custody disputes. When the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of [Maryland Rule 8-131(c)] applies. [Second,] [i]f it appears that the [court] erred as a matter of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion. In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 586 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 122-26 (1977)). 40
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DISCUSSION
I.
The circuit court did not err in denying Father’s Complaint for Custody because there was insufficient evidence to determine what custody arrangement would be in M.M.’s best interest. Father contends that the circuit court erred in concluding there was insufficient evidence to make a custody determination because it was Mother who “caused much of that insufficiency.” According to Father, by acknowledging that Mother had failed to respond but not using “any procedural tool to correct the problem,” the circuit court abused its discretion. Further, Father argues that the circuit court violated his due process rights by rejecting his attempt to provide additional evidence through further testimony from Ms. Fleming. Finally, Father contends that the circuit court erred by not considering Mother’s repeated failure to appear and participate in the custody action when assessing the best interest of the child. “Unequivocally, the test with respect to custody determinations begins and ends with what is in the best interest of the child.” Azizova v. Suleymanov, 243 Md. App. 340, 347 (2019) (citing Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 236 (1998)). “In between, a trial judge must determine whether a particular issue related to a parent presents harm to the health and welfare of a child or affects the child’s development, and whether there is a nexus between the parental issue and any adverse impact on the child’s overall well-being.” Azizova, 243 Md. App. at 347 (citing Boswell, 352 Md. at 235-38). Sixteen non-exhaustive factors for a circuit court to consider when making a custody determination are listed in Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol., 2025 Suppl.) § 9-201(a) of the Family Law Article (“FL”). Here, the circuit court did not engage with the FL § 9-201(a) factors. Rather, the circuit court determined that it had insufficient evidence from which to determine M.M.’s best interests. We see no error in this determination. As an initial matter, although he provided an affidavit of parentage, Father did not provide the circuit court with M.M.’s birth certificate. The circuit court, therefore, did not even have conclusive evidence that Father is in fact M.M.’s biological father. Further, because the Court Medical evaluator was unable to observe Father and M.M. together, the only evidence that the circuit court had regarding Father’s relationship with M.M. was that they had not seen each other in two years. What is more, as the circuit court discussed, there was at least some evidence of violence between Father and Mother. In such circumstances, Father did not provide sufficient evidence to allow the circuit court to determine what custody arrangement would be in M.M.’s best interest. The circuit court’s denial of Father’s Complaint, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion. The circuit court’s decision to decline to hear additional testimony from Ms. Fleming at the November hearing does not change our conclusion. Indeed, the circuit court heard from Father what Ms. Fleming would testify to and explained that, even with such testimony, the court would still have insufficient evidence to make a custody determination. We are satisfied that Father had sufficient opportunity to be TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
heard during the proceedings, even without the opportunity to provide additional testimony from Ms. Fleming. We sympathize with Father and understand the difficult situation that Mother’s failure to participate in the proceedings has put him in. As the circuit court aptly explained, however, we are constrained in our role to render judicial decisions, not offer legal advice. It was not the circuit court’s role to advise Father as to what legal avenue to take to ensure
Mother’s participation in the action. Father, of course, is free to seek legal advice and file a new Complaint for Custody. CONCLUSION
We hold that the circuit court did not err in denying Father’s Complaint for Custody due to insufficient evidence. We, therefore, affirm the judgments of the circuit court.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1
Father phrased the questions as follows: 1.
Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion by denying custody based on insufficient evidence where the record shows the lack of evidence resulted substantially from Appellee’s failure to appear, failure to answer, and failure to complete court-ordered evaluation appointments?
2.
Did the Circuit Court violate Appellant’s right to due process by declining to hear available witness testimony and other evidence while relying on the incompleteness of the record as the reason for denying relief?
3.
Did the Circuit Court legally err by failing to meaningfully weigh Appellee’s default, nonappearance, and noncompliance when applying the best-interest standard?
4.
Should this Court reverse and direct custody relief favorable to Appellant or alternatively vacate and remand with strict instructions and reassignment to a different judge?
2
In his subsequent Request for Order of Default, Father indicated that the affidavit of service was filed on July 10, 2023. The affidavit of service filed, however, is stamped as received on June 27, 2023. Accordingly, we use the latter date here.
3
The circuit court’s order correctly lists the Rosedale address provided by Mother. Subsequent communications from the circuit court to Mother, however, are addressed to the Rosedale address, but appear to erroneously list the city as Baltimore, rather than Rosedale. Because the address, including the zip code, is otherwise correct and the discrepancy was not raised by the circuit court or the parties, we do not address it further here.
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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 9 (2026)
Nos. 1755 & 2513, September Term 2025
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
Argued before: Leahy, Albright, Harrell (retired; specially assigned), JJ
1.
Permanency; visits; refusal
In re S.A.
Opinion by: Albright, J. Filed: July 9, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s orders changing the permanency plan goals, eliminating the trial home visit and permitting the minor to decline visits with mother on a visit-by-visit basis. The circuit court had substantial evidence that minor would not be safe in mother’s home.
In these appeals, Appellant M.A. (“Mother”), the mother of a child found to be in need of assistance, challenges two permanency plan orders issued by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, sitting as a juvenile court. Mother’s child, the respondent below and one of the Appellees here, is S.A. The first order, issued on September 16, 2025, added a concurrent plan of custody and guardianship to a non-relative to S.A.’s then-existing plan of reunification with Mother.1 The second order, issued on January 9, 2026, changed the first order’s concurrent plan to a sole plan of custody and guardianship to a non-relative. The first order was issued after the juvenile court sustained S.A.’s exceptions to a magistrate’s recommendation that S.A. have a trial home visit with Mother. About three months before the first order, in June 2025, the magistrate recommended the trial home visit occur at the start of July 2025 and that S.A.’s permanency plan be changed from a sole plan of reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and custody and guardianship with a nonrelative.2 S.A.’s attorney filed de novo exceptions, which the juvenile court sustained after a hearing. In its order, the court found that the trial home visit was not in S.A.’s best interest and allowed S.A. to decline visits with Mother. Mother then noted the first of the appeals now before this Court (the “First Appeal”). In December 2025, the court changed the permanency plan to “a sole plan of custody and guardianship to a nonrelative (specifically foster parent [Dr. K.])[,]” eliminating reunification with Mother from the plan. Mother appealed (the “Second Appeal”). In these consolidated appeals, Mother3 presents three questions for our review,4 which we have consolidated and restated as follows: 42
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Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in changing the permanency plan goals and eliminating the trial home visit? 2. Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in permitting S.A. to decline visits with Mother? For the reasons that follow, we answer “no” to both questions and affirm. BACKGROUND
S.A.’s Early Life, Mother’s Mental Health, & Department Involvement S.A. was born on July 17, 2017. From her birth until early November 2018, S.A. lived with Mother. In 2018, Mother began to struggle with her mental health. In October of 2018, Mother was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment because she was hearing voices and experiencing depression and anxiety. She was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed medication, but insurance issues prevented her from filling the prescriptions. Mother struggled to receive treatment because she did not have a vehicle. During her psychiatric stay, providers recommended that Mother undergo psychiatric treatment, and Mother’s aunt, M.G., volunteered to take Mother to the appointment. Mother physically assaulted M.G. in front of the psychiatrist’s office, and M.G. pressed charges. The following month, Mother sent S.A. to live with Father, at his home in California. Just a few weeks later, S.A. returned to Maryland after Father physically harmed another child in his care, his sixyear-old son. The California Department of Social Services (“CDSS”) had intervened and requested that Mother come to California to pick up S.A. Mother initially did not believe Father had harmed a child and did not express concern for S.A.’s safety after the incident. Flight arrangements were made for Mother, but she missed her flight. It took Mother a month to go to California and get S.A. The Maryland Department of Social Services (the “Department”) got involved in January 2019. Concerned about Mother’s reticence and advised of the physical altercation between Mother and M.G.in October, CDSS requested a safety assessment of Mother’s home by the Department. Danielle Clarke, a Child Protective Services worker for the Department, visited the home of J.B., S.A.’s maternal great-grandmother (“Great-Grandmother”), where Mother was living with S.A. and S.A.’s four-year-old half-sibling, N.A. Mother discussed the recent reported events, including her hospitalization, her altercation with her aunt, and Father’s TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
assault of his child. Mother told Ms. Clarke that she had been living at Great-Grandmother’s home for the last year. She reported she did not have a job but received “a little” child support from N.A.’s father and benefits from the District of Columbia, including Temporary Cash Assistance, food stamps, and medical assistance. Mother’s grandmother (S.A.’s greatgrandmother) helped Mother in meeting her children’s needs. Over the next three weeks, Ms. Clarke followed up with Mother three more times. Mother stated that things were going fine but that she wanted to move to her own place with the kids. Great-Grandmother told Ms. Clarke that Mother was “bottl[ing things] up” and having “anger outburst[s]” in the home. Ms. Clarke made multiple attempts to locate a therapy provider for Mother but was unsuccessful. On February 15, 2019, Ms. Clarke visited GreatGrandmother’s home to visit with Mother, S.A., and N.A. Mother told Ms. Clarke that things were going fine, and Ms. Clarke observed Mother and the girls were “in good spirits[.]” But later that day, after Ms. Clarke left, Mother had a physical altercation with Great-Grandmother’s son (“GreatUncle”). Great-Grandmother and Great-Uncle heard Mother yelling at S.A. while getting S.A. dressed. Great-Uncle told Mother he was concerned about her yelling and cursing. They began to argue, and Mother began to yell and curse at him. She broke off her wooden bedpost and threw it at GreatUncle. The children were present for this incident. Mother was arrested and removed, and Great-Uncle filed a protective order, preventing Mother from returning to the home. Four days later, on February 19, 2019, Great-Grandmother contacted Ms. Clarke to tell her about the February 15 incident. She confirmed that Mother had been in contact since the incident but could not return to the home. Great-Grandmother was willing to care for N.A. and S.A. but had an upcoming outof-state trip and no family to care for the children while she was gone.5 She agreed to bring the children6 to the Department for placement.7
until just before the hearing, and her visits with S.A. had been frequent but inconsistent. She was participating in mental health treatment and consented to the release of that treatment information to the Department. The permanency plan goal was reunification with Mother, and her visitation was ordered to be liberal and supervised. Over the next year, the court held three permanency planning review hearings. Mother’s contact with S.A. and with the Department continued to be inconsistent. The regularity of her visits with S.A. decreased during this time. Mother was ordered to participate in individual therapy, a psychological evaluation, and medication management as needed. In July 2020, more than a year after S.A. had been found CINA, Mother was not taking any medications and was waiting on intake with a new therapist. She advised the court that she did not need any services from the Department. At the July 2020 review hearing, the court changed S.A.’s permanency plan to custody and guardianship with a relative (Great-Grandmother). Mother continued to have liberal supervised visitation with S.A.
S.A.’s CINA Adjudication
Great-Grandmother’s Decline
On February 21, 2019, the Department petitioned for S.A. to be found a Child in Need of Assistance (“CINA”).8 The next day, following a hearing, the court authorized continued shelter care for S.A. S.A. was placed in a licensed foster home. On March 12, 2019, the juvenile court found S.A. to be CINA based on Mother’s neglect and committed S.A. to the Department. Specifically, the court found that Mother reportedly became “verbally aggressive” with S.A. and physically aggressive with Great-Uncle when he attempted to intervene, that the Department and Mother’s family had concerns about Mother’s untreated mental health, and that Mother had been indicated for abuse and neglect of N.A.in 2016. The court granted Mother liberal and supervised visitation with S.A. S.A. remained in the foster home until May 14, 2019, when she was placed with Great-Grandmother.
The next permanency plan reviewing hearing was held on December 8, 2020, and January 5, 2021.9 Mother apparently provided no evidence of her treatment with ICA, and the court continued to order that Mother have a psychological evaluation, mental health services, and medication management. The permanency goal remained custody and guardianship with a relative. On June 8, 2021, another permanency reviewing hearing was held. The court noted its concerns that the Department had not contacted Mother during the review period and had not followed up on Mother’s progress with her mental health treatment. The court changed the permanency plan to concurrent goals of reunification with Mother and custody and guardianship with a relative.10 The next permanency review hearing was held on October 15, 2021. Great-Grandmother’s age and reported dementia had started to affect her ability to care for S.A. during this period. S.A. was overdue for her medical, physical, vision, and dental exams, and still was not enrolled in the developmental support program the court had ordered.11
Mother’s Minimal Contact & Irregular Visitation A permanency planning/review hearing was held on July 22, 2019. Mother was not in contact with the Department TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Mother’s Mental Health Treatment In December 2020, Mother began receiving mental health services through Innovative Clinical Associates (“ICA”). She presented to Dr. Charles Besong for a psychiatric evaluation and participated in weekly therapy with Judith Johnson. She told Dr. Besong that she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had been “battling with [post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”)] for years[.]” She confirmed she was currently homeless and had a history of multiple psychiatric hospitalizations. She reported she was taking multiple medications as prescribed and had received outpatient mental health treatment from a psychiatrist and a therapist that year.
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Mother, however, had made progress toward reunification. She provided documentation confirming her engagement in weekly individual therapy and her medication compliance. She had recently started substance abuse treatment and planned to complete a psychological evaluation with that provider. She also obtained housing, and a home health assessment was to be performed by the Department a few days after the hearing. Mother had maintained contact with S.A., and their visits “appear[ed] to go well.” The court ordered that Mother’s visits could become unsupervised upon a successful home assessment and changed the permanency plan to a concurrent plan of reunification with Mother and “[c]ustody and guardianship by a non-relative[.]”
Mother’s Continued Progress At the next review hearing, on August 1, 2022, the court noted Mother’s progress towards reunification, including her completion of the CTC psychological evaluation and the successful supervised visits with S.A. at the Department. Mother was referred to career counseling and vocational support. The court changed the permanency planning goal to reunification with Mother. By the next hearing, on January 3, 2023, Mother’s visitation with S.A. was going well. Unsupervised visits between Mother and S.A. began in early August 2022, and overnight visits commenced in early December 2022. The permanency plan did not change.
S.A.’s Placement with Dr. K. S.A. Expresses Discomfort with Visitation On March 1, 2022, a permanency planning review hearing was held. S.A. had been removed from Great-Grandmother’s home and placed in the foster home of Dr. K. in November 2021. Mother continued to provide documentation of her participation in individual therapy, and her home passed the Department’s assessment. She was ordered to have liberal, supervised visitation, with possible unsupervised visitation made conditional on regular supervised visits and S.A.’s participation in play therapy. The permanency plan remained unchanged. The court ordered Mother to have a psychological evaluation “ASAP.” Mother’s Psychological Evaluation Mother completed a psychological evaluation with Dr. Johnathan Vital at the Center for Therapeutic Concepts, Inc. (“CTC”) in April 2022. She was informed at the outset that the information was to be used “to determine her cognitive, mental, and psychoemotional stability as well as her capacity for prudent insight, judg[]ment, and decisionmaking” and that the data gathered would be shared with the Department. There were several inaccuracies in the information Mother provided to Dr. Vital. In recounting why S.A. had been removed from her care, Mother claimed S.A. was placed in the foster care system as a result of Father’s abuse of his girlfriend’s child and omitted any mention of her mental health, psychiatric hospitalization, or physical altercations with her aunt and uncle. She provided “a very limited history of mental health concerns” to Dr. Vital, denying any history of psychiatric hospitalization, psychiatric diagnosis, psychotropic prescriptions, or even therapeutic counseling. She denied any history of trauma or abuse. When asked about her legal history, she did disclose the 2018 incident where she was charged with assault of her Great Uncle. Dr. Vital concluded that Mother “presents with no noteworthy mental or psychoemotional instability.” Though he noted Mother “may yet be disinclined to recognize her shortcomings in a way that might stymie her ability to make necessary adjustments in her life[,]” he determined “that she would likely function appropriately in most settings and that she is ca[pa]ble and inclined to care for the welfare and interest of her child/children.” 44
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At the next hearing, on June 22, 2023, the court noted concern about Mother’s visitation becoming inconsistent again. According to the court, S.A. displayed behavioral issues after Mother’s visits and when Mother’s visits were cancelled. The court found that “[m]ore consistent contact and visits from the mother are needed.” The permanency plan goal and ordered visitation did not change. At the next hearing, on November 20, 2023, there was discussion about S.A.’s discomfort with visitation. She recently expressed not wanting to stay overnight with Mother and “ha[d] become more anxious about the visits than usual.” The permanency plan goal and ordered visitation did not change. At a visit with the Department caseworker on April 16, 2024, S.A. reported that she liked spending time with Mother, but “does not like it being just her and her mother in the home.” She “sometimes does not feel comfortable at her mother’s home because she misses being with Dr. [K.].” The next hearing was on April 23, 2024. The court noted that S.A. “has become more vocal about not wanting to spend the night with her mother. She has not been able to verbalize the reason.” The permanency plan goal and ordered visitation did not change. At a visit with a Department case specialist in June, S.A. shared that she gets nervous at Mother’s house by herself “because sometimes her mother can be rude toward her” and that she would like her older sister, N.A., to be present during her overnight visits with Mother. This was discussed at the permanency planning hearing on July 25, 2024. The Department referred S.A. to talk therapy and the court ordered Mother and S.A. to participate in family therapy. The court also ordered a trial home visit with Mother to take place prior to the next court hearing. Visitation and the permanency plan remained unchanged. The Department faced difficulties in arranging the trial home visit. The worker attempted to contact Mother throughout August and September but reported Mother was “being hesitant and has not shown that [she] is ready to do extended overnights/home visits[.]” S.A. told the Department case specialist that “she will not be having overnight visits with her mother anymore.” TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
At the next hearing, on December 5, 2024, the court recognized S.A.’s reticence to stay at Mother’s home without her sister. The court noted Mother and S.A. had not yet participated in family therapy and repeated its order for family therapy to commence. The permanency plan goal remained reunification, and there were no changes to Mother’s visitation, with a trial home visit to be facilitated if “therapeutically appropriate.” By the next review hearing, Mother and S.A. had begun family therapy. The court noted that the therapy had been helpful and productive, and Mother’s parenting coach reported “an increase in the bond between [S.A.] and her mother.” S.A. had weekly overnight visits with Mother but was reportedly “resistant to the visits with her mother[.]” S.A.’s “mood swings” continued and were “more paramount.” The court directed the Department to facilitate a trial home visit between Mother and S.A. “if determined to be therapeutically appropriate and by the agreement of the parties.” Visitation remained otherwise unchanged, and the permanency goal remained reunification. S.A.’s feelings on visitation with Mother were again discussed at the next permanency review hearing on June 13, 2025. In the last review period, S.A. had continued her weekly visitation with Mother. Dr. K. described how the visits affected S.A., reporting that the mornings before the visits were “always a struggle” with S.A. sometimes crying. S.A. reported to the Department caseworker that she did not like having visits with Mother, who often uses foul language and yells. The Department advised that it was having trouble “moving this case forward” as a result of S.A.’s lack of desire for visitation with her Mother. Mother “is aware of [S.A.’s] reluctance to return home, which makes her complicit in this case’s hesitation” and “continues to have a nominal motivation of working towards home trial visits.” The Department recommended,12 and the magistrate recommended, a concurrent plan of reunification with Mother and custody and guardianship by a non-relative. The magistrate also recommended that S.A. be placed on a trial home visit with Mother beginning July 1, 2025. S.A.’s attorney filed exceptions and sought a de novo hearing on them. S.A.’s attorney argued that the magistrate erred in three ways: (1) “forcing” S.A. to participate in family therapy with Mother before she is “open and ready[;]” (2) failing to clarify S.A.’s ability to decline visits with her Mother; and (3) failing to enter an order granting custody and guardianship to Ms. K. Concurrent Permanency Plan Goals & S.A.’s Ability to Decline Visitation At the exceptions hearing in August 2025, the court consulted privately with S.A. alone13 and heard testimony from S.A.’s social worker, S.A.’s therapist, Dr. K., and Mother. The social worker testified that a trial visit would be contrary to S.A.’s mental health and recommended that S.A. remain with Dr. K. S.A.’s therapist testified it was not therapeutically appropriate to make S.A. participate in overnight visits or family therapy. Mother testified that, although S.A. should not be forced to visit her, S.A. “d[id]n’t really know what she wants” and should TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
“understand that you do have days where you do come with your mom.” Mother admitted to raising her voice and using curse words, but denied “yelling” or cursing at S.A. directly. She also disclosed, for the first time, that S.A. communicated with Father while in Mother’s care. When asked whether Father was in prison “for the abuse of his other child,” Mother stated she “thought it was for [his girlfriend’s] child, and not his.” To answer why she had not disclosed this contact to the Department, she claimed she was “not aware [that she was] supposed to tell anybody that.” She did not recall being told by the Department in June 2022 that the Department did not approve contact between Father and S.A. The court sustained S.A.’s exceptions in a September 16, 2025 order (the “Exceptions Order”). The court found S.A. to be “credible and forthright” and “[gave] weight to the testimony and letter of the respondent’s therapist, and also to the Court’s consultation with the Respondent.” The court ordered a “primary” permanency plan of custody and guardianship to Dr. K. and a “secondary” permanency plan of reunification with Mother. As to visitation, the court ORDERED, that visits between the child and the mother may be liberal and unsupervised, including overnight and extended visits, as arranged by the Department or its designee, and by agreement of Mother and the Respondent. It is further ORDERED, that the Respondent is not to be forced to visit with her [m]other, and the Respondent may decline a visit with her [m]other. The Court FINDS that a trial home visit would not be in the child’s best interest at this time, for the reasons stated above regarding the determination of the child’s permanency plan. Mother appealed. Sole Plan of Custody & Guardianship At the next review hearing in December 2025, the Department and S.A.’s attorney requested a sole plan of custody and guardianship with Dr. K.14 The court heard testimony from Dr. K. and Mother. The Department’s report, including a home study for Dr. K., was admitted into evidence. Since the last hearing, S.A. visited Mother three times, twice supervised and once unsupervised. The court repeated the same orders for Mother’s visitation as the previous hearing, ordering visitation only by agreement of both Mother and S.A. and allowing S.A. to decline visits with Mother. The court stated that the case was “ready to close, but for the ongoing appeal.” The court also noted, “A lot more work would need to be done before a return to [Mother] could occur.” The court ordered a sole permanency plan of custody and guardianship to Dr. K., finding this plan to be “in the best interest of the child.” Mother timely noted a second appeal. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary. DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review In CINA cases, we review judgments of the juvenile court using “three interrelated standards.” In re T.K., 480 Md. 122, Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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143 (2022). “We review the court’s factual findings for clear error; we review matters of law de novo; and we review ultimate conclusions of law and fact, when based on sound legal principles and factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, under an abuse of discretion standard.” In re I.Q., 264 Md. App. 265, 298 (2025) (cleaned up). Clear error occurs when there is not “competent or material evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion.” Id. at 310 (cleaned up). Orders relating to visitation also are reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Billy W., 387 Md. 405, 447 (2005). “An abuse of discretion may . . . be found where the ruling under consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court, or when the ruling is volati[v]e of fact and logic.” In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 583 (2003) (cleaned up). In reviewing the court’s findings and conclusions, we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See State Sec. Check Cashing, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. (DE), 409 Md. 81, 110 (2009) (cleaned up) (“[T]he appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on its findings of fact[.]”); Gruss v. Gruss, 123 Md. App. 311, 321 (1998) (“We, as an appellate court, will not make factual determinations properly left to the trial court.”). II. Legal Framework We start by reviewing the legal framework pertinent to this case. When a child is declared CINA and placed out of their home,15 the Department must develop a permanency plan for the child. See Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law (“FL”) § 5-525(f)(1). In doing so, the Department “shall give primary consideration to the best interests of the child[.]” Id. The permanency plan should “set the tone for the parties and the court by providing the goal toward which they are committed to work.” In re M.Z., 490 Md. 140, 145–46 (2025) (cleaned up). The permanency plan determines what services the local social service department must provide the family as well as what commitments the parents and child must make. In re Damon M., 362 Md. 429, 436 (2001). The court reviews the Department’s recommended plan, considers the factors specified in FL § 5-525(f)(1), and establishes a permanency plan that is “consistent with the best interests of the child[.]” CJP § 3-823(e).16 In establishing a permanency plan, the court considers the factors specified in FL § 5-525(f)(1)(i) through (vi). CJP § 3-823(e). These factors are: (i) the child’s ability to be safe and healthy in the home of the child’s parent; (ii) the child’s attachment and emotional ties to the child’s natural parents and siblings; (iii) the child’s emotional attachment to the child’s current caregiver and the caregiver’s family; (iv) the length of time the child has resided with the current caregiver; (v) the potential emotional, developmental, and educational harm to the child if moved from the child’s current placement; and (vi) the potential harm to the child by remaining in State custody for an excessive period of time. 46
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FL § 5-525(f)(1)(i)–(vi). There is a default permanency plan: reunification with the child’s parent or guardian. In re I.Q., 264 Md. App. at 307. Thus, reunification is the priority when the Department recommends, and the juvenile court establishes, a permanency plan. See, e.g., CJP § 3-823(e)(1)(i) & FL § 5-525(f) (2).17 But that priority gives way when a parent “ha[s] yet to make enough progress that reunification [is] foreseeable and that prolonging the lack of permanency would be detrimental to [the child].” See, e.g., In re M., 251 Md. App. 86, 125 (2021). In other words, the priority of reunification yields, as do all considerations in a CINA proceeding, to the best interests of the child. Id. at 123 n.10. In In re M., three-year-old M. was declared CINA due to neglect and removed from her parents’ custody. 251 Md. App. at 95–96. M.’s father had “a history of incarceration and unstable housing, with periods of homelessness and unemployment” and had “little contact” with M. during her first three years. Id. at 93, 95. After six years of “[o]bstacles and setbacks to reunification includ[ing] [M.’s f]ather’s multiple incarcerations, living situations, and failure to care for M. during unsupervised visitations in a safe manner[,]” the juvenile court ordered custody and guardianship to M.’s longtime caregiver, supervised visitation with her father, and closed the case. Id. at 93–94. Although M.’s father “contend[ed] that the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to implement the statutory priority favoring parent reunification over custody and guardianship to a relative[,]” we concluded the juvenile court acted within its discretion in closing the case in a manner that did not reunify the child with her father. Id. at 124–25. There, we confirmed that permanency planning “begins” with the presumption that reunification is in a child’s best interests, but this presumption must align with or yield to the best interests of the child: [T]he bedrock of CINA permanency planning is the “best interests of the child” standard. Although such planning begins with the presumption that reunification with parents is in a child’s best interests, that presumption may be rebutted when, as in this case, the court determines, after considering the statutory factors in FL § 5-525(f) (1), that “weighty circumstances” dictate that a different plan is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 123 n.10 (internal citations omitted). The juvenile court must change a child’s permanency plan “if a change . . . would be in the child’s best interest.” CJP § 3-823(h)(2)(vii). Determinations of a child’s best interest require a court to “assess the reality of the child[]’s circumstances and make findings accordingly.” In re Ashley S., 431 Md. 678, 711 (2013). “In balancing fairness to the parent and fulfilling the needs of the child, the child prevails.” Id. at 719. “[I]n situations where reunification may not be possible, the court may set a concurrent permanency plan and take concrete steps to implement both primary and secondary permanency plans[.]” In re Z.F., 266 Md. App. 444, 453 (2025) (cleaned up). Nevertheless, the juvenile court must carefully scrutinize proposed concurrent plans that are “diametrically inconsistent” with each other, as these give “no real TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
guidance” to the Department or the parents. In re Karl H., 394 Md. 402, 422 (2006) (holding that concurrent plans that call for “reunification or family placement . . . should not share the spotlight with a completely inconsistent court-approved plan of terminating parental rights, especially when the inconsistent plan calls for a TPR petition to be filed before the next scheduled review of the permanency plan”). III. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in changing the permanency plan goals and eliminating the trial home visit. A. Changing Permanency Plan Goals Mother first argues that “the evidence was insufficient to change [S.A.’s] [permanency] plan away from reunification alone pursuant to the statutory factors.” Mother contends that the court failed to “acknowledge” that reunification with a parent “is the preferred permanency plan and should be granted priority when consistent with the child’s best interests.” Regarding the juvenile court’s analysis of the FL § 5-525(f)(1) factors, Mother repeats that “there was insufficient evidence to warrant changing the plan away from solely reunification.” We disagree and now review the juvenile court’s findings, and Mother’s challenges to them, factor by factor.18 FL § 5-525(f)(1)(i) As to “the child’s ability to be safe and healthy in the home of the child’s parent” under Section 5-525(f)(1)(i), the court found that S.A. could not necessarily be safe in Mother’s home. Specifically, Mother’s mental illness had not been properly treated because she had failed to disclose relevant parts of her mental health history to the family therapist, that Mother lacked awareness about the risks of having facilitated contact between S.A. and her Father, and that S.A. feared returning to Mother. The court weighed this factor in favor of concurrent permanency plan goals: While there have been no assertions of recent danger to the Respondent’s physical safety if placed with her Mother, there is concern from mental illness that is not properly treated. Mother’s Exhibit 1, which are [visit] notes from [a family therapy provider], states that the Mother reports no psychiatric history, no symptoms, no family history, and no history of trauma, whereas in fact such history does exist. The Court is also concerned by the Mother’s lack of awareness in facilitating contact between [S.A.] and her Father without notifying or discussing this with the Department, and without apparent consideration regarding the Father’s criminal history. In addition, the child’s safety is not just physical safety. The child’s safety includes emotional safety. The child would not have emotional safety if placed with her Mother now. The Respondent expressed to the Court fear of returning to her Mother. In an attempt to overcome this finding, Mother argues that “[t]here was no evidence of safety concerns for S.A. in her TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
mother’s home[.]” She acknowledges that the family therapy notes “might reveal that [Mother] downplayed her distant history of mental illness during an intake for family therapy” but asserts that Mother has continued to treat her bipolar disorder with counseling and medication management since January 2021. She notes that S.A. has enjoyed unsupervised visits with Mother since 2022 and that no expert testified her regarding S.A.’s alleged lack of safety in Mother’s home. We disagree. On appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence. Before the court was substantial evidence that S.A. would not be safe in Mother’s home. This was, as the juvenile court outlined, that Mother was not forthright about her psychiatric history, her symptoms, her family history of mental illness, or her history of trauma; that disclosure of this history was necessary to treating Mother’s mental illness and resolving visitation issues with S.A.; that Mother had not appreciated the risk of S.A.’s contact with her Father or disclosed it to the Department; and that S.A. feared returning to her Mother. That Mother would have liked the court to weigh the evidence differently, or focus on other evidence, or draw different inferences from the evidence, are not sufficient reasons for us to disturb the court’s findings. Aside from her sufficiency argument, Mother also argues that the court erred in considering S.A.’s emotional safety in evaluating “the child’s ability to be safe and healthy” in Mother’s home. Again, we disagree. Plainly read, CJP § 3-823(e) and FL § 5-525(f)(1)(i) do not prohibit the court from considering a child’s emotional safety in determining whether a child can be “safe and healthy” in a parent’s home. One purpose of the CINA subtitle is “[t]o provide for the care, protection, safety, and mental and physical development of any child coming within the provisions of [the CINA] subtitle[.]” CJP § 3-802(a) (1) (emphasis added). Children are adjudicated CINA, i.e., come within the provisions of the CINA subtitle, if they have been “abused . . . [or] neglected” and their parent is “unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the child’s needs[,]” among other bases. CJP § 3-801(f) (2). “Abuse” and “neglect” both include “mental injury” or “substantial risk of mental injury.” See CJP §§ 3-801(b)(2) and (t)(1). “Mental injury means the observable, identifiable, and substantial impairment of a child’s mental or psychological ability to function.” CJP § 3-801(s). Here, because S.A was adjudicated CINA, the juvenile court was charged with guiding S.A.’s “mental and physical development[,]” among other responsibilities. Accordingly, we see no error in the juvenile court’s consideration of S.A.’s “emotional safety” when it established a permanency plan to serve S.A.’s best interest. Doing so was part of the juvenile court’s responsibility to guide S.A.’s “mental and physical development.” FL § 5-525(f)(1)(ii) As to “the child’s attachment and emotional ties to the child’s natural parents and siblings” under Section 5-525(f)(1) (ii), the court found that while there was “some attachment” between Mother and S.A., that attachment was “not sufficient” to disrupt S.A.’s placement with Dr. K. The court concluded that this factor, too, weighed in favor of concurrent goals: [T]here is some attachment between the child Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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and her Mother; however[,] the child reports fear of returning to live with her Mother, and the attachment between child and Mother is not sufficient to disrupt the child’s placement where she has been living for nearly 4 years, nearly half her life. Mother challenges this finding by arguing that while S.A. and Mother have not lived together since 2019, there have been many successful overnight and multi-day visits since 2022. Mother asserts that S.A. had, in the past, made positive statements about loving her visits and time with Mother and only made negative statements “that highlighted the economic advantages and resources” S.A. enjoyed at Dr. K.’s house. Mother’s arguments are unpersuasive because they are inconsistent with our standard of review. In assessing whether the juvenile court clearly erred in making its factual findings, we do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court by asking whether the evidence could have supported other factual findings. Below, there was evidence to support the court’s conclusion that S.A.’s attachment to Mother was “not sufficient” to warrant disrupting the placement with Dr. K. Specifically, the evidence showed that S.A. did not want to live with her Mother, and that interactions between S.A. and Mother were “distant” and unemotional. That the juvenile court could have focused on other, more-dated, evidence, i.e. successful overnights and multi-day visits since 2022, but did not, is not a basis on which to find clear error in the juvenile court’s factual findings. Mother next argues that the court inappropriately shifted the burden to Mother when it stated that “the attachment between [S.A.] and Mother is not sufficient to disrupt the child’s placement where she has been living for nearly 4 years, nearly half her life.” We disagree. In evaluating a permanency plan, the juvenile court must consider the FL § 5-525(f)(1) factors and choose a permanency plan that is “consistent with the best interests of the child[.]” CJP § 3-823(e). To do so requires a “balancing” of the considerations spelled out in these factors, see Ashley S., 431 Md. at 719, including a consideration of the child’s emotional attachment to their natural parent and their current caregiver. Specifically, Section 5-525(f)(1)(ii) concerns “the child’s attachment and emotional ties to the child’s natural parents[,]” while Section 5-525(f)(1)(iii) looks at “the child’s emotional attachment to the child’s current caregiver ” Thus, in its mandated consideration of these factors, the court did not “shift” any burden to Mother; instead, it compared S.A.’s attachments and balanced S.A.’s attachment to Mother relative to her attachment to Dr. K. The court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. FL § 5-525(f)(1)(iii) As to “the child’s emotional attachment to the child’s current caregiver and the caregiver’s family” under Section 5-525(f)(1)(iii), the court found that this factor weighed against having reunification as a sole permanency goal. The court found that S.A. had a “strong and secure attachment” to Dr. K., saying: The child has a strong and secure attachment 48
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to her foster parent, [Dr. K.]. The Court gives weight to the testimony of the bond between the Respondent and her foster parent. Mother argues that this factor actually weighed in favor of reunification with Mother, because S.A.’s attachment to Dr. K. is “not wholly positive.” She points to the June 2025 report by the Department and a November 2024 report by the Department19 to suggest that, based S.A.’s separation anxiety when being away from Dr. K., S.A.’s attachment to Dr. K. makes it less likely that S.A. could reunify with Mother. To the extent that Mother is arguing that the concurrent goals of custody and guardianship to a non-relative and reunification are improperly inconsistent, we disagree. To be sure, the juvenile court cannot order concurrent permanency goals that are “diametrically inconsistent” with each other, as these give “no real guidance” to the Department or the parents. In re Karl H., 394 Md. at 422. Here, however, the goals of custody and guardianship to a non-relative and reunification are not “diametrically inconsistent” if for no other reason than custody and guardianship to a non-relative does not work a termination of Mother’s parental rights. In fact, the court ordered services that continued to work toward reunification, such as family therapy for Mother and S.A., a parent coach for Mother “directed toward parenting a child with [S.A.]’s needs[,]” and individual therapy for both Mother and S.A. Mother also contends: “If bonding with the foster resource were the dispositive factor, no child would ever be returned to their parent.” But this factor was not dispositive. The court weighed its findings under this factor in conjunction with the other factors. And we have found no error or abuse of discretion in the court’s other findings. FL § 5-525(f)(1)(v) As to “the potential emotional, developmental, and educational harm to the child if moved from the child’s current placement” under FL § 5-525(f)(1)(v),20 the court weighed this factor toward a plan that would allow S.A. to remain with Dr. K. The court found that moving S.A. from Dr. K.’s home would cause her harm, specifically that: there would be emotional harm to the Respondent if moved from the Respondent’s current placement. The Court gives weight to the testimony regarding the Respondent’s bond with her foster parent, and to the child’s statements to the Court about wanting to stay with [Dr. K.]. In attempt to overcome this finding, Mother does not appear to contest that S.A. wants to remain with Dr. K. or that there would be emotional harm to S.A. if she were removed. Instead, Mother argues that there would be harm to S.A. by remaining with Dr. K., harm that the court’s finding does not account for. Mother misreads FL § 5-525(f)(1)(v). Plainly read, the focus of FL § 5-525(f)(1)(v) is not what harm the child may suffer by remaining in their current placement.21 Indeed, FL § 5-525(f)(1)(v) focuses on the “harm to the child if moved from the child’s current placement.” (Emphasis added.) Here, the evidence showed, and Mother does not dispute, that S.A would have been harmed by being removed from Dr. K.’s home. We see no clear error or abuse of discretion in that finding. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
FL § 5-525(f)(1)(vi) As to “the potential harm to the child by remaining in State custody for an excessive period of time” under FL § 5-525(f)(1)(vi), the court also weighed this factor in favor of changing the permanency plan. The court found that the delay in permanency caused S.A. stress, and moving toward concurrent goals including a plan of custody and guardianship, would move S.A. toward permanency. The court said: [T]here is harm to the child from remaining in State custody for an excessive period of time. The child has been in care for over 6 years. The lack of certainty and stability for the child, and the ongoing court case, causes the child great anxiety. The emotional toll from delaying permanency for the child is too much. The Court gives weight to the testimony of the Respondent’s physical reaction to the stress of speaking with the Court at the June 13, 2025 hearing. The plan of custody and guardianship to her foster parents can be achieved soon. Building and improving the relationship between the Respondent and her Mother will take time. Effectuating permanency for the child with her current foster parent is the proper and timely way to give the child permanency and enable her to exit state custody. In attempt to overcome this finding, Mother argues that the court failed to “acknowledge” the reunification with a parent takes priority over other permanency plans. Mother points out, “[t]he length of time a child spends in substitute care is only one factor of the court’s analysis.” According to Mother, the court abused its discretion in making this finding. We disagree. Here, the court did prioritize reunification in S.A.’s case until, as in In re M., Mother’s “parental priority and preferences were outweighed” by the evidence that reunification is not S.A.’s best interests. See 251 Md. App. at 126. Just like the father in In re M., Mother “enjoyed the benefits of a reunification plan throughout these CINA proceedings” and she “received services from the Department,” which she did, and does not, dispute amounted to reasonable efforts to implement that reunification plan. See id. at 125. Despite these services and reasonable efforts, Mother failed to secure reunification, even during the three years (August 2022 to August 2025) when reunification was the sole permanency plan. The court did prioritize reunification, but Mother failed to do the same, continuing to demonstrate a reticence with mental health treatment, with her daughter’s visitation, and with the Department. Under these circumstances, we perceive no error or abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s decisions to change the permanency plan away from a sole plan of reunification and then to a sole plan of custody and guardianship to Dr. K. B. Home Visit At the August 2025 hearing, the court concluded the trial home visit was not in S.A.’s best interests, for the same reasons it concluded that reunification as the sole permanency plan goal was not in S.A.’s best interests. Specifically, the court found: TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
The child has been in care for over 6 years. The lack of certainty and stability for the child, and the ongoing court case, causes the child great anxiety. The emotional toll from delaying permanency for the child is too much. The Court gives weight to the testimony of the Respondent’s physical reaction to the stress of speaking with the Court at the June 13, 2025 hearing. The plan of custody and guardianship to her foster parents can be achieved soon. Building and improving the relationship between the Respondent and her Mother will take time. Effectuating permanency for the child with her current foster parent is the proper and timely way to give the child permanency and enable her to exit state custody. In an attempt to overcome this finding, Mother argues that eliminating the home visit was against S.A.’s best interest, particularly in light of the fact that the permanency plan included reunification as a goal.22 According to Mother, she was “denied the only service and opportunity which would move her closer toward having her family again” and toward the permanency plan of reunification. Again, we disagree. What services a family receives from the local department is a function of what permanency plan is in place for a child. Indeed, a child’s permanency plan determines what services the local social service department must provide the family, as well as what commitments the parents and child must make. Damon M., 362 Md. at 436 (“Services to be provided by the local social service department and commitments that must be made by the parents and children are determined by the permanency plan.”). Here, the trial home visit, i.e, part service, part commitment, was eliminated only after the juvenile court concluded that reunification would no longer be S.A.’s sole or primary permanency plan. Because we have found no clear error or abuse of discretion in the permanency plan change that prompted the elimination of the trial home visit, we, similarly, find no clear error or abuse of discretion in the decision that followed, i.e. to eliminate the trial home visit. III. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that S.A. not be forced to visit with Mother and that S.A. be allowed to decline such visits. Mother argues that the court improperly delegated the visitation decision to a non-judicial person—S.A.—in allowing S.A. to refuse visits with Mother. Specifically, Mother points out that courts may not delegate visitation decisions to non-judicial persons and that this non-delegation principle applies to children. She asserts that the court erred as a matter of law in granting Mother visitation while allowing S.A. “full discretion to refuse those visits.” We disagree. “In determining visitation, the [juvenile] court is required to consider the best interests of the child, and therefore, visitation may be restricted or denied when the child’s health or welfare is threatened.” In re J.J., 231 Md. App. 304, 347 (2016), aff’d, 456 Md. 428 (2017). This is “[b]ecause visitation generally is awarded to non-custodial parents not Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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for their gratification or enjoyment, but to fulfill the needs of the child.” Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 221 (1998). We review the juvenile court’s findings of fact for clear error and its visitation decisions for abuse of discretion. In re G.T., 250 Md. App. 679, 698–99 (2026). We “will not disturb such decisions ‘unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.’” Id. at 698 (quoting Billy W., 387 Md. at 698). Where a child does not wish to visit with their parent, the juvenile court need not ignore the child’s wishes. Instead, the juvenile court may consider the child’s wishes as a factor in making a visitation determination. In re G.T., 250 Md. App. at 700 (affirming the juvenile court’s visitation determination where the court gave “great weight” to the child’s wishes but those “wishes were not the only factors that the court considered”). See also Code of Maryland Regulation (“COMAR”) 07.02.11.05(C)(7)(c) (indicating the Department is responsible for implementing a visitation plan that “[d]oes not force a child to participate in visitation but refers the child to a therapist for assistance in resolving the visitation issues[,]” among other responsibilities). Considering the child’s wishes as a factor in determining visitation, even according the child’s wishes “great weight,” is not tantamount to completely delegating the visitation determination to the child. In re G.T., 250 Md. App. at 700 (“Our review of the judge’s oral findings and her later written order makes it clear that the court used G.T.’s wishes as a factor and that it did not delegate its authority to G.T.”). We see no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s determination that S.A. was not to be forced to visit with Mother and that S.A. could decline a visit with Mother. The court’s findings make clear that the court only used S.A.’s wishes as a factor in its decision. Indeed, the court also placed weight on the testimony and recommendation of S.A.’s therapist. Specifically, the court said:
She still needs to be in therapy. That’s going to take a while for her to feel safe, emotionally, living with her mother and spending the night. . . . S.A. should not be forced to visit. And maybe being told in a therapeutic setting that she has a choice may make her feel more comfortable or more ready to say yes, I want to visit my mom, but right now the emotional toll is too much for this Court to place on this child. Moreover, S.A. does not have unfettered discretion to deny visitation. Read in its entirety, the juvenile court’s order afforded S.A. the ability to decline visitation on a visitby-visit basis, not generally. The order said that S.A. “may decline a visit with her Mother.” (emphasis added). The court also ordered family therapy for Mother and S.A. when therapeutically recommended and individual therapy for S.A. ., including trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy. Taken together, these provisions for therapy indicate that the court was anticipating, if not expecting, that as therapy progressed, S.A.’s feelings toward her Mother could well change. 23 The “a visit” provision was such that as therapy progressed, S.A. could revisit her feelings about each visit rather than stand on a blanket rejection of all visits. In other words, allowing S.A. to decline “a visit,” rather than all visits, was consistent with the court’s expectation.24 To the extent that Mother argues that the juvenile court improperly delegated its authority to a nonjudicial party or agency, we see no such delegation. The juvenile court ordered that Mother have liberal and supervised visits “by agreement of Mother and [S.A.]” and that “[S.A.] is not to be forced to visit with her Mother, and [S.A.] may decline a visit with her Mother.” For the reasons above, we see no abuse of discretion in this visitation arrangement.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
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FOOTNOTES
1
As we shall explain below, custody and guardianship to a non-relative became S.A.’s “primary” permanency plan, while reunification with Mother became S.A.’s “secondary” permanency plan.
2
The magistrate’s recommendation appears to recommend a tripartite permanency plan, including a third goal of placement with a relative for custody and guardianship. The magistrate’s oral ruling indicates only two, not three, plans were recommended, and, in its brief, the Department posits that the third box on the relevant form was checked in error. No one contends otherwise.
3
S.A.’s father, J.D. (“Father”), never participated in S.A.’s CINA case.
4
In her appellate brief, Mother phrases her questions as follows: 1.
Did the court err when it sustained the child’s exception to the magistrate’s recommendation, eliminating a sole plan of reunification and the trial home visit?
2.
Did the court err in allowing S.A. to refuse visits with her mother which would hamper reunification efforts when the court authorized a concurrent plan including reunification?
3.
Did the court err when it eliminated reunification from the plan altogether?
5
At this time, Father remained incarcerated for the maltreatment of his child in 2018.
6
The Department was able to reunify N.A. with her father. As of the August 2025
hearing, N.A. still lived with her father and visits Mother without limitation. 7
After the Department notified CDSS of the recent report and the Department’s intention to remove S.A. to shelter care, CDSS closed its case.
8
A child becomes a CINA when court intervention is required because: “(1) [t]he child has been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental disability or has a mental disorder; and (2) [t]he child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the child’s needs.” CJP § 3-801(f)(1)–(2).
9
At the December 8 hearing, the court determined that the Department had not made reasonable efforts toward the permanency plan and granted the Department’s request for a short continuance to obtain additional information regarding the efforts made. The hearing was continued on January 5.
10 At the end of 2020, there was a plan to transition S.A. from Great-Grandmother’s home to the home of her maternal grandmother, A.H. (“Grandmother”), but there were delays in the home study ordered to be done on Grandmother’s home. Sometime in early 2021, S.A. sustained a cigarette burn under her left eye while visiting Grandmother’s home, and the home study was paused during the investigation, from which an unsubstantiated finding followed. 11 Enrollment in the developmental support program was first ordered in August 2020, after S.A. was found eligible for services with Child Find after an intake on February 6, 2020. The Department’s contact notes and status reports do not indicate the basis for S.A.’s eligibility, nor do the later court orders. In February 2022, the Department reported that S.A. was found ineligible for services because she did not display any developmental delays. 12 The Department and S.A.’s counsel had recommended concurrent plans of reunification and custody and guardianship to a non-relative at the two previous hearings. 13 After consulting with S.A., the judge recounted, on the record, the substance of what she and S.A. had discussed. 14 According to the Department’s brief, the Department and S.A.’s attorney would have requested closure of the CINA case with custody and guardianship to Dr. K. but could not do so due to the pending appeal. 15 “[O]ut-of-home placement” is the “placement of a child into foster care, kinship care, group care, or residential treatment care.” FL § 5-501(i). 16 Most recently, our Supreme Court reiterated the importance of permanency plans for CINA children in out-of-home placements. It said, “[d]etermining a permanency plan for a child who has been committed to an out-of-home placement is critical to a child’s long-term well-being. The permanency plan defines the intended permanent placement of the child Md. , No. 052, Sept. Term, 2025, slip op. at 41 (June 22, 2026) and must be in the child’s best interests.” In re K.B., (omitting citation). Here, the court held numerous permanency plan review hearings, establishing reunification as the plan for S.A. for three years, from August 2022 to August 2025, before determining a change would be in S.A.’s best interests. 17 In descending order of priority, the hierarchy of placement options is: 1.
Reunification with the parent or guardian;
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2.
Placement with a relative for: A. Adoption; or B. Custody and guardianship under § 3-819.2 of this subtitle;
3.
Adoption by a nonrelative;
4.
Custody and guardianship by a nonrelative under § 3-819.2 of this subtitle; or
5.
For a child at least 16 years old, another planned permanent living arrangement that: A. Addresses the individualized needs of the child, including the child’s educational plan, emotional stability, physical placement, and socialization needs; and B. Includes goals that promote the continuity of relations with individuals who will fill a lasting and significant role in the child’s life[.] CJP § 3-823(e)(1)(i); see also FL § 5-525(f)(2).
18 Mother makes the same arguments as to both the August 2025 order and the January 2026 order. We surmise that this is because the court, in the second order, reiterated its FL § 5-525(f)(1) and CJP § 3-823(e)(2) findings from its first order. Thus, we take up Mother’s arguments as to both orders at the same time, using the findings and conclusions included in the court’s first order. 19 Neither report was included in Appellant’s Appendix. The November 2024 report referenced by Mother was not entered into evidence at any of the relevant hearings, and, thus, the court was not in error to not rely on the information therein. The June 2025 report cited by Mother states: “[S.A.] continues to have a very secure attachment to Dr. K[.], to which she becomes highly distressed when she is away from her for long periods of time.” Although Mother looks at this comment as a negative, the court did not do so. 20 Mother does not challenge the court’s finding regarding “the length of time the child has resided with the current caregiver” under Section 5-525(f)(1)(iv). 21 Instead, such considerations come in, conversely, with FL § 5-525(f)(1)(vi), “the potential harm to the child by remaining in State custody for an excessive period of time.” 22 The trial home visit had been included in the permanency plan orders since January 2023 and had been recommended with a specific deadline by the magistrate in the June 2025 hearing. 23 In this regard, the juvenile court said, “And maybe being told in a therapeutic setting that she has a choice may make her feel more comfortable or more ready to say yes, I want to visit my mom, but right now the emotional toll is too much for this Court to place on this child.” 24 Between the August 2025 hearing and the December 2025 hearing, three visits occurred between S.A. and Mother. Thus, S.A. did not decline all visits with Mother.
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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 9 (2026) Extrinsic fraud; custody order; evidence
Chastity Jones v. Ronald Livesay No. 2170, September Term 2025 Argued before: Shaw, Zic, Eyler, Deborah (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Shaw, J. Filed: July 8, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Carroll County Circuit Court’s denial of a motion to reconsider and vacate a 2016 custody order. Although appellant contended that appellees committed extrinsic fraud by knowingly using a false P.O. Box address to bypass service on appellant, a return of service showed appellant was served with a summons, the custody complaint and the accompanying judge’s order on Oct. 29, 2015, and that appellant filed an answer on March 3, 2016, effectively waiving any objection she may have had.
This appeal arises from the denial of a motion to reconsider and vacate a 2016 Custody order by the Circuit Court for Carroll County. Appellant is the Mother of D.T.L., the minor child who is at the center of this case, and Appellees Ronald and Lauren Livesay are the paternal grandparents. In September 2015, Appellees filed a Complaint for Custody after D.T.L, who was two years old at the time, had been left in their care for several months by Mother and Father Michael Livesay. The circuit court ultimately issued a custody order on August 9, 2016, granting sole legal and physical custody of D.T.L. to Appellees and granted Appellant and Father supervised access. Over the next nine years, Appellant filed numerous pleadings and motions, seeking to modify custody, which the circuit court denied. In December 2025, Appellant filed an emergency motion to vacate the 2016 custody order, which was also denied. Appellant timely noted this appeal, and she presents three questions for our review: 1. Did the Circuit Court err in failing to vacate the 2016 Custody Award as void ab initio under Md. Rule 2-535(b), given that Appellees knowingly used a false P.O. Box address to bypass service on the biological parents despite having documented knowledge of their physical mailing address? 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by maintaining a custody arrangement where the guardians intentionally concealed the child’s suicidal ideation, TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. ODD/ADD diagnoses, and escalating behavioral crises from the biological mother? 3. Does the biological father’s failure to maintain contact or housing since 2020 constitute legal abandonment, and did the court err by allowing Appellees to use this “unavailability” as a procedural shield to block Appellant’s petitions? For reasons that follow, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider and vacate the 2016 custody order. We decline to review the remaining questions presented by Appellant as they were not presented to the circuit court and are therefore, not preserved for our review. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. BACKGROUND
Appellant Chastity Jones is the Mother of D.T.L., a minor child, and Appellees Ronald and Lauren Livesay are the paternal grandparents. On September 22, 2015, Appellees filed a complaint for emergency custody of D.T.L. after the child had been left in their care for several months by Appellant and Father Michael Livesay. Appellees asserted that Appellant and Father were “homeless, on drugs and as of this time do not have employment,” and thus it would be in the best interest of the minor child if he remained with Appellees. Appellees requested temporary sole physical and legal custody and that the parents could have visitation “only if they have safe accommodations and food to feed [the] child.” The Court issued an order the following day, scheduling the case for an expedited hearing before a magistrate, “after service on defendants.” A Writ of Summons was issued to both Appellant and Father on September 23, 2015. The address listed was P.O. Box 1048, Emmitsburg, MD 21727. Service was not successfully effectuated. Appellees filed a second complaint for custody on October 6, 2015, requesting sole physical and legal custody of D.T.L. The court entered an order on October 13, 2015, stating: “Request for Emergency/Ex Parte Custody Denied. Expedited Magistrate’s hearing to be set after service of process on defendant’s [sic] per Court’s 9/23/15 ruling” (emphasis in original). A second Writ of Summons was issued to both Appellant and Father on October 13, 2015, and a Return of Service for both parties was filed on October 30, 2015. The Return of Service indicated that Appellant was served with the Writ of Summons, the Complaint for Custody, and the accompanying Order on October 29, 2015 in Taneytown, Maryland. A Notice of Hearing was sent to Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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all parties on November 25, 2015. The notice designated December 2, 2015, at 9:30 AM as the date for the expedited hearing. Appellant’s mailing address was listed, again, as P.O. Box 1048, Emmitsburg, MD 21727. The hearing occurred on December 2, 2015, and Appellees were the only parties in attendance. Following the hearing, the magistrate issued a report and recommendations, where he found that it was in the best interest of the minor child that Appellees be granted temporary sole legal and physical custody, pending further court proceedings. He recommended that a scheduling conference be set. A temporary custody order was issued on January 5, 2016, by the circuit court, in accordance with the magistrate’s recommendations, pending further court proceedings. A scheduling conference was set for February 9, 2016, and a notice of hearing, along with the magistrate’s report and recommendations, and temporary custody order, was mailed to Appellant’s P.O. Box address. Neither Appellant nor Father appeared for the scheduling conference. A merits hearing was set for April 18, 2016 and a notice of hearing was sent to Appellant and Father. On March 3, 2016, Appellant filed her first answer in these proceedings, where she stated that she and her four children were homeless from May 2015 to December 2015, and that she and Father had previously offered to “buy and provide for [D.T.L.], Ronald insisted he buy cause we were tight on money.” Appellant also stated that the court should consider the fact that “[Father] and I let Ronald watch [D.T.L.] for the year due to our situation. We both have full time jobs, and want our son back. Ronald said all of 2015, when we got a place/or not we could get him [D.T.L.] any time we wanted.” Appellant filed a motion, on March 3, 2016, requesting that the temporary custody order be stricken, and stated that she was “never served with the documents in this case and the address given to the court was false and has never been [her] address.” On the same day, Appellant filed an “Address Change Request” in which she listed her “old address” as Appellees’ residence and listed her new address as an apartment in Pennsylvania. The notice of hearing for the April 18, 2016 merits hearing was sent to Appellant’s new address on March 11, 2016. On March 31, 2016, the circuit court denied Appellant’s motion, stating “Temporary Order is by its terms, temporary. Merits trial is set for 4/18/2016” (emphasis in original). The merits hearing was held on April 18, 2016, and all parties were present. At its conclusion, the magistrate issued his report and recommendations. He found that granting sole legal and physical custody of D.T.L. to Appellees was in the best interest of the child, and recommended that Appellant and Father be granted supervised access to D.T.L. and be charged generally with the child’s support. Appellant and Father filed exceptions, arguing that they were never served with the complaint, had little notice of the hearing and time to prepare, that the magistrate “got facts wrong,” and that Appellees lied to Appellant and Father about what they were seeking. A hearing was set for August 19, 2016, to address the exceptions. The exceptions were overruled and on August 19, 2016, a final custody order was entered, granting Appellees sole legal and physical custody of D.T.L. 54
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The order granted Appellant and Father supervised access to the minor child and charged the parents with general support of D.T.L. Over the next nine years, Appellant filed various pleadings and motions to modify the custody arrangement. In December 2025, Appellant’s emergency motion to vacate the 2016 custody order was denied by the court. Appellant timely noted this appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In general, the denial of a motion to alter or amend a judgment or for reconsideration is reviewed by appellate courts for abuse of discretion.” Miller v. Mathias, 428 Md. 419, 438 (2012) (internal citations omitted). “We have also noted that, when reviewing a trial judge’s discretionary rulings, this Court has recognized that trial judges do not have discretion to apply inappropriate legal standards, even when making decisions that are regarded as discretionary in nature.” Id. (internal citations omitted). DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in failing to vacate the 2016 Custody Award as void ab initio under Md. Rule 2-535(b). Appellant alleges that Appellees knowingly used a false P.O. Box address to bypass service on the biological parents despite having documented knowledge of the parents’ physical mailing address. Appellant contends that since she was never properly served, a default order was entered without her knowledge, and the order is “a legal nullity due to extrinsic fraud.” Appellees contend that Appellant admitted in her March 3, 2016 Answer, that she was homeless at the time of the filing of the initial complaint for custody and that she did not have a physical address at that time. Appellees used the only address known to them. Appellees contend that by filing an answer and participating in the proceedings, Appellant waived any objection she may have had regarding service and in doing so, she submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. Maryland Rule 2-535 outlines a court’s revisory power and control over a judgment after the judgment has been entered. Section (b) of the rule states: (b) Fraud, Mistake, Irregularity. On motion of any party filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. Md. Rule 2-535(b). In Thacker v. Hale, 146 Md. App. 203 (2002), this Court held: [A]fter a judgment becomes enrolled, which occurs 30 days after its entry, a court has no authority to revise that judgment unless it determines, in response to a motion under Rule 2-535(b), that the judgment was entered as a result of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. [. . .] The evidence necessary to establish fraud, mistake, or irregularity must be clear and convincing. [ . . .] Maryland courts ‘have narrowly defined and strictly applied the TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
terms fraud, mistake, [and] irregularity,’ in order to ensure finality of judgments. See Platt v. Platt, 302 Md. 9, 13 (1984). Moreover, the party moving to set aside the enrolled judgment must establish that he or she ‘act[ed] with ordinary diligence and in good faith upon a meritorious cause of action or defense.’ Thacker, 146 Md. App. at 216-17. We note that the type of fraud necessary to vacate a final judgment must be extrinsic fraud. Our Court, in Facey v. Facey, 249 Md. App. 584 (2021) defined what constitutes extrinsic fraud. There, we stated: Extrinsic fraud perpetrates an abuse of judicial process by preventing an adversarial trial and/ or impacting the jurisdiction of the court. Fraud prevents an adversarial trial when it keeps a party ignorant of the action and prevents them from presenting their case . . . or . . . the fraud prevents the actual dispute from being submitted to the fact finder at all. Extrinsic fraud is normally collateral to the issues tried in the case in which the judgment is rendered. A court will not reopen a judgment because a party discovers fraud that took place during the trial or was contained within the trial [.] Id. at 632 (emphasis omitted). In Das v. Das, 133 Md. App. 1 (2000), we noted that “[t]he term fraud as used in Rule 2-535(b) is ‘narrowly defined and strictly applied [,]” and to “prevail on a motion to set aside an enrolled judgment, the moving party must show fraud, mistake, or irregularity by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 18 (internal citations omitted). We held that it is the duty of litigants to keep themselves informed about the progress of a pending case, and to furnish the court with their most recent address themselves. Id. at 20. In the case at bar, Appellant alleges that Appellees committed extrinsic fraud by knowingly using a false P.O. Box address to bypass service on Appellant. The record, however, includes a Return of Service that evidences that Appellant was served with a summons, the custody complaint, and the accompanying Judge’s Order on October 29, 2015. The Return of Service was signed, under oath, by the process server, and was filed with the circuit court on October 30, 2015. Appellant also filed an answer on March
3, 2016, effectively waiving any objection she may have had. While the record does contain several instances of returned mail from the P.O. Box address, the record also includes an “Address Change Request” that Appellant filed on March 3, 2016, shortly after filing her first answer in these proceedings, where she lists her old address as Appellees’ home address and her new address as an apartment in Pennsylvania. Appellant was also ultimately served with a summons, and she was present for the merits hearing on custody. Based on this record, which includes the court’s docket entries and filings by Appellant, it is clear that Appellees did not commit extrinsic fraud. With regard to the two remaining issues Appellant presents to our Court, these issues were not properly preserved for appellate review because Appellant did not present these issues to the circuit court for a determination. In Robson v. State, 257 Md. App. 421 (2023), this court stated that Maryland Rule 8-131(a) “makes unambiguously clear, the appellate courts of this state ‘ordinarily will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.’” 257 Md. App. at 459 (2023) (quoting Small v. State, 235 Md. App. 648, 696 (2018)). This Court explained that the “purpose of the preservation requirement is to preserve the integrity and the efficiency of the trial itself” and that the primary purpose is not to “facilitate or to foreclose appellate review of a trial error,” but rather to “eliminate any necessity for appellate review.” Robson at 460. “A secondary purpose of the preservation requirement is to protect the trial judge from being charged with error without having been alerted to the risk by counsel.” Id. at 461. Here, Appellant asserts, in her second and third questions, that the trial court abused its discretion by maintaining the custody arrangement because Appellees intentionally concealed the child’s suicidal ideation, ODD/ADD diagnoses, and escalating behavioral crises from Appellant, that Father’s failure to maintain contact or housing since 2020 constituted legal abandonment, and that the court erred by allowing Appellees to use Michael Livesay’s “unavailability” as a procedural shield to block Appellant’s petitions. The record is clear, however, that Appellant did not raise these issues before the circuit court. We, therefore, decline review as the issues have not been preserved.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CARROLL COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 9 (2026) Modification; motion to dismiss; hearing
Armelle S. Franklin v. Craig Anthony Osbourne No. 2055, September Term 2025 Argued before: Graeff, Leahy, Ripken, JJ. Opinion by: Leahy, J. Filed: July 7, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of mother’s modification of custody request without a hearing. Because father’s motion to dismiss the request did not seek a hearing, and because mother did not respond to father’s motion (and thus did not request a hearing), Rule 2-311(f) empowered the court to resolve father’s motion to dismiss on the papers and without a hearing.
In August 2025, appellant Armelle S. Franklin asked the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to modify the court’s custody order, entered one year earlier, that governed how she and appellee Craig Anthony Osbourne spend time with their child. Osbourne moved to dismiss Franklin’s modification request, arguing that Osbourne had failed to identify any “material change of circumstances” that could justify such a modification. Because Franklin never responded to Osbourne’s motion to dismiss, the court granted it without a hearing. On appeal, Franklin contends that it was error for the court to dismiss her modification request without a hearing. We disagree. Because Osbourne’s motion did not seek a hearing, and because Franklin did not respond to the motion (and thus did not request a hearing), Rule 2-311(f) empowered the court to resolve Osbourne’s motion to dismiss on the papers and without a hearing. We therefore affirm. BACKGROUND
Four years ago, Franklin filed for divorce in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County seeking to end her marriage to Osbourne and retain sole custody of their then-five-month-old child. Seven months into the litigation, the parties entered a consent custody order dated October 28, 2022, under which: Franklin would have “primary residential custody” and “sole legal custody” of their child; Osbourne would have supervised visitation twice a week; and the parties would reconvene in four months to update or modify the custody arrangement. 56
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Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. At the end of the divorce proceedings in January 2023, this consent order was incorporated into the judgment of absolute divorce entered on January 20, 2023. In May 2023, Osbourne moved to modify this custody arrangement. He explained that since the divorce judgment, he had secured adequate housing for him and the child to live together. Following a hearing on August 26, 2024, the court entered a revised “Custody and Access Order” on August 30, 2024, granting the parties joint legal custody of their child, who was then almost three years old. The order provided that the parties “shall share information in writing and communicate with one another in writing regarding all decisions relating to the minor child’s health, education, religion, and extra-curricular activities.” Franklin was awarded tie-breaker authority for those instances in which the parties may not be able to agree on a matter, “after making significant communication and good faith efforts.” The court ordered the parties to communicate non-emergency matters only through the “Our Family Wizard” parenting app and to be civil and respectful to one another. In addition, the court set out a “step-up schedule” under which Osbourne would get more time with the child each month, and the court divvied up holiday custody. If the parties made it all the way through Osbourne’s step-up period, then under the “final and permanent access schedule,” Osbourne would have the child on weekends and Wednesday afternoons. In May 2025, about nine months into this arrangement, Osbourne filed a petition for contempt, alleging that Franklin kept him from using the child’s daycare’s “Tadpoles” app; interfered with his allocated parenting time; and needlessly called the police on him. Franklin responded that Osbourne had abused his access to Tadpoles to harass daycare staff; that she had proposed changes to visitation but had not missed any visits, and that she had asked for a welfare check because Osbourne “hesitated to post” his “address.” The court issued a show cause order on September 11, 2025, ordering Franklin to show cause why she should not be held in contempt. While the contempt matter was pending, on August 26, 2025, Franklin filed the underlying “Petition to Modify Custody and Visitation” in which she sought sole physical and legal custody, reduced visitation with Osbourne, and limitations on Osbourne’s access to the daycare facility. Franklin responded by moving to dismiss the petition to modify. He argued that none of the facts alleged in Osbourne’s petition qualified as “material change[s] in circumstances” that justified changing the custody and visitation arrangement, and he accused Franklin of commencing the modification process in response to the contempt petition, rather than as a good-faith effort to better the interests of their child. Franklin did not respond to TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
this motion, so the court granted it and dismissed her petition to modify on October 23, 2025. Franklin timely appealed to our Court. DISCUSSION
Standard of Review When we review custody modification decisions, we ordinarily apply three standards of review—one for the facts, one for the law, and one for the court’s ultimate decision. Karen P. v. Christopher J.B., 163 Md. App. 250, 264 (2005). Here, the court did not make any findings of fact for us to review, and Franklin does not ask us to review the ultimate custody decision. Instead, Franklin argues that the court could not dismiss her modification petition without first holding a hearing. This is a question of law that we review de novo, without deferring to the court’s interpretation of the law. Id. Parties’ Contentions Franklin argues that she was entitled to a hearing under Rule 2-504.1. She says that she was preparing for such a hearing, at which she would have had “the opportunity to present additional evidence in support of her claim.” Because the court granted Osbourne’s motion to dismiss without holding a hearing, she was “denied … due process and her day in court.” Osbourne mostly argues the merits of Franklin’s petition, reiterating his position below that Franklin had failed to allege any material change of circumstances that could justify modification of the custody order. As for Franklin’s right to a hearing, Osbourne argues that because Franklin did not respond to his motion to dismiss or request a hearing, she has waived the argument she now presses. In other words, because Franklin did not ask the court for a hearing, Osbourne says Franklin should not be allowed to ask us to order a hearing. The Hearing Requirement Franklin asserts that under Rules 2-504 and 2-504.1, the court was obligated to hold a hearing on her contempt
petition. Those rules obligate the court to issue scheduling orders and, when appropriate, set scheduling conferences for new matters. See Rule 2-504(a)(1) (“Unless otherwise ordered by the County Administrative Judge for one or more specified categories of actions, the court shall enter a scheduling order in every civil action.”); Rule 2-504.1(a) (“[T]he court shall issue an order requiring the parties to attend a scheduling conference … in an action placed or likely to be placed in a scheduling category for which the case management plan … requires a scheduling conference”). Neither of these rules requires that the scheduling order set a hearing. Instead, because Osbourne moved to dismiss the petition, Franklin’s hearing rights are governed by Rule 2-311(f), which directs parties to request hearings on motions: A party desiring a hearing on a motion … shall request the hearing in the motion or response under the heading “Request for Hearing.” The title of the motion or response shall state that a hearing is requested. Except when a rule expressly provides for a hearing, the court shall determine in each case whether a hearing will be held, but the court may not render a decision that is dispositive of a claim or defense without a hearing if one was requested as provided in this section. The court correctly noted in its order dismissing the petition that Osbourne’s motion did not contain a request for a hearing and that, because Franklin did not file a response to the motion,1 Franklin had not requested a hearing, either. For that reason, Rule 2-311(f) authorized the court to consider Osbourne’s motion without holding a hearing.2 Drolsum v. Horne, 114 Md. App. 704, 711 (1997) (trial court may rule on a motion without a hearing if the other party does not respond). CONCLUSION
Franklin did not respond to Osbourne’s motion and she did not request a hearing on the motion. The applicable Maryland rules provide that the court was then free to decide the motion on the papers without a hearing.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY IS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1
See Rule 2-311(b) (giving parties 15 days to file a response to a motion).
2
Franklin’s brief does not ask us to review the court’s substantive ruling, namely that the facts alleged in her petition do not amount to a “material change of circumstances” requiring a change to the custody arrangement. Although she recites her factual allegations, she identifies only one “Issue” about the court’s lack of a hearing, and her request for relief asks us to reverse and remand the case so that the court can hold a hearing. We therefore will not review the court’s ultimate determination about what constitutes a material change of circumstances. See Guidelines for Informal Briefs §(b)(3) (“Any issue not raised specifically in an informal brief may not be considered by the Court”), https:// perma.cc/ WX5S-JMJJ.
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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 9 (2026) Custody; child support; evidence
Grayson Maxwell v. Kimberly Maxwell No. 2034, September Term 2025 Argued before: Berger, Tang, Wright (retired; specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Berger, J. Filed: July 8, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Cecil County Circuit Court’s denial of father’s motion to vacate the court’s prior orders – regarding custody of the parties’ minor child and child support – because of alleged fraud, mistake or irregularity. Absent allegations of extrinsic fraud by mother in either the custody and visitation or the child support proceedings, the circuit court did not err by denying father’s motion to vacate.
In March 2025, the Department of Social Services of Baltimore City (“Department” or “DSS”), appellee, filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City petitions for guardianship of two minor siblings, J.B. and B.B., with the right to consent to adoption or long term care short of adoption.1 After Eric B. (“Father”), appellant, failed to file exceptions, the circuit court issued an order, declaring, “Father is no longer a party in this matter.” The court subsequently denied Father’s motion for reconsideration of that order. Father noted this appeal, challenging those rulings.2 The Department included in its brief a motion to dismiss, asserting that the order from which Father appeals is interlocutory and that no appeal lies from it. We agree and shall dismiss the appeal. We shall also take the Department’s suggestion and briefly state our views on the procedural question at issue in contemplation of potential continuing litigation in these cases. BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are not relevant to the procedural issue raised in this appeal, and we therefore shall not present a lengthy recitation of them. Our focus will be on the relevant procedural facts. On January 24, 2023, J.B. and B.B. were placed in foster care, where they have remained until now. Three months later, they were declared to be children in need of assistance 58
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Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. (“CINA”). During the prior proceedings, Father had been represented by Daniel Gross, Esq. On March 13, 2025, the Department filed in the circuit court petitions for guardianship with the right to consent to adoption or long term care short of adoption, which, if granted, would result in the termination of Father’s (and Mother’s)3 parental rights (“TPR”). On the same date, showcause orders were issued to both parents, advising that their parental rights could be terminated, directing them to file timely notices of objection, and advising them of their rights to counsel. Also on the same date, summonses were issued to the parties and counsel, including Mr. Gross, directing them to appear at a scheduled Zoom hearing on May 5, 2025. On May 5, the virtual hearing was held before Magistrate Neeta Kataria. Father did not appear, but Mr. Gross did. After counsel for the Department informed the court that “there have been no entry of appearances or objections filed in this case[,]” Mr. Gross explained that he would not “object to a postponement” and “would like to speak with [his] client[.]” Department counsel averred (not entirely correctly) that “[M]other was personally served on April 23rd” and that Father had been served by the sheriff, who had not yet filed an affidavit of service.4 The court set a new hearing date of June 11, 2025. Mr. Gross assured the court that by then he would know whether he was going to represent Father in these cases, and Department counsel assured the court that by then both parents’ thirty-day periods for filing notices of objection would have expired. On June 11, a Zoom hearing was held before Magistrate William Gyauch. Mr. Gross was not present, nor had he entered an appearance in these cases. Department counsel informed the court that the sheriff had, indeed, served Father in Case No. 590 but that it was still “in the process of having [F]ather served for [B.]B.’s case [Case No. 591].”5 Father joined the hearing and was informed by the court “that he will need to contact the Public Defender’s Office regarding counsel.”6 The court scheduled a pretrial Zoom hearing date of July 16, 2025. The following day, on June 12, 2025, Father was served in person with the petition and show-cause order in Case No. 591. The affidavit of service was filed several weeks later. On July 16, a scheduling hearing was held via Zoom before Magistrate Gyauch. Mr. Gross was present but had not yet entered his appearance in the cases. Father was not present. Mr. Gross informed the court, mistakenly, that he was present “on behalf of [I.F.,]” who is not a party in either case. The court, in consultation with the attorneys, set TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
dates for the status conference, the settlement conference, production of records, and a guardianship merits hearing. On July 28, 2025, the Department attempted to serve the petitions and show-cause orders on Mr. Gross by certified mail, return receipt requested, as provided under Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article (“FL”), § 5-316(c)(2)(ii). Two weeks later, the Department filed an affidavit of service, but the return receipt was unsigned. On August 25, 2025, the court convened a status hearing before Judge Robert Taylor. Mr. Gross was present; Father was not. Department counsel noted that Mr. Gross “has actually not filed an entry of appearance” and that “Father likewise has not filed an objection.” Department counsel further declared that, “[F]ather is not a party[,]” “[h]e hasn’t filed an objection[,]” and “his time has run.” The court asked Mr. Gross whether he agreed, and Mr. Gross replied, “I have no representations, Your Honor.”7 The court declared its agreement with Department counsel, stating, “Time for an objection has long past due. Absent some extenuating circumstances [Father] has consented [to guardianship and termination of his parental rights] by operation of law.” The court excused Mr. Gross from the hearing, and it subsequently issued an order, stating, Father’s CINA attorney Daniel Gross was present. Father has not filed an objection, and his counsel has not made an entry of appearance under these TPR matters. The time for [F]ather to object has expired. Father is no longer a party in this matter. Two more Zoom hearings were held before Judge Charles Blomquist without Father’s participation. Then, on October 29, 2025, Jeffrey Dier, Esq., entered his appearance in the cases. A few weeks later, on November 15, 2025, Mr. Dier filed notices of objection on Father’s behalf. In response, the Department promptly filed motions to strike what it deemed late objections. Attached to the motions to strike were affidavits of service on Father, prior court orders (including the August 25th order declaring that Father’s time for filing notices of objection had expired and that he was no longer a party to the cases), and affidavits of service on Mr. Gross, including the unsigned delivery receipts. On November 19, 2025, at a Zoom hearing before Judge Blomquist, the following colloquy took place: THE COURT: So just help me understand. I think there was an order issued by Judge Taylor in the case that already recognized that no objection had been filed by [Father], so why am I even hearing this? MR. DIER: Well, Your Honor, do you want me to -- you want me to chime in? I mean I am filing a response to that motion which I just received the other day. But generally speaking there was -- there’s several issues involved here. One is that [Father] -- there’s no proof of service for [Father] for J.[B.]’s case. There’s no required affidavit of service by the private process server. The Department -- I’m not sure exactly who filled it out, but there’s a data entry sheet of some kind, but no required affidavit of service on him for that child. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Additionally, the Juvenile Court attorney at that time for the -- for [Father], he was not actually served with the -- with the petition show cause order and notice of objection is required under the law. There was apparently delivery to his -- the lobby of his -- the large building that he works in. He never -- he’s advised me he never received the documents. He didn’t sign for them as required under the law. THE COURT: So, Mr. Dier, I mean I appreciate all that recitation, but I am looking at an order that’s dated 8/25/2025 signed by Judge Taylor in which he says in the order the time for [F]ather to object has expired. Father is no longer a party in this matter. *** MR. DIER: . . . The issue of service of actual jurisdiction of the court is called -- is under -- falls under fraud, mistake or irregularity can be raised at anytime. So this issue can be raised even on appeal for the first time. So, you know, I’m raising it now. But the lack -- the lack of notice and due process falls under mistake or irregularity so I’m raising it now. I mean if -- if Ms. Witlen[8] wants to go ahead with this case and have an appeal that could take, you know, very long, she’s welcome to do that, but -- but that’s the basis. I can raise this before the Circuit Court at anytime. That’s the law. *** MS. WITLEN: Thank you. Your Honor, in my motion to dismiss obviously I attached nine different exhibits. Father personally appeared at a hearing. He was served by the sheriff. It wasn’t private process service. It was the sheriff’s department. The sheriff’s department filed a civil intake data sheet in which it states that they served [F]ather. After Mr. Dier objected and raised this issue the Department was able to coordinate with the Department of Safety and Corrections to obtain an affidavit of service which I uploaded today which verifies that Mr. -- or Sergeant McCaskill actually did serve [F]ather on the date that the civil intake sheet is dated. Additionally, Your Honor, Mr. Gross who was the CINA attorney appeared at -- personally appeared at three different TPR hearings. At no point in time did he raise that there was a mail issue. The Department does not believe that Mr. Dier has standing to raise a mail issue with Mr. Gross’s office with no affidavit attached. I am prepared to move forward with this case. The court also has to look at the best interest of the child and this case has now been dragging on because [F]ather has not objected and there are court orders in which he has been deemed to be not a party for lack of objection. There is no affidavit supporting, Your Honor. There’s been no tendering of an individual saying that there was Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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fraud, mistake or irregularity. Mr. Dier doesn’t have standing to do that. THE COURT: Well, again, help me understand the [e]ffect of the August 25th order. Why am I being asked to review Judge Taylor’s order? This is not a recommendation from a magistrate. This is an order from a sister judge. I’m not an Appellate Court. I mean I guess, you know if he wants to he could take an interlocutory appeal or he’s going to have to wait until the conclusion of the -- the termination of parental rights. I’m not sure that’s in the best interest of -- of the children or the parents, but that would be -- I’m not sure I have the ability to hear this matter. Am I wrong? MS. WITLEN: Are you asking me, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. MS. WITLEN: I believe that the -- I believe that no appeal was filed to Judge Taylor’s order from August 25th. THE COURT: Wouldn’t it be more appropriate to go back to Judge Taylor for a motion to reconsider? MS. WITLEN: I don’t have any issue with that, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yeah. I mean I -- I mean I’m not sure how it got in front of me except I’m the termination of parental rights judge. So at this point I’m going to go ahead and dismiss Mr. Dier’s -- Mr. -- I’m dismissing his objection. I’m not sure I have the ability to do that because you can’t object to something -- he’s not a party, so. Later that same day, Judge Blomquist issued an order, declaring: Judge R. Taylor’s 8/25/25 order ruled [F]ather had not filed a timely objection and was not a party to the matter. The Motion to Strike the late objection filed by Jeffrey Dier, Esq., submitted by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS), is hereby deemed MOOT, as the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the matter. On December 9, 2025, Mr. Dier filed (on Father’s behalf) a motion for reconsideration of Judge Taylor’s August 25th order. Attached to that motion were the Department’s affidavit of service on Mr. Gross, including a copy of the unsigned mail receipt; a copy of the court’s August 25th order; and an affidavit from Mr. Gross, averring, among other things, that his office is located in “a large multi-story office building comprised of hundreds of virtual work spaces”; that “the lobby receives hundreds of pieces of mail a day”; that he has “experienced serious challenges receiving mail that is addressed to [him]”; that he “never received or signed for” the petitions, show-cause orders, or notice of objection forms in this case; that he “never received” information regarding “deadlines for filing objections to the petitions”; and that he “did not intend to or enter” his appearances on Father’s behalf “[f]or purposes of any” TPR proceeding “involving his children.” After the Department filed a response to Father’s motion for reconsideration, requesting that it be denied, the court, 60
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on December 22, 2025, issued a memorandum opinion and order denying Father’s motion for reconsideration. In part, the court stated: In [Father’s] motion to reconsider, he does not dispute that Mr. Gross was in fact served with the show cause order via certified mail. Mr. Gross claims that he did not personally see the document because of problems with the internal distribution of mail in his office building. This is not the Department’s problem. Nothing in Section 5-316 requires the Department to ensure that the properly served attorney actually reads his mail. Such a burden would be impossible to meet. More to the point, nothing about the failure of Mr. Gross to promptly read his mail prevented [Father] from filing a timely objection to the TPR action. It may well be that Mr. Gross did not see the show cause order in this case, as he attests in his affidavit. Nonetheless, service was effectuated when it was delivered to his address of record via certified mail, return receipt requested. It is obvious, moreover, that Mr. Gross was well aware of the TPR action before he was actually served with the show cause order. Father then noted this appeal. DISCUSSION
Motion to Dismiss With narrow exceptions, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), § 12-301. Section 12-301 “does not define finality, but instead leaves it to [the Supreme] Court to determine what makes a judgment ‘final.’” Metro Maint. Sys. S., Inc. v. Milburn, 442 Md. 289, 297 (2015). To be a final judgment, “a ruling must ordinarily have the following three attributes”: (1) it must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy[;] (2) unless the court acts pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602(b) to direct the entry of a final judgment as to less than all of the claims or all of the parties, it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties; (3) it must be set forth and recorded in accordance with Rule 2-601. Id. at 298. Initially, we note that the only order at issue in this appeal is the December 22nd order9 denying the motion for reconsideration of the prior August 25th order because the notices of appeal were filed on January 5, 2026, well beyond thirty days after August 25, 2025. Md. Rule 8-202(a) (requiring that a notice of appeal “be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken”). In any event, neither the August 25th order nor the December 22nd order has any of the attributes of a final judgment because neither order is, in fact, a final judgment. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
As the Department points out, the December 22nd order did not finally adjudicate the grant of guardianship of the minor children and, therefore, “was an order ‘that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties to the action’ and ‘not a final judgment.’” (Quoting Md. Rule 2-602(a)(1).) Nor did the order invoke Rule 2-602, which requires that the court “expressly determine[] in a written order that there is no just reason for delay” before it may certify an otherwise non-final judgment for appeal. Md. Rule 2-602(b). Nor did the order comply with Rule 2-601, which requires, among other things, that the clerk “enter a judgment by making an entry of it on the docket of the electronic case management system used by that court along with such description of the judgment as the clerk deems appropriate.” Md. Rule 2-601(b) (2). The Supreme Court of Maryland has set forth “only three exceptions” to the final judgment rule. Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615 (2005). Those are: “appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute;” “immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602” (which we already have ruled out); and “appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine.” In re C.E., 456 Md. 209, 221 (2017) (cleaned up). There is no statutory right of appeal from the December 22nd order. Although CJP § 12-303(3)(x) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order “[d]epriving a parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order[,]” application of that provision is ruled out because that exception has been narrowly interpreted as to not apply to an order, such as that in this case, that neither alters immediate custody of a child nor materially changes a permanency plan. See C.E., 456 Md. at 224, 226-27 (holding that “a juvenile court’s order waiving a department’s obligation to provide reasonable reunification efforts, while leaving a custody order and permanency plan unchanged, does not deprive a parent of care or custody of a child” and is therefore not immediately appealable). The collateral order doctrine is a “legal fiction” that permits immediate appeals from “orders that would otherwise not be appealable at the time they are entered.” Md. Bd. of Physicians v. Geier, 451 Md. 526, 554 (2017). There are four requirements that an interlocutory order must satisfy for the collateral order doctrine to apply: (1) the order must conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) the order must resolve an important issue; (3) the order must resolve an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action; and (4) the issue would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment. Id. at 546. At minimum, the December 22nd order does not satisfy the fourth requirement. The issue (whether the circuit court properly determined that Father had waived
his objections) would be reviewable after the circuit court’s final disposition of the Department’s guardianship petitions. Because “[e]ach of the four elements . . . must be satisfied” for the collateral order doctrine to apply, Spivery-Jones v. Receivership Est. of Trans Healthcare, Inc., 438 Md. 330, 360 (2014), we conclude that the December 22nd order does not qualify as a collateral order. In sum, no immediate appeal lies from the December 22nd order, and we therefore grant the Department’s motion to dismiss. Additional Guidance on Remand We shall up take the Department’s suggestion10 and briefly discuss the merits of the circuit court’s ruling, to provide guidance following remand to that court as these cases proceed. In doing so, we recognize that what we say here is only dictum. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (stating that an appellate court “may decide” an issue not properly before it “if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal”); see also Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 170 (1994) (discussing merits of important issue despite dismissing the appeal). “Promptly after a petition for guardianship is filed under this Part II of this subtitle, a juvenile court shall issue a showcause order that requires the party to whom it is issued to respond as required under the Maryland Rules.” FL § 5-316(a). “On issuance of a show-cause order as to guardianship of a child, a petitioner shall serve the order on . . . each living parent’s last attorney of record in the CINA case[.]” FL § 5-316(b)(2). Service on an attorney under FL § 5-316 “shall be” either by “personal service” or “certified mail, . . . return receipt requested[.]” FL § 5-316(c)(2). In the instant case, the only evidence that service was made on Father’s last attorney of record in the CINA case was a return receipt. Conspicuously missing from that return receipt was the attorney’s signature, thereby rebutting the presumption that he was served. (In addition, the attorney filed an affidavit in the circuit court, declaring among other things that he “never received or signed for” the show-cause orders or related documents in the cases; that he “never received the information contained in the petitions”; and that he “did not intend to [nor did he] enter [his] appearances on behalf of” Father in the TPR proceedings and therefore “did not have access to the MDEC information” on the cases.) We have held that the failure to serve notice on the last attorney of record in a CINA case, in strict compliance with the requirements of statute and rule, tolls the thirty-day period for a parent to file a notice of objection in an ensuing guardianship case. In re Adoption/Guardianship of Genara A., 152 Md. App. 725, 736 (2003). Applying that holding here, we are constrained to agree with the Department that the circuit court erred in its ruling that Father’s notices of objections, filed November 15, 2025, were untimely.
APPEAL DISMISSED. CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS ASSESSED TO APPELLANT.
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FOOTNOTES
1
As the Department acknowledges in its brief, the effect of granting those orders would be to terminate the parental rights of the children’s biological parents. Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article (“FL”), § 5-325(a).
2
Father raises two claims in his brief. First, he asserts that the juvenile court erred in finding that he was deemed to have consented to the petitions because service was defective, thereby depriving the court of personal jurisdiction over him. Second, Father asserts that the CINA attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
3
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
4
In Case No. 590 (J.B.’s case), the Department submitted a Civil Intake Data sheet appearing to state that Father had been served in person on April 10, 2025. On November 19, 2025, the Department filed an affidavit of service attesting to that fact. In Case No. 591 (B.B.’s case), Father was served in person on June 12, 2025, more than five weeks after the May 5th hearing.
5
Department counsel further explained that the Department was forced to rely upon the sheriff to serve the parents rather than its usual process server “because there was a safety issue.”
6
The court also confirmed Father’s correct contact information, including his phone number, address, and email address.
7
As the Department points out in its brief, “only 28 days had passed since the Department had mailed the show[-]cause orders and petitions to Mr. Gross,” but “Mr. Gross did not correct the Department or inform the court he had not been served with copies of the show cause orders and petitions.”
8
Sarah Witlen, Esq., was counsel for the Department.
9
The order was issued December 17, 2025, but was not docketed until December 22, 2025. The memorandum opinion and order are not docketed in Case No. 591, even though its caption contains both case numbers; and furthermore, notices of appeal are docketed in both cases. The Department refers to this order as the “December 17, 2025, Order.”
10 We commend the Department for adopting a position on appeal contrary to that taken in the circuit court. As we explain, we agree with the Department’s new position.
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In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 9 (2026) Enrolled judgment; extrinsic fraud; irregularity
Kevin Henderson v. Ashley Henderson Nos. 2146, September Term 2025 Argued before: Nazarian, Arthur, Sharer (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by: Arthur, J. Filed: July 6, 2026 The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s denial of husband’s motion to revise a protective order entered four years earlier. His assertions, if true, might establish that wife and her attorney persuaded the court to enter a judgment that was based on a false factual premise, but they do not establish the kind of extrinsic fraud that is required before a court may revise an enrolled judgment. And husband did not show that there was an “irregularity” within the narrow meaning of that term in Rule 2-535(b).
In 2021 the Circuit Court for Baltimore County entered a final domestic violence protective order against Kevin Henderson. More than four years later, Mr. Henderson moved to revise that order under Maryland Rule 2-535(b). The circuit court denied the motion. Mr. Henderson appealed. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 15, 2021, Ashley Henderson filed a petition for protection from domestic violence and child abuse in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. As the respondent, she named her husband, Mr. Henderson. As the basis for relief, Ms. Henderson alleged that Mr. Henderson had threatened violence, that he had inflicted mental injury on their twoyear-old son, and that he had tried to harm their unborn child. In a written attachment, she explained that, after an incident in which Mr. Henderson had screamed at her, threatened her, and insulted her, she discovered that he had confiscated the medicine that she needed in order to avoid having a miscarriage. The attachment implies that Mr. Henderson was unhappy that his wife had become pregnant again. The circuit court granted a temporary protective order on March 15, 2021, and set a hearing on the final protective order for March 22, 2021. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions.. The hearing went forward on March 22, 2021. Both parties were represented by counsel. After the hearing, the court entered a final protective order. As the bases for its decision, the court wrote that Mr. Henderson took away the medicine that his wife needed in order to prevent a miscarriage. The court added that there was a “prior history of domestic violence.” The protective order lasted for one year, until March 21, 2022. Mr. Henderson, through counsel, filed a timely request for in banc review of the order granting the final protective order. On May 5, 2021, a three-judge panel affirmed. In the immediate aftermath of that ruling, Mr. Henderson pursued other relief, without success, but he did not seek further appellate review. On November 3, 2025, Mr. Henderson, representing himself, moved to vacate the protective order, which had become an enrolled judgment after the passage of more than 30 days. See LVNV Funding LLC v. Finch, 463 Md. 586, 60708 (2019). In support of his motion, he asserted that his wife had terminated the pregnancy on March 17, 2021, three days before the entry of the final protective order. He charged that his wife and her counsel “perpetrated a fraud” upon the court. He attached many exhibits. On November 4, 2025, the circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. On December 4, 2025, Mr. Henderson noted a timely appeal. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
In his informal brief, Mr. Henderson poses three questions, which we quote: 1. Whether the Circuit Court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by finding “no statutory basis for relief” under Maryland Rule 2-535(b) despite evidence of extrinsic fraud and fraud upon the court. 2. Whether the Circuit Court erred by failing to recognize “irregularities” in the proceeding, specifically the improper “Child Abuse” case designation and the procedural conduct of Petitioner’s counsel. 3. Whether the Circuit Court violated the Appellant’s right to Due Process by denying the Motion to Vacate and Motion for Reconsideration without an evidentiary hearing. MOOTNESS
Because the final protective order expired more than four years ago, on March 21, 2002, one might reasonably ask Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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whether the challenge to the protective order has become moot. What difference does it make if the circuit court erred in entering an order that is no longer in effect? Although Ms. Henderson has not filed a brief and thus has not raised the issue of mootness, an appellate court can raise the issue of mootness on its own motion. See Sanchez v. Potomac Abatement, Inc., 198 Md. App. 436, 439 (2011). “Generally, a case is moot if at the time it is before the court there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties and the court cannot provide an effective remedy.” Piper v. Layman, 125 Md. App. 745, 749 (1999). “[M]ootness,” however, “will not preclude appellate review in situations where a party can demonstrate that collateral consequences flow from the lower court’s disposition.” D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc., 465 Md. 339, 352 (2019). In Piper v. Layman, 125 Md. App. at 752, this Court held that, even though a protective order had expired, a challenge to the order was not moot because it “could have significant repercussions . . . in several ways.” Id. at 752. In this case, for example, if Ms. Henderson were to file another petition for a protective order, a court would consider the prior order in evaluating the merits of the new petition and thus might find a pattern of abuse. Id. More broadly, a person against whom a domestic violence protective order had been issued may suffer the stigma of being labeled an abuser. Id. at 753. In this regard, we note that Mr. Henderson claims to have been forced to resign from his job in 2021 in order to avoid being fired because of the charges of domestic violence. He will undoubtedly continue to experience the consequences of that forced resignation throughout his professional career. His case is not moot. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from the denial of a motion to revise an enrolled judgment under Maryland Rule 2-535(b), “‘the only issue before the appellate court is whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion in denying the motion.’” Canaj, Inc. v. Baker & Div. Phase III, LLC, 391 Md. 374, 400-01 (2006) (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055/CAD, 344 Md. 458, 475 (1997)). DISCUSSION
Maryland Rule 2-535(b) states: “On motion of any party filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity.” “The terms ‘fraud, mistake, or irregularity’ as used in Rule 2-535(b) . . . are narrowly defined and are to be strictly applied.” Early v. Early, 338 Md. 639, 652 (1995). “The burden of proof in establishing fraud, mistake, or irregularity is clear and convincing evidence.” Jones v. Rosenberg, 178 Md. App. 54, 72 (2008). Rule 2-535(b) reflects a strong policy in favor of putting an end to litigation (see, e.g., Penn Cent. Co. v. Buffalo Spring & Equip. Co., 260 Md. 576, 585 (1971); Bland v. Hammond, 177 Md. App. 340, 357 (2007)) and of fostering the certainty and reliability of enrolled judgments. See Powell v. Breslin, 430 Md. 52, 70 (2013). “The overarching aim of Md. Rule 64
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
2-535(b)[] . . . is the preservation of the finality of judgments, unless specific conditions are met.” Id. at 71. “[O]nce parties have had the opportunity to present before a court a matter for investigation and determination, and once the decision has been rendered and the litigants, if they so choose, have exhausted every means of reviewing it, the public policy of this State demands that there be an end to that litigation.” Schwartz v. Merchants Mortg. Co., 272 Md. 305, 308 (1974); accord Kent Island, LLC v. DiNapoli, 430 Md. 348, 366 (2013). In this case Mr. Henderson asked the court to revise the judgment only on the grounds of “fraud” and “irregularity.” We begin with the issue of “fraud.” In the context of Rule 2-535(b), “fraud” means “extrinsic fraud”—that is, “fraud [that] actually prevents an adversarial trial” and “prevent[s] the actual dispute from being submitted to the fact finder at all.” Hresko v. Hresko, 83 Md. App. 228, 232 (1990). “Fraud prevents an adversarial trial when it keeps [parties] ignorant of the action and prevents them from presenting their case,” when it “prevents the actual dispute from being submitted to the fact finder at all.” Facey v. Facey, 249 Md. App. 584, 632 (2021). In Schwartz v. Merchants Mortgage Co., 272 Md. at 309, the Court, quoting United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1878), provided examples of extrinsic fraud: “Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side,—these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and a fair hearing.” Accord Hresko v. Hresko, 83 Md. App. at 233. By contrast, “[i]ntrinsic fraud relates to facts that were before the court in the original suit and could have been raised or exposed at the trial level.” Facey v. Facey, 249 Md. App. at 633 (emphasis in original). “[I]ntrinsic” fraud includes “the use of forged documents, perjured testimony, or any other frauds which are ‘intrinsic’ to the trial of the case itself.” Id. (Emphasis in original.) Because of the strong policy favoring the finality and conclusiveness of enrolled judgments, a showing of intrinsic fraud alone will not justify the grant of a revisory motion under Rule 2-535(b). See Schwartz v. Merchants Mortg. Co., 272 Md. at 309; Manigan v. Burson, 160 Md. App. 114, 120-21 (2004). Although Mr. Henderson claims to have alleged extrinsic fraud, he is incorrect. He alleges nothing more than intrinsic fraud—fraud that relates to facts that were before the circuit court. TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
In his informal brief, Mr. Henderson asserts that, at the hearing concerning the final protective order, his wife and her attorney failed to disclose that his wife was no longer pregnant and, thus, that her fear of miscarriage could no longer serve as a basis for a protective order. In other words, he asserts that his wife and her attorney suppressed important evidence and misled the finder of fact. “This silence,” he argues, “allowed the Court to issue a Final Protective Order based on a ‘fear of imminent bodily harm’ related to a pregnancy that no longer existed.”1 Much like allegations of perjured testimony, Mr. Henderson’s allegation of fraud in this case is intrinsic to the trial. Assuming solely for the sake of argument that Mr. Henderson’s factual assertions are correct, therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to revise the protective order. Mr. Henderson’s assertions, if true, might establish that his wife and her attorney persuaded the court to enter a judgment that was based on a false factual premise, but they do not establish the kind of extrinsic fraud that is required before a court may revise an enrolled judgment. We turn now to the issue of irregularity. “‘Irregularity’ has a narrow judicial definition in Rule 2 535(b) jurisprudence.” Thacker v. Hale, 146 Md. App. 203, 219 (2002). “It means ‘a failure to follow required process or procedure.’” Id. (quoting Early v. Early, 338 Md. at 652). “Irregularities warranting the exercise of revisory powers most often involve a judgment that resulted from a failure of process or procedure by the clerk of a court, including, for example, failures to send notice of a default judgment, to send notice of an order dismissing an action, to mail a notice to the proper address, and to provide for required publication.” Id. at 219-20 (collecting authorities). “[I] rregularity, in the contemplation of the Rule, usually means irregularity of process or procedure, . . . not an error, which in legal parlance, generally connotes a departure from truth or accuracy of which a defendant had notice and could have challenged[.]” Weitz v. MacKenzie, 273 Md. 628, 631 (1975) (citations omitted). Mr. Henderson identifies two alleged irregularities. First, he says that the court designated the case as one involving “domestic violence” or “child abuse” despite the absence of
any finding of child abuse.2 Second, he says that his wife’s attorney advocated on her behalf at the hearing on the temporary protective order without entering an appearance and that the attorney said that she would represent his wife only “if the Court grants a Temporary Protective Order.” Neither of Mr. Henderson’s examples are “irregularities” within the narrow meaning of that term in Rule 2-535(b). Mr. Henderson had notice of both alleged irregularities and could have challenged them. He had the full opportunity to raise those issues in the proceedings involving the protective order, including the proceedings involving his direct appeal of the protective order before the in banc panel. His case could not be more different from cases involving true “irregularities,” which typically occur when the court takes some action without informing the party affected, as when the court dismisses a party’s claim or enters judgment against a party without giving proper notice. In a final argument, Mr. Henderson asserts that he supported his motion with detailed exhibits. He complains that the court erred because it did not conduct an evidentiary hearing. He is incorrect. Maryland Rule 2-311(f) concerns hearings on motions other than revisory motions under Rules 2-532, 2-533, and 2-534. In pertinent part, it states: Except when a rule expressly provides for a hearing, the court shall determine in each case whether a hearing will be held, but the court may not render a decision that is dispositive of a claim or defense without a hearing if one was requested as provided in this section. No rule expressly provides for a hearing on motions to revise enrolled judgments under Rule 2-535(b). Thus, as long as the court did not “render a decision that is dispositive of a claim or defense”—i.e., as long as the court did not grant Mr. Henderson’s motion and revise the judgment—the court could determine for itself whether to hold a hearing. “Nothing in the Maryland Rules requires a hearing when a motion to revise a judgment based on ‘fraud, mistake, or irregularity’ is denied.” Li v. Lee, 210 Md. App. 73, 116 (2013), aff’d, 437 Md. 47 (2014).
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED; APPELLANT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS.
FOOTNOTES
1
Of course, even if the court knew that Ms. Henderson had terminated the pregnancy at the time of the hearing on the final protective order, Mr. Henderson’s alleged attempt to induce a miscarriage might still bear on his propensity to injure her.
2
It did, however, involve domestic violence.
TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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Case Index FULL TEXT
BRIEFS
In the matter of Nicholas Malloy
12
10
Wayne O. Cox II v. Kim D. Cox
15
10
Andre Goddard v. Timeka Lockley
21
10
In re J.B. and B.B.
33
10
Jeremy McCullough v. Shiann Price Muhammad
38
10
In re S.A.
42
11
Chastity Jones v. Ronald Livesay
53
11
Armelle S. Franklin v. Craig Anthony Osbourne
56
11
Grayson Maxwell v. Kimberly Maxwell
58
11
Kevin Henderson v. Ashley Henderson
63
11
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Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Topic Index FULL TEXT
BRIEFS
12
10
15
10
21
10
33
10
38
10
42
11
53
11
56
11
58
11
63
11
GUARDIANSHIP; JURISDICTION; DEATH In the matter of Nicholas Malloy
MONETARY AWARD; EQUITY; RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS Wayne O. Cox II v. Kim D. Cox
PHYSICAL CUSTODY; DOMESTIC VIOLENCE; ACCESS Andre Goddard v. Timeka Lockley
FINAL JUDGMENT; NON-FINAL ORDER; GUARDIANSHIP In re J.B. and B.B.
CUSTODY; EVIDENCE; SUFFICIENCY Jeremy McCullough v. Shiann Price Muhammad
PERMANENCY; VISITS; REFUSAL In re S.A.
EXTRINSIC FRAUD; CUSTODY ORDER; EVIDENCE Chastity Jones v. Ronald Livesay
MODIFICATION; MOTION TO DISMISS; HEARING Armelle S. Franklin v. Craig Anthony Osbourne
CUSTODY; CHILD SUPPORT; EVIDENCE Grayson Maxwell v. Kimberly Maxwell
ENROLLED JUDGMENT; EXTRINSIC FRAUD; IRREGULARITY Kevin Henderson v. Ashley Henderson
TheDailyRecord.com/Maryland-Family-Law
Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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Maryland Family Law Update • September 2026
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