Transitioning from foster care to adulthood can be a difficult path. Page 3 No uniform equation for determining alimony awards. Page 4 Missouri court issues
Vol. XXXVII, No. 3
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3 Child Advocacy: Transition from foster care to adulthood: A difficult path
4 Cover Story: ‘Alimony is tough’: No uniform equations for determining awards
6 In the News:
Missouri Supreme Court issues opinion on third-party visitation in adoption cases
The Supreme Court of Missouri was asked to weigh in on a question of who has a right to seek visitation in a contested adoption case when they are not related by blood or marriage.
7 In the News:
Custody hearing should have been stayed for active-duty military father
A father on active duty was entitled to a mandatory stay of a custody hearing under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), the North Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled, reversing the denial of his motion and a modified custody order.
8
Monthly Memo
NC court rules collateral estoppel does not bar child custody order … SC court reverses wife’s alimony award, affirms RSUs … Trial court must distribute undistributed marital funds … Missouri Eastern District affirms, remands judgments in divorce dispute … Parental rights termination is affirmed
9 Family Law Digest
11 Full Text Unreported Opinions
54 Case Index
55 Topic Index
Transitioning from foster care to adulthood: A difficult path
When a young person is in foster care and the permanency plan is that they will move to adulthood from foster care (aka “age out”), there are many obstacles for the youth to overcome.
The local department of social services is charged with assisting the youth in overcoming those obstacles to achieve independence beginning at age 14.
The “transition plan” guides the youth’s move to adulthood, which the worker and the youth create and then update every 180 days.
The plan should be “personalized at the direction of the youth” and should address “choices and options in housing; health insurance; education; opportunities for mentors and support services; employment; and health.”
Consider Anthony, who was about to turn 21 years old.
He has been in foster care for five years and is living in a foster care group home.
He has not completed tenth grade and although he has access to therapeutic services, he has not used those services.
He is unable to maintain employment for more than a few months.
Although he is diagnosed with mental health conditions, but his current diagnosis does not make him eligible for public benefits as an adult.
His biological family cannot provide support for him.
The statistics concerning a foster youth successfully advancing to adulthood are less than encouraging.
Foster youth like Anthony, face several hurdles including housing instability, un- and under-
LITTLE JOAN
Child Advocacy
employment, lack of training or certificates for employment, involvement in legal systems as an adult, substance abuse, and early parenting.
“Among former foster youth who age out of care, approximately 22% to 30% become homeless during the transition to adulthood, according to a 2024 study. This is substantially higher than the estimated 4% lifetime prevalence of homelessness in the general population.”
“One in five (20%) youth who were in fos¬ter care at 17 and surveyed at age 21 had not yet earned an educational degree, vocational certificate or license of any kind.”
Maryland’s data closely tracks the national data with only 72% of transitioning foster youth having completed high school or a GED, and 20% of such youth not completing high school, a GED, or any type of certificate.
Among other provisions concerning kinship care, The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (“Fostering Connections Act”) was designed to address the challenges facing aging-out youth by extending foster care assistance for youth beyond age 18, up to 21 years of age.
Prior to 2008, Maryland’s foster youth were already able to remain in foster care until age 21.
The legislation, however, encouraged collaboration with the Maryland State Department of Education to support educational
stability and the development of a tuition waiver program for higher education at state institutions and various certification programs available to youth until 25 years of age.
Unfortunately for Anthony, as he ages out of foster care, he cannot access the educational and employment support that derives from the Fostering Connections Act because he had not completed his high school education.
While he is in foster care, he has the benefit of a broad array of individuals, committed to his wellbeing, including the social worker, court, group home staff, and attorney, to guide and support him.
Upon his 21st birthday, as Louisa Twitchell so aptly expresses when referring to all foster youth in this dilemma, “…..suddenly, at the entrance to possibly the most crucial transition in their lives, foster youth are formally cut off from this support and expected to live independently.”
Anthony will lose his connections to the only individuals who have assisted him and will be expected to succeed on his own, simply due to the arrival of his birthday.
The current post-foster care policy has no safety net for young people, delayed in their maturation, but not considered disabled, and who will need services beyond the age of 21.
The lack of a post-foster care safety net highlights the importance of the local department of social services exhausting every resource, while a youth is in foster care, to position that youth on the best path to independence.
Joan F. Little is Chief Attorney at Maryland Legal Aid.
‘Alimony
BY HoPe KeLLer
is tough’: No uniform equations for determining awards
Special to The Daily Record
In recent years, several states have enacted mathematical rules for determining alimony payments. Florida, for example, in 2023 replaced permanent alimony with “durational alimony” that is capped at a percentage of the marriage’s length.
The situation in Maryland is more nuanced.
Here, Family Law Code §11-106 requires judges to consider 12 factors when determining whether, and how, to grant alimony. (See box.) The number of factors, and the intangible nature of some of them, results in significant unpredictability, attorneys say.
“The fact that the court is supposed to give consideration to 12 different factors and come up with a number, to me, that just opens it up for endless possibilities,” said Laurie Wasserman, partner at Wasserman White Family Law in Towson.
Unlike Maryland’s child support guidelines, which Wasserman called straightforward, the state’s alimony factors are often difficult to quantify.
“There’s no way to mathematically compute someone’s nonmonetary contributions to their family,” she said. “How do we give a number to that?”
Types of alimony
Maryland has three types of alimony: pendente lite, rehabilitative and indefinite.
Pendente lite is temporary support while the divorce is in progress. It ends with a final divorce decree or a more permanent alimony arrangement.
Rehabilitative alimony, the most common form of support, is designed to help a spouse for a limited period while he or she obtains an education or professional training to become self-supporting.
SUBMITTED PHOTO
Christopher Roberts, of Roberts Family Law in Rockville, said it’s important for clients to have a plan if they want to receive rehabilitative alimony for a sufficient period of time.
Indefinite alimony has no specific end date and is generally used in two scenarios: when a spouse, due to age, illness or disability, is unlikely to be able to support themselves, or when the spouses’ lifestyles would be “unconscionably disparate.”
Christopher Roberts, of Roberts Family Law in Rockville, said it’s crucial for clients to have a solid plan if they want to receive rehabilitative alimony for a sufficient period.
“You really need to be able to articulate what your specific, concrete
plan is,” Roberts said. “The timeline of the rehabilitative alimony is driven more than anything by what it is the person is trying to accomplish in terms of rehabilitating their employment and income.”
When it comes to indefinite alimony, Roberts said “indefinite” is misleading.
“Indefinite is not permanent,” he said. “It just doesn’t have an end date.”
Indefinite alimony usually ends if the recipient remarries or a court determines that the financial circumstances of either spouse have changed significantly.
Roberts gave the example of a man who began paying alimony at 50 but is now 65 and looking to retire.
“That’s when you see people coming back and asking to terminate alimony,” he said.
Fault as a factor
Of the 12 factors that judges must weigh when considering alimony, Roberts said he thinks No. 6 – fault – is the least relevant, especially now that Maryland has moved to no-fault divorce.
“I think it’s most lawyers’ experience that if the reason for the breakup of the marriage is the allegations from one party to the other, (that) typically does not heavily impact the court’s consideration of how much or how long alimony should be awarded, or whether it should be awarded,” Roberts said.
Wasserman agreed.
“I think the court is more forward-looking than backward-looking when it comes to alimony,” she said.
Counseling clients
Attorneys need to educate their clients about alimony, and they also must disabuse them of misconceptions, Wasserman said.
“This is one of the hardest things that attorneys have to advise our clients about,” she said. “Clients need to realize that you can take a group
SUBMITTED PHOTO
Laurie Wasserman a partner at Wasserman White Family Law in Towson, said the fact that judges in Maryland are required to consider 12 factors when determining whether or how to grant alimony ‘opens it up for endless possibilities.’
SUBMITTED PHOTO
Sara Donohue, of counsel at Stein Sperling in Rockville, said alimony cases are a large portion of the cases she handles.
of judges, give them the same set of facts, and they could all come up with different results.”
Sara Donohue, of counsel at Stein Sperling in Rockville, said that alimony cases make up a good portion of the cases she litigates.
“I settle a lot of cases, but if I end up in court, it’s usually custody or alimony,” she said.
The 12 statutory factors
1. The ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting.
2. The time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment.
3. The standard of living that the parties established during their marriage.
4. The duration of the marriage.
5. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family.
6. The circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties.
7. The age of each party.
8. The physical and mental condition of each party.
9. The ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony.
10. Any agreement between the parties.
11. The financial needs and financial resources of each party, including all income and assets.
12. Whether the award would cause a spouse from whom alimony is sought to become eligible for medical assistance (Medicaid) earlier than would otherwise occur.
“Alimony is tough,” Donohue continued. “It’s really one of the more difficult areas in Maryland to advise with a lot of certainty.”
Nevertheless, Donohue said she does not favor a set-in-stone formula for alimony: “It sounds like, ‘Wouldn’t that make life so much simpler for us?’ But I just think there’s room for injustices to occur.”
Missouri Supreme Court issues opinion on third-party visitation in adoption cases
BridgeTower Media Newswires
ST. LOUIS, MO -- The Supreme Court of Missouri was asked to weigh in on a question of who has a right to seek visitation in a contested adoption case when they are not related by blood or marriage.
Instead of reaching an answer to this question, the court analyzed 452.375.5(5)(a) and determined that when custody is not at issue, the statute does not create an independent cause of action. Because the adoption was finalized in this case before this appeal reached the court, it reversed a lower court’s decision and found one of the former guardians of the children in question had no standing to fight for visitation.
The case
Two women — Lora Martinez and Alicia Smith — became co-guardians of twin girls and parented them for nearly a decade. But, after their relationship ended, they filed competing petitions for adoption.
Martinez was ultimately granted custody; Smith appealed, but the courts sustained the decision in favor of Martinez. Following her unsuccessful appeal, Smith filed an action requesting third-party visitation.
Martinez opposed Smith’s visitation action, but a day before trial, the guardian ad litem reported that the two women had reached a settlement agreement. But Martinez had not reviewed or approved Smith’s judgment, according to Martinez’ attorney Jonathan Sternberg whose practice is based in Kansas City and St. Louis.
“The next day, Ms. Smith’s counsel sent the court a proposed judgment awarding her third-party visitation,” Sternberg wrote in a brief before the court. “Mother (Martinez) stated she did not agree to it. Ms. Smith’s counsel
acknowledged Mother did not agree but requested the court enter it anyway. The court entered it as a ‘consent judgment.’ ”
Martinez asked the court to amend the judgment and dismiss the case on the grounds that Smith lacked standing for her visitations as a non-relative. In lieu of dismissing the case, she called for a new trial because she had not consented to the judgment.
Sternberg said the court failed to rule on Martinez’ motion within 90 days and Smith filed a family access motion to enforce the visitation. The court granted Smith’s request and Martinez appealed.
This case was appealed from Jackson County and then the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District before reaching this court.
In Smith’s brief before the court, she argued that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Martinez’ appeal and Martinez lacks standing to appeal considering the visitation order was entered at her behest. Additionally, Smith said the appeal should be dismissed because Martinez’ brief violates Rule 84.04(c) which says the statement of facts in an appellant’s brief “shall be a fair and concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for determination without argument.”
In oral arguments before the court on Oct. 29, Sternberg said the law forbids a trial court from considering third-party visitation rights after an adoption has been finalized, pointing to the court’s decision in Hanson v. Carroll.
“This court’s decision in the Hanson case in 2017 makes that clear,” Sternberg said. “In Hanson, your honors held that once guardianship letters had issued and custody had already been awarded as a result, a third-party can’t file a new action under 452.375.5(5) because ‘parental custody is not at issue.’”
Chief Justice W. Brent Powell interrupted to ask Sternberg:
“Even if you are correct about the application of the law here, why is it that we wouldn’t find that your client invited this error? That your client stipulated to the entry of judgment in this case after this independent action was filed?”
Sternberg said the question was a chicken and egg issue and that in fact, his client did not consent to the judgment.
The decision
In the Feb. 24 unanimous opinion authored by Judge Kelly C. Broniec, she wrote that both Martinez and Smith framed the case as an issue of standing, presupposing that seeking third-party visitation and custody is an independent cause of action.
“In her first and fourth points on appeal, Martinez argues it is improper for a party to seek third-party custody or visitation under section 452.375.5(5) after losing an adoption proceeding and highlights case law pertaining to section 452.375.5(5),” Broniec wrote. “Alternatively, Smith distinguishes the cases on which Martinez relies as predominantly involving grandparents and argues a previous adoption proceeding does not prevent a party from seeking third-party custody or visitation because an adoption is not a child custody determination for purposes of section 452.375.5 and the court of appeals authorized third-party visitation after an adoption.”
But the real issue at the heart of the case is whether Smith can seek third-party visitation and custody under section 452.375.5. Broniec goes on to say that although related, whether a party has standing and whether a cause of action exists are distinct inquiries.
Custody hearing should have been stayed for active-duty military father
BridgeTower Media Newswires
RALEIGH, NC -- A father on active duty was entitled to a mandatory stay of a custody hearing under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), the North Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled, reversing the denial of his motion and a modified custody order.
A mother and father never married but had two children together. Their custody and child support case had an “exceptionally contentious and complex history,” with the parties operating under two custody orders: one from 2016 for their daughter and one from 2017 regarding their son.
In 2019, the parties reached an agreement that required the father to pay $36 per month until the total amount of $3,936 was paid. But in 2021, the mother filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the father had failed to make required payments. The trial court entered an order that set forth a schedule for payment totaling $28,059.13.
At a hearing in January 2023, after receiving no evidence regarding the father’s payments or his ability to pay, the father was taken immediately into custody for failure to pay. While he was in jail, the father filed a motion to stay an upcoming hearing on the mother’s motion to modify custody, explaining that he was scheduled for military service over the next few months, first in various trainings and then deployment to West Africa.
As part of his motion, the father attached a memo from his commanding officer, which detailed his upcoming service, as well as a training schedule, which identified when he would and would not be available to participate in trial court proceedings.
The court denied the motion and held the hearing without the father (or counsel) and entered an order modifying custody.
The father appealed.
Judge Donna Stroud reversed in Roybal v. Raulli, joined by Judges Valerie Zachary and Toby Hampson.
The father’s motion should have been treated as a motion to stay the custody proceedings under the SCRA, the court found.
“Before the trial court, there was never any question that Father was requesting a continuance or stay under the SCRA because he was required to attend several training dates leading up to his October 2023 deployment,” the court wrote.
While the mother argued that the father’s motion failed to meet the requirements of a motion to stay under the SCRA, the court disagreed.
It was undisputed that the father was a “servicemember” as defined by the statute, and the memorandum from his commanding officer made clear that he was engaged in “active military service” under the SCRA, the court said.
The memorandum from the commanding officer and the training schedule both explained that “the training dates listed on the 2023 training schedule were ‘mandatory,’ an ‘obligation,’ and ‘required,’” the court said. “We understand that Mother and the trial court both had valid questions about Father’s credibility on various matters, especially regarding Father’s ability to pay his child support in a timely manner. But Mother never raised any question about the credibility or validity of the memorandum, training schedule, or email from [the commanding officer], nor was there any question that Father was actually attending military training on [the hearing dates].”
In addition to meeting the conditions of the SCRA, the denial of the father’s motion to continue was prejudicial, the court found. The trial court made many findings of fact in its order following the hearing, without the father having an opportunity to be present or to present his own evidence, resulting in a modi-
fication of the custodial schedule for both children and the mother receiving sole legal custody.
As for the trial court’s order finding the father in contempt and sending him to jail, it also needed to be reversed.
“No matter the findings or provisions of the Contempt Order, the trial court must consider evidence and make findings as to Father’s present ability to pay any purge payment before he can be committed for civil contempt,” the court explained. “[A] contempt order cannot serve as an anticipatory automatic ‘show cause order’ for future payments due because show cause orders can be issued only after the alleged contemnor has failed to comply with an order.”
As no show cause order was issued, the burden of proof remained on the mother, as the party who originally moved to hold the father in contempt and be committed for failure to pay child support. But no evidentiary hearing was held and the mother presented no evidence.
“We understand the trial court’s and Mother’s frustration with Father’s continuing failure to pay child support as ordered,” the court said. “But no matter how abysmal Father’s record of paying his child support has been, each order for commitment for civil contempt must comply with Section 5A-23 and must take into account Father’s present ability to pay when the commitment and purge payment is ordered.”
The court reversed and remanded.
Jeremy T. Browner of Browner Law in Hillsborough, who represented the father, said he was “very pleased” with the court’s strong protection for servicemembers.
“When dealing with any type of military service in a family law context, it is really important to understand how the SCRA interacts with the situation,” he said.
NC court rules collateral estoppel does not bar child custody order
RALEIGH, NC -- The doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar Carteret County Department of Social Services (DSS) from pursuing a juvenile petition alleging abuse, neglect, and dependency.
We reversed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that collateral estoppel is applicable and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
The case arose from repeated allegations of sexual abuse made by a minor child, Alice, against her father during an ongoing custody dispute between her parents. Two prior investigations conducted by Craven County DSS in 2021 found the allegations unsubstantiated and raised concerns that the mother had coached the child to fabricate claims. In a subsequent child custody order (CCO), the district court expressly found that the father had not abused the child, that the mother’s testimony was untruthful, and that she had willfully denied the father visitation. The court awarded the father primary custody.
COLUMBIA, SC -- The Court reversed the family court’s alimony award to Wife, while affirming the inclusion of Husband’s vested RSUs in income for child support and the denial of attorneys’ fees.
The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The Court addressed a cross-appeal from a divorce decree involving Wife and Husband. The parties married in 1999, have two children, and separated in 2020. The family court initially issued temporary orders finding Husband’s gross monthly income to be $25,286, and requiring him to pay $3,000 per month in child support and $3,000 per month in alimony. Husband later sought reconsideration, claiming he could meet his obligations by selling nonmarital Google restricted stock units (RSUs). Wife sought attorneys’ fees, which the court denied. The final hearing occurred over
Monthly Memo
four days in 2023, during which the parties provided extensive financial, employment, and lifestyle testimony.
BridgeTower Media Newswires
Trial court must distribute undistributed marital funds
RALEIGH, NC -- The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court’s equitable distribution rulings in a long-term divorce, concluding that while the valuation of a Florida residence was supported by competent evidence, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to distribute identified marital funds held in a construction company’s bank accounts.
The appeal arose from a 2023 equitable distribution (ED) judgment and a 2024 order denying a motion to amend. The parties’ marriage lasted from 1999 to 2023. At separation, both agreed that a construction company owned by the plaintiff and a residence in Cape Coral, Florida, were marital property, but they disputed valuation.
The company maintained two bank accounts with a combined balance of $273,869.30. Of that amount, $98,843.09 represented earned income and was marital property, while the remainder was reserved for ongoing projects. The plaintiff’s expert valued the company at $62,591.57, expressly excluding the bank account funds. The defendant’s expert valued the company at $323,000. The trial court adopted the plaintiff’s valuation and awarded the company to the plaintiff but did not separately distribute the $98,843.09 in marital funds.
Bridgetower Media Newswire
Missouri Eastern District affirms, remands judgments in divorce dispute
ST. LOUIS, MO -- The Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District reversed part of the St. Louis County Circuit Court’s ruling in a dispute over a marital settlement agreement, finding the lower court misread the contract’s language. Judge James M. Dowd authored the opinion, joined by Judge Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey and Judge Gary M. Gaertner Jr.
In a decision issued Feb. 17, the court held that the trial court erred in concluding that a mortgage forbearance period did not trigger a contractual sale provision and further found that attorney’s fees should have been awarded, while affirming the lower court’s ruling regarding insurance proceeds.
The issue goes back to Dec. 4, 2020, when the St. Louis County Circuit Court entered a dissolution judgment for the marriage between husband William Troupe and wife Deborah Troupe. The judgment included a marital settlement agreement, or MSA.
Bridgetower Media Newswire
Parental rights termination is affirmed
BOSTON, MA -- Where a mother’s parental rights were terminated by a Juvenile Court judge, the termination decree should be affirmed because the mother has waived her argument that the judge erred in ruling that the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal from the home.
“In this appeal from a Juvenile Court decree terminating her parental rights as to Mattis, the mother, while not disputing her unfitness at the time of trial, argues that the judge erred in ruling that the Department of Children and Families (department) made ‘reasonable efforts ... to prevent or eliminate the need for removal from the home.’ Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 61 (2011), quoting G.L.c. 119, §29C, first par. The mother thus contends that the department failed to prove her unfitness was not ‘merely temporary.’ ... We hold that the mother’s argument that the department failed to use reasonable efforts is waived, and we clarify that, contrary to her argument, our footnote in Adoption of Chad, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 828, 839 n.20 (2019), was not intended to suggest a more relaxed approach to waiver in the reasonable efforts context. Further seeing no abuse of discretion in the judge’s decision not to order post-termination or post-adoption visitation, we affirm the decree.”
Bridgetower Media Newswire
Family Law Digest
JEFFREY SCHATZ V. SARAH ROBLES
Interlocutory; final judgment; collateral order
No. 1153, September Term 2025
Argued before: Nazarian, Beachley, Albright, JJ.
Opinion by: Albright, J.
Filed: Jan. 21, 2026
The Appellate Court dismissed father’s appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City during ongoing custody litigation. The challenged order is not a final judgment, it is interlocutory—and not appealable. Nor is immediate appellate review available under the narrow collateral order doctrine.
The Appellate Court vacated the Frederick County Circuit Court’s commitment of the juvenile to the care and custody of the Department of Juvenile Services for placement at a behavior modification facility. The Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article’s relevant provision permits three dispositions: probation, commitment or services in the home for the child and family. Here, the court erred in imposing a disposition not authorized by law.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Washington County Circuit Court’s modification of custody order. The circuit court considered carefully all the evidence before it, including one parent’s relocation, with a view towards determining the best interests of the child.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s order modifying custody and granting primary physical and legal custody of the children to father. Although mother claims that she did not consent to one specific condition in the order – restricting her sister from accessing the children during visitation – the transcript demonstrates that mother consented to the order’s complete terms, including the contested condition, by responding affirmatively on three separate occasions. Moreover, mother did not object or otherwise react to the court’s oral recitation of the term.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Frederick County Circuit Court’s indefinite alimony and a monetary award to wife. The trial court properly valued the parties’ marital property, considered the relevant statutory factors and did not abuse its discretion in making its monetary award. It also carefully considered the evidence in analyzing the relevant factors in support of its decision to award indefinite alimony.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Harford County Circuit Court’s award of retroactive child support to grandmother who cared for father’s minor child in loco parentis for approximately two years. Although father contends that he did not consent to grandmother’s custody of son in loco parentis and could have avoided paying support if grandmother had returned son to his care, his actions belie that argument.
NATRESA STUCKEY V. DAVID BRANDFORD
Legal and physical custody; error; argument
No. 1298, September Term 2025
Argued before: Graeff, Tang, Eyler, James (retired; specially assigned), JJ.
Opinion by: Tang, J.
Filed: Jan. 8, 2026
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s award of sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties’ three children to father and its termination of father’s ongoing child support payments. In her informal brief, mother does not identify any error made by the magistrate or court in deciding the case. Nor does she offer any argument in support of such contention.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s award of primary physical and sole legal custody of the 15-year-old minor to her father. Father was able and willing to provide proper care and attention to the minor child, while mother had neglected her daughter and was unable or unwilling to provide her with proper care.
YADIRA PATRICIA CABRERA LOPEZ V. SALVADOR GARCIA MADRIGAL
The Appellate Court vacated the Cecil County Circuit Court’s child support award. The evidence and testimony indicate that father’s monthly income is $2,169. Mother’s testimony indicates that her monthly income fluctuates between $2,310-2,610 depending upon hours worked. The court nonetheless used an income of $2,600 for both parties in its child support calculation. The court included no explanation for either income figure attributed to the parties.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s award of physical and legal custody of the two young children to mother, award of $892 in monthly child support to mother and award of $5,000 in attorney’s fees to mother.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 3 (2026)
Interlocutory; final judgment; collateral order
Jeffrey Schatz v. Sarah Robles
No. 1153, September Term 2025
Argued before: Nazarian, Beachley, Albright, JJ.
Opinion by: Albright, J.
Filed: Jan. 21, 2026
The Appellate Court dismissed father’s appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City during ongoing custody litigation. The challenged order is not a final judgment, it is interlocutory—and not appealable. Nor is immediate appellate review available under the narrow collateral order doctrine.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
Maryland custody Order, creating an obstacle to Plaintiff’s ability to remain close to [the minor’s] life and muddying future jurisdictional waters.” Mr. Schatz’s Modification Petition is now pending before the circuit court and is scheduled to be heard by that court on February 12, 2026.
On April 2, 2025, while his Modification Petition was pending, Mr. Schatz filed a Motion to Prevent Removal of a Minor Child from Maryland and West Virginia (“Removal Motion”). This is the motion that Ms. Robles responded to late. Mr. Schatz moved to strike the Opposition; the circuit court considered it anyway and then denied the Removal Motion. Thereafter, Mr. Schatz sought reconsideration of that denial. By date, this was what happened:
April 2, 2025 Removal Motion is filed
May 1, 2025 Ms. Robles’s Opposition is filed late4
Appellant Jeffrey Schatz and Appellee Sarah Robles are the parents of a six-year-old child. In this interlocutory appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Mr. Schatz argues that the collateral order doctrine permits this appeal, during ongoing custody litigation that he initiated, of the circuit court’s allegedly erroneous decision to consider Ms. Robles’s late-filed answer (“Opposition”)1 to one of Mr. Schatz’s motions. Because Mr. Schatz’s appeal is not allowed by the collateral order doctrine,2 we dismiss the appeal and do not reach the merits of Mr. Schatz’s four appellate questions.3
The late-filed Opposition about which Mr. Schatz complains was filed by Ms. Robles not long after Mr. Schatz initiated a second round of custody litigation. The first round, also initiated by Mr. Schatz, ended in June 2021, when the circuit court issued an initial custody order granting sole legal and sole physical custody of the minor to Ms. Robles, and supervised parenting time with the minor to Mr. Schatz every other Sunday from 1:15 p.m. to 2:35 p.m., with additional parenting time for Mr. Schatz to be “left to Ms. Robles’s discretion[.]”
Mr. Schatz initiated this, the second round of custody litigation, on February 21, 2025, when he filed a Motion to Modify Custody (“Modification Petition”). In his Modification Petition, Mr. Schatz alleged that since the initial custody order, there had been a material change of circumstances such that a change of legal custody and visitation was appropriate. Mr. Schatz also alleged that Ms. Robles wrongfully removed their minor child from the state of Maryland and “relocated [their minor child] to West Virginia in secret without notice to the court or Plaintiff, despite the existence of [t]his Court’s
May 2, 2025
Mr. Schatz files Motion to Strike Opposition because it is late
May 12, 2025 Circuit court considers Ms. Robles’s late-filed Opposition in denying Removal Motion
May 16, 2025 Circuit Court denies Mr. Schatz’s Motion to Strike as moot
May 20, 2025 Mr. Schatz files Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of his Removal Motion
June 13, 2025 Reconsideration is denied
Here, Mr. Schatz does not deny that this is an interlocutory appeal, nor does he rely on the statutory bases for an interlocutory appeal to suggest that he can pursue this interlocutory appeal. Instead, he points to the common law collateral order doctrine and argues that it supports his appeal.
In Maryland, the final judgment rule restricts the availability of appeals to final judgments. Md. Code Ann., Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) § 12-301; see also In re Samone H., 385 Md. 282, 297 (2005). A final judgment is “a judgment . . . or other action by a court . . . , from which an appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken.” CJP § 12-101. Practically speaking, a final judgment “must either determine and conclude the rights of the parties involved or deny a party the means to prosecute or defend his or her rights and interests in the subject matter
of the proceeding.” In re Samone H., 385 Md. at 298 (cleaned up). If an order is not a final judgment, it is interlocutory—and generally not appealable. Id.
The collateral order doctrine is a very narrow exception5 to the final judgment rule. Premised “upon a judicially created fiction, the collateral order doctrine permits immediate appellate review of an order that shares sufficient attributes of a final judgment.” In re Katerine L., 220 Md. App. 426, 441–42 (2014). The order must meet the doctrine’s four “very strictly applied” requirements, “and appeals under the doctrine may be entertained only in extraordinary circumstances.” In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 634 (2003). A reviewable interlocutory order “(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” Id. at 633 (cleaned up). “The four elements of the test are conjunctive in nature, and in order for a prejudgment order to be appealable, each of the four elements must be met.” In re Katerine L., 220 Md. App. at 442 (quoting In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 327 (2001)). Because of this, an appellate court need not address all prongs of the doctrine in its analysis. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 420 Md. 300, 318 (2011) (assuming arguendo that that the third and fourth requirements were satisfied before analyzing the first two requirements in full).
Mr. Schatz argues that the orders entered on May 10, 2025 (denying his Removal Motion) and June 13, 2025 (denying his Motion for Reconsideration) meet the “stringent four-part test” of the collateral order doctrine. Specifically, Mr. Schatz contends (1) that with its May 10, 2025 and June 13, 2025 orders (collectively, “Orders”), the circuit court “conclusively determined” that it would consider a procedurally defective pleading (Ms. Robles’s Opposition), meaning that Mr. Schatz’s Motion to Strike would not be heard on the merits; (2) that “the issue is too important to be denied review[;]” (3) that the Orders “resolved an important issue completely separate from the merits” of the underlying custody litigation, namely “whether a litigant has a right to have motions decided according to the Maryland Rules on a procedurally proper record[;]” and (4) that the Orders “are effectively unreviewable” because on an appeal from a final custody order, the alleged error would likely be deemed harmless. Mr. Schatz argues that reliance on a challenged pleading to moot the challenge to that pleading undermines public confidence, particularly for pro se litigants who must rely on the Maryland Rules’ plain language. We disagree.
The collateral order doctrine’s second element, “that the interlocutory order resolves an important issue,” typically means a jurisdictional or other fundamental issue such as a child’s safety or whether a jury trial will occur at all. See, e.g., In re M. P., 487 Md. 53, 73 (2024) (denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction satisfies second element); In re O.P., 470 Md. 225, 251 (2020) (denial of temporary shelter care satisfies second element); Schuele v. Case Handyman & Remodeling Services, LLC, 412 Md. 555, 573 (2010) (a denial of motion to compel arbitration satisfies second element); Rios v. State, 186 Md. App. 354, 365 (2009) (denial of a motion to enforce a plea agreement satisfies second element).
We do not doubt that Mr. Schatz (and Ms. Robles) were personally interested in the outcome of the Removal Motion. But the circuit court’s denial of it did not “resolve an important issue” as the law defines this standard. See In re Foley, 373 Md. at 633 (cleaned up). In the Removal Motion, Mr. Schatz did not allege an issue of the minor’s safety as a result of the relocation he asserted. Nor did he claim that he was being denied his court-ordered supervised parenting time rights. The circuit court recognized as much, when, in denying Mr. Schatz’s Motion for Reconsideration, it said, “The late-filed [O]pposition did not change the fact that [Mr. Schatz’s Removal Motion] lacked any specificity about any issue with relocation of the minor child.”
Nor did the circuit court’s denial of the Removal Motion “resolve an important issue” regarding the circuit court’s jurisdiction. In the Removal Motion, Mr. Schatz asked that the circuit court establish “clear geographical boundaries” on Ms. Robles in order to “prevent potential jurisdictional complications[,]” and “allow both parents and the child to participate fully in the litigation process within [Maryland and West Virginia]. At the time that Mr. Robles made these requests, however, the circuit court apparently had “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” over the matter by virtue of having issued the June 2021 custody order. See Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law Article (“FL”) § 9.5-202(a).6 Ms. Robles has not disputed this, instead answering Mr. Schatz’s Modification Petition with admissions and denials but no suggestion that the circuit court is without jurisdiction to hear the matter. Against this background, we cannot agree that Mr. Schatz’s wish to “prevent potential jurisdictional complications[,]” and the circuit court’s denial of that wish, equates to an “important issue” that satisfies the collateral order doctrine.
Nor is the second element satisfied by Mr. Schatz’s “procedural fairness” contention. Mr. Schatz argues that the Orders resolve an important issue because they deny him his right to procedural fairness and adherence to Maryland Rule 2-311(b), which requires that responses to motions be filed “within 15 days of being served with the motion[.]” See Md. Rule 2-311(b). Mr. Schatz contends that by considering Ms. Robles’s late-filed Opposition in ruling on (and denying) his Removal Motion, rather than taking up his Motion to Strike first and then ruling on and presumably granting his unopposed Removal Motion, the court denied him denied procedural fairness. This denial, argues Mr. Schatz, is the kind of “important issue” that satisfies element two of the collateral order doctrine.
Again, we disagree. In In Re: O.P., our Supreme Court looked at the gravity of the underlying issue in determining that an Order denying temporary shelter care satisfied the second element. 470 Md. at 251. Because that decision, i.e., temporary shelter care or not, “hinge[d] on whether there was an emergency situation that require[d] temporary placement outside the home for the safety and welfare of the child[,]” the Supreme Court determined that the denial Order “easily satisfied” the second element. Id.
Here, the underlying issue in the Removal Motion was not whether Ms. Robles’s Opposition was timely filed. As Mr. Schatz himself acknowledged in his Removal Motion, the motion implicated the minor’s best interest. As a consequence, the
circuit court was required to consider Ms. Robles’s views, not merely (and exclusively) to assess whether those views were timely expressed. See Flynn v. May, 157 Md. App. 389, 407–10 (2004) (reversing child custody determination made after the entry of a default against Mother after she filed an answer without the proper certificate of service). The circuit court recognized as much, when, in denying Mr. Schatz’s Motion for Reconsideration, it said, “The Court routinely considers late-filed papers when the issues involve the welfare and best interest of children.”
Because the circuit court’s denial of the Removal Motion
did not hinge on the lateness of Ms. Robles’s Opposition, but rather on the minor’s best interest, the circuit court’s decision to overlook the lateness of the Opposition is not the kind of “important decision” that satisfies the second element of collateral order appellate review.7 Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.8 Mr. Schatz will have the opportunity to challenge the circuit court’s decision to overlook the lateness of Ms. Robles’s Opposition if, after the circuit court issues a final judgment on his Modification Petition, he elects to note an appeal or a cross-appeal.
FOOTNOTES
1 We refer to Ms. Robles’s late-filed paper as her Opposition in order to distinguish it from the Answer, i.e., the pleading, she had already filed in the litigation.
2 Ms. Robles has not moved to dismiss this appeal. Nonetheless, we take up the issue of appealability sua sponte, as appealability is required to confer appellate jurisdiction. See Johnson v. Johnson, 423 Md. 602, 605–06 (2011) (“Neither the parties nor the courts below have raised any issue concerning the appealability of the Circuit Court’s order. Nevertheless, an order of a circuit court must be appealable in order to confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court, and this jurisdictional issue, if noticed by an appellate court, will be addressed sua sponte.”). Mr. Schatz anticipated the appealability issue in his appellate brief and in the Application for Leave to Appeal that he filed below. This Application was not ruled on below nor should it have been. See Md. Rule 8-201 (describing how to secure appellate review); Md. Rule 8-204 (pertaining to applications for leave to appeal and not listing this kind of appeal as one that must be accompanied by an Application for Leave to Appeal). We treated Mr. Schatz’s Application for Leave to Appeal as a Notice of Appeal.
3 Mr. Schatz presents the following questions for our review:
1. Did the circuit court commit reversible error and abuse its discretion by considering an untimely and substantively deficient responsive pleading as the basis for denying Appellant’s substantive Motion to Prevent Removal of a Minor Child, while Appellant’s timely Motion to Strike that very pleading was pending and undecided?
2. Did the circuit court commit reversible error by subsequently declaring the Motion to Strike moot, thereby creating an unreviewable proceduralloop where its initial error became the justification for precluding a ruling on the procedural defects?
3. Is the circuit court’s post-hoc factual finding that a litigant’s initial motion “lacked any specificity” clearly erroneous when the finding is directly contradicted by the detailed, multi-ground motion in the record, and was that erroneous finding an improper justification for the court’s prior procedural errors?
4. Did the circuit court err as a matter of law by invoking the “best interest of the child” standard to justify its departure from the mandatory procedural requirements of the Maryland Rules, thereby misapplying a substantive legal standard to excuse prejudicial procedural errors.
4 Maryland Rule 2-311(b) requires that parties file any response they may have to a motion “within 15 days after being served with the motion, or within the time allowed for a party’s original pleading pursuant to Rule 2-321(a), whichever is later.” Here, there is no dispute that Ms. Robles filed her Opposition two weeks late.
5 In his appellate brief, Mr. Schatz argues that the Orders are appealable through the collateral order doctrine exception. He does not argue that either of the other two exceptions to the final judgment rule apply. See Johnson, 423 Md. at 607 (“[T]here are only three exceptions to that final judgment requirement: appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute; immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602; and appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine.”).
We agree that there is no statutory basis for Mr. Schatz’s appeal. Interlocutory appeals from the denial of an injunction are permitted, but only in very limited circumstances. See, e.g., CJP § 12-303(3)(iii) (permitting an interlocutory appeal from the circuit court’s refusal to grant an injunction if “the right of appeal is not prejudiced by the filing of an answer to the bill of complaint or petition for an injunction on behalf of any opposing party, nor by the taking of depositions in reference to the allegations of the bill of complaint to be read on the hearing of the application for an injunction[.]” Here, Mr. Schatz makes no such contention.
Nor is an immediate appeal permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602. This rule permits immediate appeal from an order that adjudicates “fewer than all of the claims in an action,” or “less than an entire claim,” or “the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the involved parties,” provided that the circuit court directs the entry of a final order as to the portion that was adjudicated and concludes that “there is no just reason for delay.” Md. Rule 602(b). Here, Mr. Schatz requested no such ruling from the circuit court and it did not enter one.
6 This section states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in § 9.5-204 of this subtitle, a court of this State that has made a child custody determination consistent with § 9.5-201 or § 9.5-203 of this subtitle has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
(1) a court of this State determines that neither the child, the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this State and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this State concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(2) a court of this State or a court of another state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this State.
FL § 9.5-202(a).
7 This is not to say that the failure to follow Maryland’s procedural rules should always be overlooked. We only conclude that, on the facts of this case, the circuit court’s having overlooked the lateness of Mr. Robles’s Opposition (two weeks) does not satisfy the collateral order doctrine’s second element.
8 Because we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we decline to address Ms. Robles’s request for fees pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court vacated the Frederick County Circuit Court’s commitment of the juvenile to the care and custody of the Department of Juvenile Services for placement at a behavior modification facility. The Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article’s relevant provision permits three dispositions: probation, commitment or services in the home for the child and family. Here, the court erred in imposing a disposition not authorized by law.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
BACKGROUND
At a disposition hearing on September 16, 2024, following adjudication, the Circuit Court for Frederick County, sitting as a juvenile court, committed Appellant to the Department of Juvenile Services. The court then stayed the commitment and entered a temporary disposition for six months. Appellant was placed on supervised probation with GPS monitoring and other special conditions. The court advised Appellant of the consequences of non-compliance with its order.
Three days later, Appellant appeared before the juvenile court for an emergency hearing. The State alleged that he violated the conditions of his GPS monitoring by going outside of the home beyond curfew, and that he had smoked marijuana. Appellant was detained and a hearing was scheduled for September 26, 2024. On that date, the juvenile court committed Appellant to DJS and ordered that he be sent to a behavior modification program.
In 2022, Appellant was adjudicated delinquent by the Circuit Court for Frederick County, sitting as a juvenile court, in connection with an armed robbery. The court committed Appellant to the Department of Juvenile Services (DJS), he completed an out of home placement, and he was placed on one year of supervised probation. In August 2024, Appellant was found in violation of his probation after being found involved in a theft offense. The court held a disposition hearing on September 16, 2024, and issued an “Order of Temporary Disposition Suspended Commitment Order And Supervised Probation.” On September 26, 2024, the court found that Appellant had violated the terms of his release, and he was detained and committed to DJS for out of home placement. Appellant noted this timely appeal, and he presents two questions for our review:
1. Did the juvenile court impose an illegal disposition upon Appellant when it entered a disposition order not authorized by the Juvenile Causes Act?
2. Did the Juvenile Court’s summary revocation of Appellant’s supervised probationary status and imposition of the suspended commitment without a hearing violate the due process protections afforded by Maryland Rule 11-424 and the Maryland and U.S. Constitutions?
We hold that the juvenile court erred in imposing a disposition unauthorized by law. We, therefore, vacate the disposition and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with our holding. As a result, we decline to address question two.
At the hearing, the State asserted that Appellant was on notice that the case would be set before the court to “review detention” and to consider the “imposition of the suspended commitment.” The State “believes the evidence that we put forth before Your Honor at the first disposition hearing on the 16th was sufficient to justify a commitment, that it would be best for the public, best for respondent, for the competency and character development of respondent, accountability, public safety, for all the reasons noted in 3-802, the reasons that we placed on the record, Your Honor, we do believe were sufficient to justify that commitment.”
The State explained:
While he’s out on a short leash, on a lockdown GPS pending final disposition, when everybody’s told us he gets it now—for once, he appropriately gets it. He’s pending another commitment. He’s going to take it serious. His dad takes him home, and he - - what’s he do? He turns off the cameras to the exterior of the house and goes outside. This is not a respondent who is confused. He’s been on GPS and CD for I’ll call it a year. Over and over again, he’s on CD. He’s not confused. He doesn’t understand that maybe I can’t go out. He’s not confused. He doesn’t misunderstand that maybe I can go out. He was outside from- -I’ll say I think the numbers are 1:50 to 2:15. Dad goes outside, sees him at a car with his friends, come inside. Dad isn’t an expert, says he appears to be under the influence of substances when he comes in. Neighbors see him smoking out there
with his friends. . . So, Your Honor, I do ask that Your Honor issue a commitment order today.
Appellant’s counsel argued that section 3-8A-19.7 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code does not permit a child to be placed in a facility used for a detention for a technical violation:
[Appellant’s Counsel]: So in reviewing—and first, there are two orders that Your Honor issued. It was the issue for the GPS lockdown monitoring and the order temporary disposition suspended commitment order and supervised probation. So the alleged violation is, and I say alleged because I still think he’s entitled to violation of probation hearing, I’ll get into that, but what the alleged violation is that he violated GPS. He was outside the house, I believe on the street, not far from his house. But he was in violation for those actions. And I understand that this is a violation of the GPS monitoring. I reread the suspended commitment order and supervised probation. I don’t see that it is necessarily a violation of that or that it states that for any violation he could be committed.
And in reading 3-8A-19.7 of [the] Courts and Judicial Proceedings [article], it states that a child may not be placed in a facility used for a detention for a technical violation. And this would be a technical violation. And also 3-8A-19 (d)(3)(i) says child may not be committed to DJS for out of home placement if the most serious offense—one of those specifically, it says a technical violation. So again, GPS is a separate order, even if it is a violation of whichever, it’s still a technical violation.
[Appellant’s Counsel]: 3-8A(19(d)(i) states that a juvenile—Your Honor, Juvenile law statutory and the disposition provisions by statute under that cited section are, one, the Court may place the child on probation or supervision in his own home or commit a child to DJS, Department of Health, or another agency on appropriate terms, designating the type of facility where the child’s committed, or three, order participation in rehabilitation services. While the words suspended commitment do not exist, they are- and because that’s not a statutory authorized disposition- the order does state with suspended commitment order and supervised probation that this has to be treated as a probation order. So, regardless, Your Honor, due process still applies…
There must be a hearing. The burden is still going to be on the State to prove in this hearing the violations. And also statutorily to commit the violation—to commit, the violation must be a nontechnical one. . . . And really, Your Honor, in no universe does the order or law permit a commitment on a technical violation. It’s not stated on the order in the first place. If it did, it
would be unlawful. The court cannot circumvent statutory due process portions. . . . The right to a VOP hearing is also constitutionally required, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, so I have all those statutes and that case as well for Your Honor.
Your Honor, I believe that proper procedure right now, because of what the alleged violation is, is for the Court to release [J.D.] because it is unlawful to have him detained on a technical violation. And in a VOP hearing, the State would need to file a violation of probation petition. . . Maryland Rule 11-424 does address VOPs and what needs to be done as well as for Juvenile Court.
In response, the court noted that Appellant was aware of the potential consequences and that “he knew he had to walk the line.” The court stated that the “slip-up” happened right after he was put on GPS lockdown, while he was out late at night in a friend’s car and possibly under the influence. The court found that Appellant’s behavior amounted to “thumbing his nose basically at the Court.”
THE COURT: All right. We were here back on September, I think 16th and I did make certain findings. I did find that placement was appropriate at that time due to J.D.’s needs, the need for public safety, protection of the community, accountability for [J.D.] and for the offenses committed, and for competency and character development, help him become a responsible and productive member of society, provide for his care, protection, wholesome mental and physical development, provide for a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with his best interest and protection of public interest. And I thought it was appropriate that day. I was willing to-because [J.D.] seemed to be on an upswing--- to give him a chance with respect to that. But in fact, he was not in the situation he purported to be that day because he had used prior to being in Court that day.
And subject to a hearing at a violation of probation hearing, I do find there is enough, and I can consider it with respect to what he did within two days of being here, but I’m not going to impose that commitment today. Everyone is on notice that I don’t need to find him in violation. It’s not necessarily a technical offense.
I found that all the appropriate factors to commit him were present on September 16th, and he understood he was being cut a break on the 16th because commitment was appropriate that day. It remains appropriate today as well. The Court then committed Appellant to the care and custody of the Department of Juvenile Services for placement at a behavior modification facility. The court ordered that he be detained at a juvenile detention facility, pending placement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Matters of statutory interpretation, like a juvenile court’s authority under CJP section 3-8A-19, are reviewed de novo. In re M.P., 487 Md. 53, 84 (2024).
DISCUSSION
I. The Juvenile Court erred in imposing a disposition not authorized by the Juvenile Causes Act.
Appellant argues that his September 16th disposition was illegal as there is no language in the Juvenile Causes Act or Maryland Rules authorizing a stayed commitment or a temporary disposition. The State argues that section 3-8A19 of the Maryland Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code does not prohibit a juvenile court from ordering a stayed or temporary disposition. The State contends that the juvenile court has the discretion to fashion specific terms to meet the needs of juvenile respondents, and in this case, the court’s order combined supervision in the home with a commitment to the Department of Juvenile Services to address Appellant’s individual needs, and it fulfilled the priorities expressed in the Juvenile Causes Act. The State argues that the use of the phrase, “terms the court deems appropriate” in section 3-8A-19(d)(1)(i) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code relating to probation and section 3-8A-19(d)(1)(ii) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article relating to commitment, permit the court to cross apply these two subsections and issue an order of “temporary suspended commitment supervised probation.”
In examining issues requiring statutory interpretation, we always seek “to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature.” State v. Weems, 429 Md. 329, 337 (2012). “We [start] with the normal, plain meaning of the statute,” looking to the statute’s language. Id. The plain language is viewed “within the context of the statutory scheme . . . considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” If the language is unambiguous, the inquiry ends. Id.
The purposes of the juvenile delinquency subtitle of the Juvenile Causes Act are stated in section 3-8A-02 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code:
(a) The purposes of this subtitle are:
(1) To ensure that the Juvenile Justice System balances the following objectives for children who have committed delinquent acts:
(i) Public safety and the protection of the community;
(ii) Accountability of the child to the victim and the community for offenses committed; and
(iii) Competency and character development to assist children in becoming responsible and productive members of society;
(2) To hold parents of children found to be delinquent responsible for the child’s behavior and accountable to the victim and the community;
(3) To hold parents of children found to be delinquent or in need of supervision responsible, where
possible, for remedying the circumstances that required the court’s intervention;
(4) To provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this subtitle; and to provide for a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with the child’s best interests and the protection of the public interest;
(5) To conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties and to separate a child from his parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety;
(6) If necessary to remove a child from his home, to secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents;
(7) To provide to children in State care and custody: (i) A safe, humane, and caring environment; and (ii) Access to required services; and
(8) To provide judicial resources for carrying out the provisions of this subtitle.
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-02.
When a juvenile court finds that a child has committed a delinquent act, it must decide if the child needs guidance, treatment, and rehabilitation and, if so, the nature of that guidance, treatment, and rehabilitation, at a “disposition hearing.” In re M.P., 487 Md. 53, 62 n.3 (2024). The court’s dispositions are governed by the Juvenile Causes Act, including § 3-8A-19(d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, which provides that:
Disposition by Court
(d) (1) In making a disposition on a petition under this subtitle, the court may:
(i) Subject to 3-8A-19.6 of this subtitle, place the child on probation or under supervision in his own home or in the custody or under the guardianship of a relative or other fit person, upon terms the court deems appropriate, including community detention;
(ii) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection, commit the child to custody or under the guardianship of the Department of Juvenile Services, the Maryland Department of Health, or a public or licensed private agency on terms that the court considers appropriate to meet the priorities set forth in section 3-8A-02 of this subtitle, including designation of the type of facility where the child is to be accommodated, until custody or guardianship is terminated with approval of the court or as required under section 3-8A-24 of this subtitle; or
(iii) Order the child, parents, guardian, or custodian, of the child to participate in rehabilitative services that are in the best interest of the child and the family.
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-19(d).
In our review of the Juvenile Causes Act, we found the statute to be clear and unambiguous. It plainly provides for three types of disposition: probation, commitment or court ordered home services. The statute does not reference or include language conferring upon the juvenile court,
the ability to stay a commitment or to grant a temporary disposition. The subsections of the statute that the State argues allow the court to impose a suspended commitment or temporary disposition are distinct and do not provide that a juvenile court can mix and match dispositions or delay the imposition of a commitment. We note that “[as] a court of limited jurisdiction, the juvenile court may exercise only those powers granted to it by statute.” In re Ryan W., 434 Md. 577, 602 (2013) (citing In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 334 (2001). As explained in In re W.Y. and In re S.F., a juvenile court does not have the authority to act outside of
the boundaries of the statute, even if the court determines that such requirements further the child’s rehabilitative goals. In re W.Y., 228 Md. App. 596, 611(2016); In re S.F., 477 Md. 296, 326 (2022).
In sum, the plain meaning of section 3-8A-19(d) of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is clear and unambiguous. It permits three dispositions: probation, commitment, or services in the home for the child and family. Here, the court erred in imposing a disposition not authorized by law.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY REVERSED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Washington County Circuit Court’s modification of custody order. The circuit court considered carefully all the evidence before it, including one parent’s relocation, with a view towards determining the best interests of the child.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
disregarding its own factual findings, speculating about Munson’s living arrangements, and awarding custody contrary to the child’s stability and best interests.
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Initial Custody Award
This case comes to us from a judgment by the Circuit Court for Washington County modifying a child custody order. Tasha Munson, also known as Tasha Smith (“Smith”),1 appellant, and Kayla Munson (“Munson”), appellee, were married on 20 January 2017. They share a child, K.M. (“the child”), born on 27 March 2020. The parties separated in August 2020. A judgment of absolute divorce in favor of Munson and a separate child custody order were entered on 18 November 2021. On 28 July 2022, Munson filed a petition for modification of custody.2 On 24 April 2024, the court entered a consent order modifying child custody. Less than three months later, both parties filed petitions to modify custody. Munson withdrew ultimately her petition to modify custody and filed a counter-petition for modification of custody. On 22 August 2024, Munson filed a petition for contempt. After a hearing on 17 September 2024, the court entered a pendente lite custody order.
A hearing on the merits of the petitions for modification and the petition for contempt was held on 25 March and 4 April 2025. On 9 May 2025, the circuit court announced its decision from the bench. The court found that a material change in circumstances occurred and entered an order modifying custody. Smith filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. This timely appeal followed.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Smith presents the following issues for our consideration:
I. Whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, and violated Smith’s constitutional right to travel by modifying custody based on her Coast Guard relocation; and, II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
At all times pertinent to this appeal, Smith served in the United States Coast Guard, where she worked as an aviation maintenance technician. In 2020, Smith was ordered to relocate from her duty station in Maryland to a new duty station in North Carolina. According to Munson, the couple planned to go to North Carolina and move back later to Maryland so that the child could be closer to family, as “[a] ll of our family is up here.” Munson and the child moved to North Carolina with Smith in August 2020, but shortly after arriving there, the parties separated and divorced eventually.
In conjunction with the judgment of absolute divorce entered on 18 November 2021, the circuit court entered a custody order pursuant to which the parties were awarded joint legal custody and shared physical custody of the child. The child spent two weeks with one parent, followed by two weeks with the other parent. Smith was granted tiebreaking authority on matters regarding the child’s health care and other subjects. The order set forth a detailed holiday schedule.
Consent Custody Order
Subsequently, the parties negotiated a consent custody agreement. Munson agreed to the modified custody arrangement because she lived a reasonable driving distance from Elizabeth City, North Carolina, planned to drive there often, and thought she would have more access to the child because many of the provisions in the agreement allowed her to be involved in his life. She planned to see the child on his first day of school and visit him on long weekends and holidays. She planned also to attend extracurricular activities and drive the child to Maryland to see family members. In addition to being more involved in the child’s life, Munson thought that she and Smith would work on their relationship, that Smith might move back to Maryland, and that they could parent on a fifty-fifty basis.
On 24 April 2024, the court entered a consent order modifying custody. Pursuant to that order, the parties were awarded again joint legal custody and shared physical custody “as detailed in the original Custody Order[.]” Smith was granted
tie-breaking authority, but the parties were required to attend “at least one session of mediation and make a good-faith effort to resolve [any] disagreement” about major decisions prior to Smith exercising tie-breaking authority. The parties were ordered to “jointly engage the services of a family therapist and [to] participate in family counseling, once per quarter.” All communications between the parties were to “be done via AppClose.” The order included provisions regarding communications with the child, including that telephone and Facetime calls with the non-custodial parent were to occur between 7 and 8 p.m. every Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Sunday.
The parties agreed that when the child started kindergarten, Smith would have primary physical custody and Munson would have physical custody on a schedule that was detailed in the order and included, but was not limited to, one weekend per month, all long weekends due to federal holidays and days off of school, and summer vacation with the exception of Smith’s two consecutive weeks of vacation. If either party changed her residence, she would provide the other party “at least ninety (90) days advance and prior written notice via [AppClose] . . . of her intention to relocate the child’s residence.” The order provided further that, [i]f said relocation materially impacts either party’s access with the child, then in such event, the parties shall attempt to agree upon a modification of the physical custody and visitation arrangements if necessary. In the absence of a modification agreement, each party shall have the right and opportunity to have the issue of custody and visitation resolved by the Court[.]
Petition and Counter-Petition to Modify the Consent Custody Order
Less than three months after the court entered the consent custody order, Smith filed a petition to modify custody. She averred that she had received orders from the Coast Guard “to permanently change duty station” from North Carolina to Alabama on 18 August 2024. Smith sought sole legal and primary physical custody of the child. She requested that each party have the child on a six-week repeating schedule until the Sunday before the child entered kindergarten, which was anticipated to occur in August 2025, at which time she would be granted primary custody.
Munson opposed Smith’s petition and filed a counterpetition for modification in which she asserted that, as a result of Smith’s transfer from North Carolina to Alabama, which she alleged was a material change in circumstances, the travel time between the parties’ homes increased to fourteen hours and the parties were “unable to reach an agreement as to how the two-week rotation would be facilitated due to the distance.” Munson alleged also, among other things, that Smith refused to cooperate in selecting a family therapist, continued to disregard her “input or opinions on issues pertaining to the child’s care and wellbeing[,]” and continued “to dictate the child’s medical care” and exclude her participation in it. According to Munson, Smith’s transfer to Alabama would “further alienate” the child from her and his life in Maryland. Further, the changes to custody anticipated
when the child started kindergarten were no longer in the child’s best interest and joint legal and shared physical custody were no longer appropriate and were detrimental to the child’s health and future educational path. Munson requested sole legal and primary physical custody of the child and that Smith be awarded visitation on a schedule to be determined by the court.
On 22 August 2024, Munson filed a petition for contempt asserting that Smith had absconded with the child, prevented the child from contacting Munson, and refused to respond to Munson’s inquiries. A pendente lite hearing was held on 17 September 2024. Thereafter, the court entered a written order awarding shared physical custody and setting forth a detailed pendente lite access schedule.
Merits Hearing
A hearing on the merits of the petition and counter-petition for modification of custody and the petition for contempt was held on 25 March and 4 April 2025. The parties did not dispute that there had been a material change in circumstances resulting from Smith’s relocation to Alabama.
A. Smith’s Testimony
Smith testified that, while in the Coast Guard, she rotated duty stations every four years, unless she was granted an extension. Prior to being assigned a duty station, Smith had an opportunity to provide the Coast Guard with a list of preferred locations known as a “dream list.” She could ask to stay at her current duty station or request another location. In May 2024, after the parties had negotiated the consent custody order that was entered by the court on 24 April 2024, Smith received an order from the Coast Guard to relocate to Alabama. Before receiving that order, Smith requested, via her dream list, three locations in Elizabeth City, North Carolina and, as her fourth choice, Mobile, Alabama. According to Smith, there were no locations in Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, or New Jersey for the type of work she performed.
On direct examination, Smith testified that she did not speak to Munson about her dream list because she had not decided at that time if she was going to stay in the Coast Guard. On cross-examination, Smith was questioned as follows:
Q. . . . And you agree that throughout . . . those proceedings [negotiating the consent custody order entered on 24 April 2024] at no point did you communicate to Ms. Munson or to any of us that you: one, may not be in North Carolina; two, you were considering not staying in; or three, that you could potentially, might be coming out?
[Smith]: The –
Q. Yes or no, did you communicate any of that? Did you communicate with Ms. Munson that hey, I’m trying to decide whether to stay or not?
A. No, no.
Q. Did you communicate with Ms. Munson, hey, I’m going to sign a contract to extend my two year?
A. That did not happen in that timeframe. That happened right after A School. I took my 2024 end
of enlistment and I added two years to it to make it 2026.
Q. Okay.
A. So, I was active duty until 2026 no matter what and [Munson] was aware that I rotate every four years. I was trying to stay in Elizabeth City, so that is why the communication didn’t happen. Until I knew that I was going to not be in Elizabeth City, that’s when I communicated to [Munson]. I had never intended to not be in the Coast Guard, but these are all decisions that go into signing a contract. So, when I signed that contract that’s when I was given other orders to go to Alabama.
Smith signed the transfer order on 9 May 2024 and notified Munson about the transfer on 26 May 2024, but did not tell her when she would be moving to Alabama. Two days after giving Munson notice, Smith suggested that they continue to share parenting time until August when, pursuant to the terms of the April 2024 consent custody order, Smith was to have primary custody because the child was to start kindergarten. Munson did not agree and requested primary custody beginning immediately, a proposal rejected by Smith. The parties did not engage in mediation. They continued to exchange the child every two weeks until 4 August 2024. On that date, Munson transferred the child to Smith.
The Coast Guard gave Smith a travel period of 18 August to 1 September 2024 so that no personal leave had to be used to effectuate her relocation to Alabama. Smith and her family used that period of time to take a family vacation and move to Alabama. Smith did not inform Munson that she was moving from North Carolina to Alabama on 18 August 2024, did not provide Munson with her new address in Alabama, and did not provide telephone access between Munson and the child during the time her family was on vacation. On 18 August, which was the day to transfer the child back to Munson, Smith sent her a message stating that she was moving, that the “current custodial rotation which involves alternating every two weeks between North Carolina and Maryland is no longer appropriate given the significant distance between our location and Maryland[,]” and that she would be keeping the child with her in Alabama until the court issued a new custody order. Smith testified that she did not give Munson her address in Alabama because she “wasn’t sure what she might do[,]” but she testified also that she told Munson if she would “come up with a reasonable equal parenting schedule” she would arrange a meeting place and provide her new address.
Munson pleaded with Smith to see the child, but Smith refused to provide her new address until a hearing in the circuit court on 17 September 2024. Smith did not bring the child to that hearing. Pursuant to a court order issued after the hearing, the parties began a custody arrangement of two months in one party’s care and then two months in the other party’s care. The first time Munson saw the child was 1 October 2024.
At the time of the merits hearing, Smith and her husband, whom she married on 17 March 2022, lived in Alabama with their two children, one of whom was three years old and the other who was a year and a half old. They lived in a four-
bedroom home with a backyard. Smith’s husband was a stayat-home father. Smith provided health and dental insurance coverage for the child through the Coast Guard. The health and dental plan, known as Tricare Prime, provided primary care within one hundred miles of Smith’s duty station. According to Smith, if Munson was awarded primary custody of the child, he would be covered under Tricare Prime for emergency visits. Smith argued that the child should remain primarily with her and begin school in Alabama consistent with the consent custody order.
Smith testified that Munson had not treated her with respect and deflected her questions about the child. She claimed that Munson was not supportive of the child’s relationship with Smith’s other two children, her husband, or with Smith’s father. Munson was opposed to the child calling Smith’s husband “dad” and Smith did not think that Munson would facilitate the child’s access to Smith’s father. Smith believed the child was better off in her primary care. She testified that she knew how his insurance worked, scheduled his medical appointments, routinely took him to appointments with his pediatrician, and could give him a stable schedule with fewer hours at daycare because her husband was a stay-at-home father. Smith claimed Munson neglected the child’s medical care. Specifically, she pointed to Munson’s initial refusal to agree to surgery to address the child’s thirteen cavities, her request for a second opinion, and her reluctance to allow the child to be sedated. Smith pointed also to the child’s twelve ear infections. She testified that, although it was recommended that the child have tubes inserted in his ears, Munson wanted to discuss that recommendation and, during the resulting delay, the child contracted additional ear infections. According to Smith, the child required weekly physical therapy for a brachial plexus injury to his right arm that occurred at birth, but Munson made no attempt to set up the therapy. Smith set up the physical therapy, but advised Munson that she could not participate in it via video call when the child was in Smith’s care because that would constitute a HIPAA violation due to other children being in the therapy room. Smith set up the therapy so that the child could participate remotely via Zoom when he was in Munson’s care.
Smith continued that she tried to prepare home-cooked meals, with minimal fried foods and sugar, for her family. In videos, Smith observed that Munson allowed “lots of candy and just access to sugar, ice cream, brownies, pizza.” Smith had “never seen [the child] eating food other than junk food on any call.” When asked if she discussed the food issue with Munson, Smith responded that she “had brought up once about a lollipop and then I just decided that that’s not my style of parenting, but I can’t control her style of parenting.” Smith stated that, after daycare or soccer practice, between 7 and 8:30 in the evening, Munson brought the child to her place of employment, which was a retail establishment where fireworks were sold. Smith claimed that Munson sent the child back to her with a moldy cup containing liquid that had been in the cup two weeks earlier when he was transferred to Munson’s care. Smith did not know how many bedrooms were in the mobile home where Munson resided and that the rented mobile home was under contract of sale.
Smith acknowledged that she and Munson were not able to communicate with regard to major decisions about the child’s well-being. She did not want to be required to go to mediation before exercising tie-breaking authority. She claimed that Munson failed to adhere to the court’s pendente lite order requiring the child to be exchanged at specific airports. Smith stated that Munson did not provide her with information about the child’s activities such as soccer and his birthday party and was unwilling to discuss religion or the child’s attendance at church. Smith believed that the child’s Catholic daycare in Maryland included the practice “prayers with him.”
B. Amanda Schreiver’s Testimony
Amanda Schreiver testified on behalf of Munson. She had been friends with Munson for thirty-two years and met Smith eleven years ago. The child refers to Schreiver as Aunt Amanda. Schreiver observed the child with Munson, went on outings with them to Hershey Park for Halloween and Christmas, and observed Munson prepare meals, snacks, and drinks. She described the relationship between Munson and the child as “loving.” She described Munson as capable of fostering a relationship between the child and Smith and as a fit and proper parent. She stated that Munson would not harm the child and is not a violent person, is not an alcoholic or an excessive drinker, and that she wants what is best for the child. Schreiver described Munson’s home as a “very clean” two-bedroom, two-bathroom mobile home “out in the country.” Smith’s attorney stipulated “to all of this.”
C. Munson’s Testimony
At the time of the hearing, Munson resided in her rented mobile home for more than two years. She worked full time as a manager at Phantom Fireworks. She worked two eighthour shifts and two twelve-hour shifts per week. Typically, she worked 8 or 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 or 5 p.m. or 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. Munson made her own work schedule, so she was able to have up to six days off at a time. Her aunt watched the child when she worked late. Munson was seeking another residence because the home she rented was in the process of being sold and the closing was set then for 29 May 2025. She intended to move to a two-bedroom, one-bathroom apartment with an open floor plan located on the “[o]ther side of Hancock[,]” about ten miles from her current residence. The apartment was being painted and remodeled. She anticipated signing the lease in May. On cross-examination, she stated that she could have the lease for her new apartment “tomorrow.” She planned to give Smith notice of her move when the painting was completed, and she had the “actual address and the lease.”
Munson did not have health insurance for the child, but had dental and vision coverage for him through her employer. If she had custody, she could obtain health insurance coverage for the child through her employer. According to Munson, Smith liked to keep the Tricare medical insurance coverage with her. Munson had not secured health care providers for the child in Maryland because she did not have access to Tricare as she was not a spouse and Smith told her there were no health insurance cards. After Smith moved to
Alabama, she chose the child’s medical providers without obtaining input from Munson. Smith did not inform Munson of the child’s physical therapist until October 2024. Munson also attended college as a full-time student. When the child was in her care, he attended the Good Shepherd preschool at the Methodist Church in Hancock on Mondays, Thursdays, and Fridays. Munson received a grant from the Department of Education to pay the child’s tuition at the preschool. Munson had many family members in the area and one of her aunts watched the child as needed. According to Munson, the child did well in school, had friends, played four seasons of soccer, and played t-ball. For three seasons, Munson served as the coach for the child’s soccer team.
Munson acknowledged that she and Smith have “always had rough communications both ways.” According to Munson, Smith said she was going to reenlist and try to stay in North Carolina. She never said or gave the impression that she would be moving from North Carolina. Munson understood that there was always a chance Smith could be transferred out of North Carolina, but she thought she would be there longer “because the way she talked she was going to try to stay, or she would talk about getting out.” If Munson had known that Smith was going to move, she never would have consented to the modified custody arrangement. The first time Smith told Munson she had been transferred to Alabama was on 26 May 2024, about a month after the consent custody order was entered.
Munson testified that it was “unrealistic” to hop on a plane, pay for a hotel, and spend thousands of dollars a month to see her son. She proposed that Smith keep the child for the remainder of the summer, except for Munson’s week of vacation, and then the child would return to live in Maryland where he was established in school and sports. Smith proposed that they rotate custody every six to eight weeks, but Munson did not agree because it would have been difficult for the child to adjust, and he would have lost his spot at his preschool.
On 17 August 2024, as Munson was traveling to pick up the child and was about halfway through Virginia, she received a text from Smith saying that she had relocated to Alabama and would not be returning the child. Munson denied being aggressive at the time with Smith, but she wanted to know where the child was. She requested Smith’s address so she could get him.
According to Munson, Smith ignored her suggestions, and they had “a one-sided coparenting relationship” in which she was “constantly disrespected” and not seen as the child’s parent. Smith, who was the child’s biological parent, pointed out “a number of times that [the child’s] blood relations are more important than any of [Munson’s] family.” Munson did not have a relationship with the two children Smith had with her husband because Smith told her “it’s inappropriate.”
Nevertheless, if the children were in front of her, Munson said hello. Munson hoped that she and Smith could get along, talk to each other, and be friendly in front of their child.
Every time Munson offered to get the child medical insurance coverage through her employer, Smith threatened to exercise her tie-breaker authority and take her to court. Munson believed that she and Smith needed family
counseling because they did not communicate well and she felt that she was “not equally heard[,]” had “no input[,]” and that Smith ignored anything she said that was contrary to Smith’s opinion. As an example, Munson asked for family counseling and the court-ordered video calls with respect to the child’s medical appointments, but she never received them. In addition, Munson claimed that when she and Smith exchanged the child, Smith ignored her and would not acknowledge her. On one occasion, Munson invited Smith to have lunch with her and the child and Smith walked away. Munson stated that such behavior was common. The child had not seen his two mothers exchange words or smile at each other. On another occasion, Smith said she would bring the child to his t-ball practice but did not, stating that he was visiting with relatives from her side of the family. Smith accused Munson of not addressing the child’s car sickness. Munson testified that, although the child rarely gets car sick when with her, she kept grape-flavored Dramamine in her car. On one occasion, when he vomited in the car, Munson got out, obtained clean clothing from luggage that was in the car, and after the child was cleaned and changed, they went on to have breakfast. Smith, however, was not satisfied with how Munson addressed the situation.
Munson acknowledged that she took the child to her place of employment. She said that her workplace was one-half mile conveniently from where the child played soccer. After she picked up the child from preschool, they would go to her office and change clothes. After soccer practice, they would return to the office where they would eat dinner and watch a movie. Munson explained that she worked in a retail store and that no chemicals or fireworks were manufactured there. Munson stated that information she received from doctors was “completely different” from what she was told by Smith. For example, when the child returned to Munson’s care in October 2024, Smith arranged for him to have virtual physical therapy appointments once a week on Tuesday mornings. Although Smith told Munson that she was not allowed to participate in the therapy sessions because it was a HIPAA violation, Munson reached out to the provider where she was told there was no issue with her participating in the sessions. As a result, Munson did not begin attending the child’s therapy until his eighteenth session Munson pointed out also that the child’s medical records indicated that he was working on his therapy with his “mom and his dad.” Munson acknowledged that, on one occasion, the child did his virtual physical therapy session in the lobby of a building where the grandmother was attending an eye doctor appointment. Munson had brought her grandmother to the eye doctor and did not want the child to miss his physical therapy appointment. Munson explained the situation to the physical therapist, who had no objection. Munson acknowledged that the child was not engaged in that particular therapy session because he was looking forward to getting pancakes afterward.
Munson explained that she did not try to prevent the child’s dental surgery. She wanted merely a second opinion because some of the teeth at issue were baby teeth, and she wanted to know if there were alternative modes of sedation. Munson addressed also Smith’s accusation that she gave the child a moldy cup. Munson said the cup was sent by Smith with the
child and that she had washed it. Smith accused Munson of being neglectful and the issue was discussed between the parties over a five-day period. Eventually, Munson refused to answer any additional questions about the cup. Munson expressed concern that Smith was trying to create distance between her and the child, and that Smith might take him and move again so she would not see him anymore.
The Court’s Ruling
At the close of the evidence, the court held the case sub curia. The court issued its ruling from the bench on 9 May 2025. After finding that there had been a material change in circumstances, the court proceeded to “analyze the best interest factors as set forth in Maryland’s case law.”
Preliminarily, the court addressed Smith’s assertion that the parties agreed already that the child would reside primarily with her once he began attending kindergarten. The court stated:
The Court also notes as an introductory comment that Ms. Smith made the argument that because the parties had already reached an agreement that [the child] would primarily reside with her once he reached school attendance age that therefore the Court shouldn’t consider a change in custody. The Court would note that that consent provision of the current custodial arrangement was entered prior to either party having knowledge of the change in duty station assignment and the change in geographic residence. Therefore, the Court does not believe it [is] appropriate or supported by law to indicate that once a material change in circumstances has been shown that the Court is precluded from considering the best interest of the child as to custodial placement between the parties.
The court proceeded to consider the factors set forth in Montgomery County Department of Social Services v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 420 (1978), and Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 304-11 (1986) (referred to hereafter collectively as the Sanders-Taylor factors). We will address the court’s findings in more detail, infra.
After considering all the Sanders-Taylor factors, the court awarded the parties shared legal custody and granted primary physical custody and tie-breaking authority to Munson. With respect to visitation by Smith, the court ruled:
The Court also believes it appropriate weighing all of the factors that primary physical custody of [the child] would be awarded to Ms. Munson and that extensive visitation including extensive visitation in the summertime be awarded to Ms. Smith. The Court will give the parties the opportunity to provide a proposed visitation arrangement by close of business next Friday concerning this matter. If the parties cannot reach an agreement the Court will generally follow the visitation arrangement that was set forth in the prior order switching Ms. Munson for Ms. Smith in that order regarding holiday arrangements. The Court would expect Ms. Smith to have extended
visitation during the summer when [the child] is out of school including for the majority of the summer.
As for the petition for contempt, the court found that Smith was in contempt by denying Munson visitation access to the child and failing to provide full and complete information about where the child was living. The court determined, however, that Smith’s compliance with the pendente lite order purged her contempt.
Smith filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the court “transferred primary custody during a dispute about visitation conditions, without providing adequate facts or justification for its decision[.]” In the motion, she argued, inter alia, that the court “arbitrarily made a custody determination unnecessarily and beyond what was required” and that “it was an abuse of discretion to determine custody rather than visitation logistics.”
We shall include additional facts as necessary in our discussion of the questions presented.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When an action has been tried without a jury, an appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence.” Md. Rule 8-131(c). We “will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and [we] will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. Indeed, “[t]he trial judge who sees the witnesses and the parties, and hears the testimony is in a far better position than the appellate court, which has only a transcript before it, to weigh the evidence and determine what disposition will best promote the welfare of the child.” Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 201 (2020) (cleaned up).
Further, when reviewing a circuit court’s child custody determinations, we utilize three interrelated standards of review. Kadish v. Kadish, 254 Md. App. 467, 502 (2022) (citing In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003)). First, we apply the ‘“clearly erroneous’” standard of review to the court’s factual findings. Id. (quoting Yve S., 373 Md. at 586). Second, where the court’s custody determination “involves an interpretation and application of statutory and case law,” we decide “whether the circuit court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Barrett v. Ayres, 186 Md. App. 1, 10 (2009) (quoting Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 391-92 (2002)). Finally, if we determine that the circuit court’s “ultimate conclusion” was “founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous,” we do not disturb that conclusion absent a “clear abuse of discretion.” Kadish, 254 Md. App. at 502 (cleaned up). An abuse of discretion occurs when the challenged decision is “well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what the court deems minimally acceptable.” North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 14 (1994). See also B.O. v. S.O., 252 Md. App. 486, 502 (2021) (stating that an abuse of discretion “should only be found in the extraordinary, exceptional, or most egregious case” (cleaned up)). We will not reverse a circuit court’s decision just because we might have ruled differently. North, 102 Md. App. at 14.
DISCUSSION
I.
Smith contends that the circuit court erred, as a matter of law, and violated her constitutional right to travel by modifying custody based on her Coast Guard relocation. She asserts that the circuit court “neither applied nor discussed” Braun v. Headley, 131 Md. App. 588 (2000), or Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486 (1991), two cases that she asserts address the interaction between a parent’s fundamental constitutional right to interstate travel and the best interests of the child standard. Smith argues also that the court “ignored Domingues’ directive to give ‘critical importance’ to the pre-relocation parent-child relationship, giving no weight to the parties’ April 2024 consent order designating [Smith] as primary physical custodian with tie-breaking authority.” Further, the court failed to address Munson’s “acknowledged familiarity with the Coast Guard’s relocation process.”
According to Smith, “[b]y failing to correctly apply Braun and Domingues to undisputed facts that overwhelmingly favored protecting [Smith’s] interstate relocation while preserving the child’s relationship with both parents, the court infringed [on Smith’s] constitutional right to travel.” These claims, however, are not properly before us for our consideration. Ordinarily, we will not decide an issue (other than jurisdiction) “unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]” Md. Rule 8-131(a). Smith did not raise her constitutional right to travel as a defense against a change in custody. Our review of the transcripts makes clear that Smith did not raise the issue at the merits hearing. Nor did she raise the issue in her motion to reconsider. As the issue was neither raised in nor decided by the circuit court, it was not preserved properly for our consideration, and we shall not address it.
Even if the issue had been preserved properly, reversal would not be required. For the reasons discussed infra, we conclude that the circuit court considered carefully all the evidence before it, including Smith’s relocation, with a view towards determining the best interests of the child.
II.
Smith argues next that the circuit court’s custody determination was a clear abuse of discretion because the court disregarded its own factual findings, speculated about Munson’s living arrangements, and awarded custody contrary to the child’s stability and best interests. Smith maintains that the circuit court’s decision to modify custody “was not grounded in the evidence[,]” “disregarded [her] credibility,” disregarded the existing consent order in which Munson agreed to Smith having primary custody when the child began kindergarten, disregarded “the superior stability of her home[,] speculated about [Munson’s] circumstances[,]” and “minimized concrete evidence of parental neglect.” Further, she asserts that the court failed to identify deficiencies in her parenting and acted in contradiction of its own findings, including that she gave timely notice of her relocation to Alabama, “acted in good faith to remain in North Carolina ‘to facilitate visitation,’” and “had not engaged in parental alienation.”
Specifically regarding Munson’s home, Smith contends that the circuit court “conceded” that her “home environment was superior” to Munson’s, who “rented a mobile home that was ‘put up for sale[,]’” “speculated” that Munson would find another residence, and “dismissed photographs of the existing mobile home as ‘no longer relevant,’ even though no evidence described the supposed new [residence].”
Lastly, Smith argues that “[t]reating minor, reciprocal communication issues as a basis for reversing an established custodial order reflects a misapplication of the ‘best interests’ standard.” She maintains that the court “downplayed” and gave “no meaningful consideration” to Munson’s reluctance to pay for the child’s sedation during dental surgery and her “history of sending [the child] home with a moldy sippy straw.” According to Smith, although the court found “mutual shortcomings” on the part of each party, it failed to provide any reason why Smith’s shortcomings “should carry greater weight – particularly in light of her consistent credibility, compliance, and initiative to preserve shared custody.” We are not persuaded by Smith.
Modification of Custody Determinations
The decision “whether to grant a [custody] modification rests with the sound discretion of the trial court[.]” Leineweber v. Leineweber, 220 Md. App. 50, 61 (2014) (cleaned up). When, as here, parents seek modification of a custody order, the circuit court engages in a two-step process in deciding the motion. The court must consider: “(1) whether there has been a material change in circumstances, and (2) what custody arrangement is in the best interests of the [child].” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 639 (2016). A material change in circumstances requires some evidence that a change has occurred since the prior custody determination that “affects the welfare of the child.” Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. 146, 171 (2012). Here, the parties agreed, and the court found, that a material change in circumstances existed. No challenge to that finding is before us.
After a court finds that there has been a material change in circumstances, it considers the best interests of the child as if it were an original custody proceeding. Id. at 171-72; see also Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md. App. 1, 28 (1996) (“If a material change of circumstance is found to exist, then the court, in resolving the custody issue, considers the best interest of the child as if it were an original custody proceeding.”). Whenever a court exercises jurisdiction over a child’s custody, the child’s best interests are of transcendent importance and must be the paramount consideration that guides the court’s analysis. See A.A. v. Ab.D., 246 Md. App. 418, 441-42 (2020). In Kadish, 254 Md. App. at 504, we delineated the two sets of factors that the court should consider in assessing the child’s best interests: In analyzing the best interests of the child, we are guided by the factors articulated in Montgomery County Department of Social Services v. Sanders,38 Md. App. 406, 420 (197[8]), and, with particular relevance to the consideration of joint custody, Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 30411 (1986). In Sanders, this Court listed ten nonexclusive factors: (1) fitness of the parents; (2) character and reputation of the parties; (3) desire
of the natural parents and agreements between the parties; (4) potentiality of maintaining natural family relations; (5) preference of the child; (6) material opportunities affecting the future life of the child; (7) age, health, and sex of the child; (8) residences of parents and opportunity for visitation; (9) length of separation from the natural parents; and (10) prior voluntary abandonment or surrender. 38 Md. App. at 420.
In Taylor, the [Supreme Court of Maryland] enumerated thirteen specific, non-exclusive factors, including some that overlap with the Sanders factors: (1) capacity of the parents to communicate and to reach shared decisions affecting the child’s welfare; (2) willingness of parents to share custody; (3) fitness of parents; (4) relationship established between the child and each parent; (5) preference of the child; (6) potential disruption of child’s social and school life; (7) geographic proximity of parental homes; (8) demands of parental employment; (9) age and number of children; (10) sincerity of parents’ request; (11) financial status of the parents; (12) impact on state or federal assistance; and (13) benefit to parents. 306 Md. at 304-11.
Maryland’s Supreme Court held that the Sanders-Taylor factors are “not intended to be all inclusive, and a trial judge should consider all other circumstances that reasonably relate to the issue.” Taylor, 306 Md. at 311. We recognize that it is advisable to leave “‘the delicate weighing process necessary in child custody cases’” to the circuit court, so long as there are sufficient facts in the record to support the court’s custody decision. McCarty v. McCarty, 147 Md. App. 268, 273 (2002) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 132 (1977)). We also recognize that “[c]ourts are not limited by any particular list of factors but are instead vested with wide discretion in making decisions concerning the best interests of children.” Kadish, 254 Md. App. at 504 (citing Azizova v. Suleymanov, 243 Md. App. 340, 345 (2019)).3
Trial Court’s Consideration of the Sanders-Taylor Factors
The circuit court considered clearly and thoroughly the Sanders-Taylor factors. The court found that the child was five years old and “generally healthy[,]” and that both parents had established strong relationships with him “that should be encouraged.” Both parties were found to be “fit and proper to have custody” of the child. In addressing the parties’ fitness, the court stated specifically that it did not place great weight upon the issue of the dirty sippy cup or view it as an indication of Munson’s lack of fitness. The court rejected also the allegation that there was some type of “unfitness” with respect to Munson’s “household.” The court found the residences of both parties “to be appropriate” and that “both parties have maintained stable residences and appropriate residences for the child and would do so regardless of what the Court orders as a custodial arrangement.” As for the character and reputation of the parties, the court found that both were employed, and there was no “type of particular
character defect or engagement [in] illicit activities that would make either of them unfit to have custody of [the child] or visitation access.”
In addressing the desire of the natural parents and agreements between the parties, the court found both parties’ requests to have custody sincere and noted that there had been “great efforts in this case to provide as much access as possible . . . to each of the parties with [the child], even given the geographic distance between the parties’ residence[s].”
The court took note of the extensive litigation and the prior consent custody order that was “upset” when Smith received a change in her duty assignment and the distance between the parties’ residences “greatly increased[.]” The court addressed the willingness of the parties to share custody, stating that there were indications “this [cuts] both ways.”
The court noted that the parties possessed the capacity to communicate and share decision-making affecting the child’s welfare, but that there were times “when tensions and hostility prevent that[.]” The court found credible Smith’s testimony that she received her order to change duty stations on 9 May 2024, and that she informed Munson of the transfer on 26 May 2024, but that she failed to give Munson her new address. In addressing the “communication difficulties between the parties[,]” the court stated:
While there … were extensive texts [sic] messages exchanged th[rough] the app, App Close [sic], some of those indicate that the parties can cooperate and keep each other informed regarding what’s going on with [the child]. There are other times indicating where the parties are either non-responsive to one another[,] do not necessarily answer questions in case of Ms. Smith and when that occurs Ms. Munson becomes angry and agitated and generally leads to a decline and [sic] the quality of the parties’ communication.
The court further stated:
Obviously, there are times when the parents’ communications has [sic] been appropriate and the[y] have attempted to keep each other informed as to what is happening with [the child] and have attempted to provide access including through video chats within [sic]. There has also been testimony before the Court of conflicts of intents to cut the other party out from either receiving information from care providers for [the child] including doctors or dentist and there have been times when video chat visitation has been denied and there have been instances where Ms. Smith failed to provide for extended period[s] of time information to Ms. Munson regarding her new residence once she did relocate to Alabama. She indicated that she was scared that Ms. Munson would show up and cause a scene, perhaps abscond [with] the child. But the fact remains that she did not disclose to Ms. Munson her new residence where [the child] was living and there was a period of time when she moved, relocated her residence, did not tell Ms. Munson where that was and did not tell her where the child was.
The court found that there were times Smith had “either not disclosed information that should have been disclosed or ha[d] taken steps to make it difficult for Ms. Munson to acquire information concerning [the child].” The court found also that Smith “was not necessarily cooperative” in allowing Munson access to the child’s medical and dental records, “a source of contention between the parties.” As a result of that, there was an order for family therapy. The court found that Munson “credibly testified that family therapy was necessary” and that Smith “did not keep that family therapy.”
With respect to the potential of maintaining natural family relations, the court found that the child had a good relationship with his siblings, that Munson had taken steps to encourage a relationship with Smith and the child’s extended family members including aunts, uncles, and cousins, and that Smith expressed concern that Munson would deny and thwart visitation with Smith’s parents. The court took note also of Munson’s concern that Smith’s change of duty assignment was “the first step in an attempt to” alienate the child from her and that the next duty assignment would be much further away where there would not be an opportunity for her to see the child. The court found Munson sincere in her desire to encourage and maintain a relationship with Smith and to maintain the child’s relationship with his extended family of both parents who were located generally in Maryland and Pennsylvania. The court took note that the child had two younger siblings in Smith’s household, that he “gets along well” with them, and that no other children lived in Munson’s household. The court determined that Smith was “not receptive” to Munson’s “cordial outreaches” and that she had “exhibited some dis[d]ain for the fact that she has to deal with [a] shared custodial arrangement[.]” The court did not consider the child’s preference due to his young age.
In addressing the geographic proximity of the parents’ residences and opportunities for the child to spend time with each parent, the court stated:
Obviously, that’s what’s giving rise to the matter being before the Court today. The parties were making it work with liberal visitation time when there was reasonable time between the parties. They have since attempted to address the issues with shared physical custody. Once the change of duty assignment had been effectuated there had been extended visitation between the parties with the parties exchanging [the child] at BWI airport and Pensacola Airport. That schedule is no longer feasible because [the child] is, has attained the school age, will be going to kindergarten and obviously is going to have to be in one place so he can attend school.
The court determined that both parties worked and were self-supporting. Both had “insurance resources that would be appropriate to provide for the care and custody of the child.” As for the demands of parental employment, the court found that both parties were employed full-time, that Smith’s husband was a stay-at-home father (“there is some built in childcare there”), and that Munson provided childcare through pre-school arrangements and through her aunt. The court did not find the length of separation from the natural
parents or the impact on State or Federal assistance to be persuasive factors, and determined that there had not been a prior voluntary abandonment or surrender of the child. With respect to the potential disruption of the child’s social and school life, the court found that the child had “essentially been living between both residences up until this point” and that “this would be a much greater factor had he already been enrolled in and attending school.” The court noted that the child would soon be going to school in the fall.
Analysis
Considering these findings, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting primary physical custody to Munson. There is nothing in the record before us to show that the court disregarded its factual findings. The court’s custody determination was grounded in the evidence. We reject Smith’s assertion that the court disregarded the consent order. The court considered properly the SandersTaylor factors and the best interests of the child as if it were an original custody proceeding. Also contrary to Smith’s assertions, the court did not minimize “concrete evidence of parental neglect.” The court considered the evidence presented about the child’s sippy cup, did not place great weight upon that incident, and did not view it as an indication of Munson’s lack of fitness. Terranova v. Bd. of Trs. of Fire & Police Emps. Ret. Sys. of Balt. City, 81 Md. App. 1, 13 (1989) (“The weighing of the evidence and the assessment of witness credibility is for the finder of fact, not the reviewing court.”).
As for Munson’s residence, at the time of the hearing, she resided in a two-bedroom mobile home. The court rejected Smith’s suggestion that Munson’s household was somehow unfit and determined that both parties had maintained stable and appropriate homes for the child. That finding was supported by evidence. We find no support for
Smith’s assertion that the court “conceded” that her “home environment was superior” to Munson’s. Nor did the court speculate that Munson could find another residence. Munson testified that, at some point after the hearing, she would be moving to an apartment because her current residence was being sold. The court was free to credit her testimony, which it did.
There is no indication in the record that the court disregarded Smith’s credibility. Moreover, Smith’s suggestion that the court was required to view the parties’ communication issues as “minor” and “reciprocal” is without merit. Although the court found some communication shortcomings by both parties, it took specific note of Smith’s failure to provide Munson with the address in Alabama where the child was living and instances when Smith “either [had] not disclosed information that should have been disclosed or ha[d] taken steps to make it difficult for Ms. Munson to acquire information concerning [the child].”
As for Smith’s contentions that the court “downplayed” and gave “no meaningful consideration” to Munson’s reluctance to have the child undergo sedation for dental issues, that the court failed to provide reasons why her shortcomings should carry greater weight in light of her “consistent credibility, compliance, and initiative to preserve shared custody[,]” and that the court failed to identify deficiencies in her parenting, we note that appellate review is not an appropriate forum for a party to relitigate its case or to argue the weight of the evidence. See Kremen v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 363 Md. 663, 682 (2001) (“Our function is not to retry the case or reweigh the evidence[.]”). As we have noted, “[t]he weighing of the evidence and the assessment of witness credibility is for the finder of fact, not the reviewing court.” Terranova, 81 Md. App. at 13. The trial court was not required to adopt Smith’s interpretation of the facts or her desired outcome.
FOOTNOTES
1 For present purposes, we shall refer to appellant as Smith and to appellee as Munson.
2 Smith filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to transfer the case to North Carolina, both of which were denied. She filed also a renewed motion to dismiss, which the court treated as a motion to revise and denied.
3 Although not applicable in the case at hand, we note that § 9-201 of the Family Law (“FL”) Article of the Maryland Annotated Code, effective 1 October 2025, sets forth factors that the circuit court may consider in determining custody and visitation.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s order modifying custody and granting primary physical and legal custody of the children to father. Although mother claims that she did not consent to one specific condition in the order – restricting her sister from accessing the children during visitation – the transcript demonstrates that mother consented to the order’s complete terms, including the contested condition, by responding affirmatively on three separate occasions. Moreover, mother did not object or otherwise react to the court’s oral recitation of the term.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
THE COURT: So, if [F.] wanted to spend the night with you,
[MOTHER]: Yes.
THE COURT: -- would you assure the [c]ourt and assure [Father] that [Sister] would not be present?
[MOTHER]: I’[d] assure. THE COURT: Okay.
[MOTHER]: [Sister] lives in her own house.
THE COURT: Okay. So, I mean, really, we’re leaving it up to [F.]
[MOTHER]: Yeah.
The court then offered Father’s counsel an opportunity for a recess to discuss the contested condition with her client and Mother. Approximately ten minutes later, after the recess, Father’s counsel indicated that the parties had reached an agreement and placed the following terms on the record:
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: [Father] will have primary physical and legal custody of the [] [C] hildren[.] [Mother] will have --
THE COURT: He has legal as well?
This case arises from a custody dispute involving K. and F.1 (collectively, “Children”), the two minor children of Erica Roman (“Mother”), appellant, and William E. Robinson, Jr. (“Father”), appellee. On March 5, 2025, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County entered a custody modification order, granting primary physical and legal custody of the Children to Father. Mother now challenges one specific condition in the order restricting her sister (“Sister”) from accessing the Children during visitation (“contested condition”). Based on our review of Mother’s informal brief, we have formulated the following question for our consideration:2 Did the circuit court err in entering the custody order without Mother’s consent to the contested condition? For the following reasons, we answer this question in the negative and dismiss the instant appeal.
BACKGROUND3
On March 5, 2025, Mother and Father appeared for a hearing before the circuit court on Father’s motion requesting modification of custody, visitation, and child support. During the hearing, the court engaged in discussions with both parties regarding custody and visitation arrangements. The court specifically requested Mother’s assurance that Sister would not be present during visitations with the Children:
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: And legal custody, yes, Your Honor.
THE
COURT: Okay. The primary physical and legal custody will go to [Father]?
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very good, okay.
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: And [Mother] will have visitation as requested by the [C]hildren, with the following additional conditions. [Mother] shall be the one that is responsible for transportation of the [C]hildren for these visits. [Sister] will not be present at --
THE COURT: Can you spell her name?
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: I think it’s [spells Sister’s name].
THE COURT: Okay.
The court then conducted a voir dire of Mother to ensure that she understood and accepted the complete terms of the custody agreement:
THE COURT: Okay, [Mother], I’m going to ask you. Did you hear everything that [Father’s counsel] put on the record?
[MOTHER]: Yes.
THE COURT: Is that your agreement that you reached here today?
[MOTHER]: Yes.
THE COURT: You understand, I’m going to tell you the same thing. I’m going to say so ordered, it’s going to be an [o]rder of the [c]ourt. That means you can’t change your mind tomorrow. Do you understand that?
[MOTHER]: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. You will be required to be bound by it. Do you agree to be bound by it?
[MOTHER]: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you believe this agreement is in [the Children’s] best interest?
[MOTHER]: Yes.
As the transcript indicates, when asked if she had heard and understood the conditions that Father’s counsel imposed, Mother answered affirmatively and expressed her belief that the agreement represented the Children’s best interest. The transcript does not reflect any objection by Mother at that time. The court then read aloud the conditions of the custody order on the record. Regarding the contested condition, the court stated:
THE COURT: I further order that [Mother] will provide transportation [for the Children]. I further order that [Sister] will not be present during any visitation or transportation. And I further order that [Mother] will have suitable sleeping arrangements for the [C]hildren at times when they have visitation with her. And at this moment, the [c]ourt reserves on child support. Okay. So, Mr. Clerk, you can help me get an [o]rder together to that effect?
CLERK: Yes, I can.
THE COURT: Very good, okay[.]
Once again, Mother failed to object to the contested condition. The circuit court subsequently entered a written order on custody and child support, incorporating the contested condition. The corresponding term in the custody order provides: “[A]nd it is further ORDERED that during [Mother]’s period of access, [Sister] shall not be in the presence of [the Children[.]]”4 Mother timely filed the instant appeal, challenging the validity of her consent to the custody order.
DISCUSSION
I. The Circuit Court Did Not Err In Entering The Custody Order.
A. Parties’ Contentions
In her brief, Mother primarily argues that she did not properly consent to the contested condition in the custody order. Mother specifically claims that, during the March 5, 2025 hearing, she only stipulated that Sister would not be present during the Children’s pick-ups. Mother contends that she was not given an opportunity to agree to exclude Sister from all visitations with the Children because “[the court] never let [Father’s counsel] finish her statement[5] so [Mother] had no idea what [Father’s counsel] was saying nor did the [j]udge.” Mother further maintains that she did not fully understand that the contested condition would be included in the agreement due to her dyslexia and learning disability. Conversely, Father responds that Mother was present
during the March 5, 2025 hearing and did not object during the court’s recitation of the comprehensive list of terms in the custody agreement. Father argues, therefore, that this appeal should be dismissed because Mother consented to the contested condition.
B. Consent Orders
“Consent [orders][6] are ‘agreements entered into by the parties which must be endorsed by the court.’” Dennis v. Fire & Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 390 Md. 639, 655 (2006) (citation omitted). These orders memorialize the parties’ mutual agreement to relinquish their right to pursue litigation on any prospective meritorious claims. See Long v. State, 371 Md. 72, 82-83 (2002); see also Smith v. Luber, 165 Md. App. 458, 468 (2005) (“Because a consent [order] is entered into with the sanction of the court, normally no appeal will lie.”). The Supreme Court of Maryland has previously explained that “[c]onsent [orders] are hybrids, having attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees.” Long, 371 Md. at 82 (citing Chernick v. Chernick, 327 Md. 470, 478 (1992)). Indeed, “a consent [order] . . . embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature. But it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial [order.]” Long, 371 Md. at 82-83 (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992)). “[T]herefore, a consent [order] cannot be entered unless both parties agree to the order which is presented to the clerk.” Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md. App. 359, 361 n.1 (1977). “The entry of a . . . consent [order] implies that the terms and conditions have been agreed upon and consent thereto given in open court or filed by stipulation.” Id. at 363; see also Kent Island, LLC v. DiNapoli, 430 Md. 348, 360 (2013) (“[A] consent order entered properly carries the same weight and is treated as any other final judgment.”).
The Supreme Court of Maryland has recognized the “well-settled principle of the common law that no appeal lies from a consent [order]” because appeals are available only to parties who are aggrieved by the final judgment. Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 222-25 (2007). Generally, a party cannot be aggrieved by a judgment to which she acquiesced. See, e.g., Dietz v. Dietz, 351 Md. 683, 689-90 (1998) (describing “the acquiescence rule” and its limitation on the right to appeal); Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 630 (1996) (“The right to appeal may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below from which the appeal is taken[.]”). The rationale behind this principle has been characterized as “an ‘estoppel,’ a ‘waiver’ of the right to appeal, an ‘acceptance of benefits’ of the court determination, creating ‘mootness,’ and an ‘acquiescence’ in the judgment.” Franzen v. Dubinok, 290 Md. 65, 68 (1981) (citations omitted).
The Court in Suter recognized a limited exception to the acquiescence rule when an appellant challenges the validity of her consent to the terms of a consent order. 402 Md. at 224 n.10. “If there was no actual consent because the [order] was coerced, exceeded the scope of consent, or was not within the jurisdiction of the court, or, for any other reason, consent was not effective, an appeal will be
entertained.” Id. This Court has explained that, under this narrow exception, the only question that can be raised on appeal is whether the parties consented to the terms of the consent order. See Dorsey, 35 Md. App. at 362; see also Prince George’s Cnty v. Barron, 19 Md. App. 348, 349 (1973) (“[A]ny doubt that arises goes to the question of whether the [order] was in fact entered by consent.”).
In the case before us, Mother challenges the validity of her consent to the custody order’s entry. Thus, in the instant appeal, we are confined to reviewing whether the circuit court erred in entering the March 5, 2025 custody order based on Mother’s claim that she did not consent to the contested condition.
C. The Consent Requirement
“[T]he power of the court to enter [an order] by consent is dependent on the existence of actual consent of the parties at the time the [order] is entered[.]” Dorsey, 35 Md. App at 362 (citation omitted). In this context, “consent” requires voluntary agreement to the terms of a consent order. Barnes v. Barnes, 181 Md. App. 390, 420 (2008) (dismissing appeal “[b]ecause there is no evidence on the record to contradict the conclusion that both parties voluntarily agreed to the terms of the [o]rder”). We determine the extent of the parties’ agreement based on “what they plainly and unambiguously expressed, not what they intended the agreement to mean.” Long, 371 Md. at 84 (citing Roged, Inc. v. Paglee, 280 Md. 248, 254 (1977)). Where the underlying agreement is not the product of duress, “[t]he fact that one of the parties may have changed his or her mind shortly before or after the submitted consent order was signed by the court does not invalidate the signed consent [order].” Chernick, 327 Md. at 484.
Applying these principles to the case before us, we hold that the circuit court did not err in entering the custody order. The transcript reflects that, during the March 5, 2025 hearing, the court personally questioned Mother about Sister’s presence during visitations with the Children. The court’s initial inquiry was clear and direct: “[W]ould you assure the [c]ourt and assure [Father] that [Sister] would not be present?” Mother unequivocally confirmed her agreement in her response to the court: “I’[d] assure.” Mother now argues that she was deprived of her right to consent to the full extent of the custody order because Father’s counsel’s preliminary explanation of the contested condition was interrupted and incomplete. We are unconvinced for two reasons.
First, the court conducted a thorough voir dire of Mother shortly after Father’s counsel recited the contested condition. The transcript demonstrates that, during this voir dire, Mother consented to the order’s complete terms, including the contested condition, by responding affirmatively on three separate occasions: (i) when asked if “she hear[d] everything that [Father’s counsel] put on the record”; (ii) when asked if she accepted those terms; and (iii) when asked if the arrangement served the Children’s best interest.
The court also explained the order’s binding nature to
Mother before confirming her acquiescence: “I’m going to say so ordered, it’s going to be an [o]rder of the [c]ourt. That means you can’t change your mind tomorrow. Do you understand that?” Once again, Mother verified her understanding and agreed to comply with the order. Nothing in the record suggests that the underlying agreement was the product of duress. See Chernick, 327 Md. at 485 (explaining that, absent duress, “[t]he fact that one of the parties may have changed his or her mind shortly before or after the submitted consent order was signed by the court does not invalidate the signed consent [order]”). The contested condition addresses legitimate concerns about the Children’s welfare, which the parties and the court discussed at great length. The transcript is devoid of any indication that Father, Father’s counsel, or the court coerced Mother into consenting to the contested condition. On the contrary, the record establishes that the court tookconsiderable measures to ensure that Mother’s consent was voluntary. See Barnes, 181 Md. App. at 420 (requiring voluntary agreement to consent order’s terms). For example, the court facilitated a recess to allow the parties to negotiate privately and engaged in an extensive colloquy with Mother to confirm that she fully understood and agreed to the order’s terms. Although the court provided Mother with multiple opportunities to request clarification about the contested condition during this colloquy, Mother neither objected to the terms nor sought any further explanation of their implications on her visitations with the Children. Thus, “there is no evidence on the record to contradict the conclusion that both parties voluntarily agreed to the terms of the [consent] [o] rder.” Id.
Mother’s assertion that she subjectively intended to agree only to Sister’s exclusion from pick-ups is immaterial. As previously stated, this Court “determine[s] what the parties meant by what they plainly and unambiguously expressed, not what they intended the agreement to mean.” Long, 371 Md. at 84 (citing Roged, Inc., 280 Md. at 254). Mother’s plain and unambiguous responses to the court’s questions reflect her voluntary agreement to be bound by the March 5, 2025 custody order. Thus, Mother’s purported subjective intent does not override her repeated affirmations to the terms of the custody order as articulated by the court on the record. Second, the circuit court read the custody order’s complete terms, including the contested condition, aloud on the record after the initial interruption. The court expressly stated, “I further order that [Sister] will not be present during any visitation or transportation.” Mother did not object or otherwise react to the court’s oral recitation of the term.7
Here, because Mother and Father voluntarily entered into an agreement in open court, “‘which under Maryland law is binding upon the parties,’ intending that the court w[ould] subsequently reduce the agreement to a written order, the legal principles regarding consent orders are ‘equally applicable’ to the resulting order.” Barnes, 181 Md. App. at 409 (quoting Smith, 165 Md. App. at 470-71). Therefore, the parties “relinquished the right to litigate the controversy” and
“g[a]ve up any meritorious claims or defenses they may have had[.]” Long, 371 Md. at 83, 86 (citing Fiege v. Boehm, 210 Md. 352, 360 (1956)).
When a consent order is contested on the basis that no actual consent was given, but the record demonstrates that the order is properly entered and consistent with the parties’ agreement, we will dismiss the appeal. Barnes, 181 Md. App. at 418-20 (citing Casson v. Joyce, 28 Md. App. 634, 638-39 (1975)). Because the record reflects that Mother
consented to the March 5, 2025 custody order, the appeal is not properly before us. For this reason, we shall dismiss Mother’s appeal. See Barnes, 181 Md. App. at 418-20
CONCLUSION
We hold that the circuit court did not err in entering the March 5, 2025 custody order because Mother consented to its terms. Accordingly, we dismiss the instant appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1 For privacy purposes, we refer to the children by anonymized letters. K. and F. were born in 2008 and 2012, respectively.
2 Mother did not include a question presented in her informal brief; rather, she provided that “[t]he main issue is that my custody order was updated and states [] [S]ister . . . can’t be around my children.”
3 Given the limited question before us, we focus only on the events that transpired at the March 5, 2025 hearing.
4 For the sake of thoroughness, we note that the judge’s signature on the circuit court’s written order bears the handwritten date “3/5/2026.” The official stamp on the order indicates that it was actually entered on March 5, 2025. This mistake has no effect on our analysis.
5 From our review of the record, it appears that Mother is referencing the following exchange between Father’s counsel and the court:
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: And [Mother] will have visitation as requested by the [C]hildren, with the following additional conditions. [Mother] shall be the one that is responsible for transportation of the [C]hildren for these visits. [Sister] will not be present at --
THE COURT: Can you spell her name?
[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: I think it’s [spells Sister’s name]. THE COURT: Okay.
6 As the Supreme Court of Maryland has previously delineated, “[f]or purposes of this analysis, the terms ‘judgment,’ ‘order[,]’ and ‘decree’ are functionally interchangeable.” Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 222 n.8 (2007) (citations omitted).
7 A party may properly withdraw her consent before the court files an official written order with the clerk. Compare Chernick, 327 Md. at 484-85 (explaining that consent could not be withdrawn because “at the time that the order was filed both parties agreed and consented to the terms[]”), with Dorsey, 35 Md. App. at 362 (holding that party “obvious[ly] . . . withdrew [] consent before the final meeting with the trial judge[]” and that “both the trial judge and the appellees had full knowledge that the appellant was not consenting to the [order] two days before it was signed[]”).
Here, however, Mother did not validly withdraw consent before the court entered its written order on March 5, 2025. This case is distinguishable from Dorsey, 35 Md. App. at 362-63, because Mother and Father both agreed to the custody order’s complete terms at the time of its presentation to the clerk; the court entered a written order consistent with the parties’ oral agreement; and the court signed and dated the written order on the same day. Thus, as in Chernick, 327 Md. at 484-85, Mother’s subsequent dissatisfaction with or reconsideration of the contested condition does not retroactively undermine or negate the validity of the custody order.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Frederick County Circuit Court’s indefinite alimony and a monetary award to wife. The trial court properly valued the parties’ marital property, considered the relevant statutory factors and did not abuse its discretion in making its monetary award. It also carefully considered the evidence in analyzing the relevant factors in support of its decision to award indefinite alimony.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
installments of $700. The parties also paid the property taxes and utilities for the home. Wife paid $5,000 from funds she inherited to install an air purification system in the home. The parties disagreed as to the necessity of the air purification system.
In 2009, Husband’s mother and step-father conveyed to the parties a life estate in the home, where the parties resided together with their children throughout the marriage. The parties stipulated to the admission of a special warranty deed granting life estates in the property to Husband and Wife.
Both parties attended college. Wife has two associate’s degrees and Husband has a bachelor’s degree. During the marriage, Husband pursued a master’s degree in business, but he did not complete it. During the marriage, Wife attended massage therapy school, but she did not pursue a career in massage therapy because Husband was unsupportive of the career.
On March 21, 2025, the Circuit Court for Frederick County granted an absolute divorce to appellant, David Morgan (“Husband”), and appellee, Victoria Morgan (“Wife”). The court also distributed the parties’ marital property and granted Wife’s request for indefinite alimony and a monetary award.1 Husband timely appealed that judgment and presents the following issues, which we have rephrased as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred in its statement of the grounds for divorce;
2. Whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion in making a monetary award;
3. Whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion in awarding indefinite alimony.
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties married on May 5, 2007 in St. Augustine, Florida, and have three minor children. The parties lived in Florida throughout the marriage until their separation. Shortly after their marriage, the parties moved into Husband’s grandfather’s former house, which was owned by Husband’s mother and step-father, located in Micanopy, Florida. Husband and Wife verbally agreed to pay Husband’s mother and step-father a total of $60,000 for supplies and improvements to the home, which they paid in monthly
Both parties have been employed throughout the marriage. At the time of the marriage, Wife was employed as a store manager for Publix. Subsequently, both parties worked for Nationwide Insurance, but they decided to leave Nationwide and work for Publix. Following the birth of their first child, the parties agreed that Wife would transition to part-time work at Publix. During the marriage, Wife’s highest income was $30,000 per year.
Husband worked full-time during the marriage with the exception of 2019, when he went from full-time employment in management at Publix to working part-time, one day per week, in order to find other employment because he was “exhausted and needed a break.” When Husband went to part-time employment, Wife returned to full-time employment at Publix as a bakery manager. The parties enjoyed a comfortable standard of living during the marriage, living within their means and generally avoiding debt.
Wife began experiencing problems in the relationship prior to the birth of their first child in 2010. She described Husband as easily angered and annoyed during her pregnancy. In 2012 following the birth of the parties’ second child, Wife began noticing Husband drinking more frequently. He drank “a big bottle of Jack Daniels” every three days. Husband’s behavior became erratic and he often acted aggressively.
When Wife was pregnant with their third child, she found a compromising photo on Husband’s phone of her best friend, “A.,” who was also the wife of Husband’s best friend and a godparent to the parties’ children. Wife subsequently found Husband and A. engaged in a kiss in the parties’ home. Husband told Wife that it was an accident and that he was only trying to comfort A. In 2020, Wife confronted Husband
regarding compromising photographs and disturbing emails she discovered between Husband and A. Husband told Wife that he was sorry and it would never happen again.
Nonetheless, Husband continued his relationship with A. He spent time with A. away from his family while deceiving Wife that he was out with friends. Wife confronted Husband about romantic messages on his phone, and he acknowledged that the messages were from A. Wife also noticed that Husband had begun engaging in “worrisome” activities on his computer.
Wife told Husband to move out of the house after Christmas, which he did. In 2022, Wife fell and hit her head on a sidewalk, resulting in a concussion and a jaw injury that required surgery. Wife asked Husband to stay and help her with the kids while she recovered.
After Wife’s recovery, Husband refused to move out of the house, and Wife described his drinking during this time as “out of control.” Husband drove the children while drunk and attempted to drive Wife and the children while drunk on one occasion before Wife ordered him to pull the car over so that she could drive. One morning, Husband attempted to leave for work highly intoxicated and Wife hid his car keys to prevent him from driving. Husband became enraged and wrestled Wife to the floor, demanding the car keys. Once Husband found the keys, he left the home and drove to work. Wife testified that Husband often consumed alcohol heavily before family activities, birthday parties, and vacations. Wife found empty beer cans, whiskey bottles, and wine boxes in Husband’s car and at home in cabinets and his dresser. Wife discussed Husband’s drinking with him, and he attended therapy “off and on during [their] marriage.”
In August of 2022, Wife brought the children to Maryland for an extended visit with her family while Husband remained in Florida. At the end of that summer, Wife informed Husband that she planned to remain in Maryland and enroll the children in school. Wife found employment at Safeway and established residency in Frederick County. On April 26, 2023, Wife filed a complaint for absolute divorce.
The circuit court held a merits trial on December 11, 2024, January 17, February 11, and February 18, 2025. Both parties were represented by counsel.
At the time of trial, both parties were forty-three years of age. Husband testified at trial that he continued to live in Florida and reside in the marital home. Husband believed that the marriage had deteriorated because the parties grew apart. He and Wife worked a lot and disagreed as to what was best for the children. He did not deny Wife’s allegations of his infidelity. He testified that he has continued his relationship with A. and that she moved in with him in October 2024. A. does not contribute to the expenses of the home. Husband denied having any issues with alcohol currently and further denied that his alcohol consumption during the marriage was a factor in the demise of the marriage.
Husband is currently employed by Ben E. Keith, a food distribution company, earning $72,000 per year. During the marriage to the present time, Husband has maintained parttime employment with Publix, which he schedules at his discretion, typically one day per month, which allows the opportunity to purchase company stock for investment
purposes.
Wife currently works full-time at Safeway as an overnight stock clerk earning $16.25 per hour with up to eight additional hours of overtime, earning approximately $2,903 per month. Wife testified that she does not have enough income, including child support and alimony, to meet her monthly expenses, and she has a monthly deficit of $3,534. Wife has borrowed $25,000 from her parents to meet her expenses.
On March 21, 2025, the court entered a thirty-eight-page written opinion, followed by a written order. The court granted the parties an absolute divorce. Among other things, the court awarded Wife indefinite alimony2 in the amount of $750 per month and a monetary award in the amount of $80,000. The court ordered, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, that they “take all steps necessary” to equalize all retirement and other accounts.
Husband filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION 1.
Grounds for Divorce
Husband contends that the circuit court’s statements regarding the grounds for divorce in Maryland were ambiguous, and therefore clearly erroneous. Specifically, he points to the circuit court’s statement that irreconcilable differences is not a ground for divorce in Maryland unless accompanied by a six-month separation.
Wife argues that the circuit court’s reference to irreconcilable differences was a harmless typographical error because the court properly granted the divorce on the ground of a six-month separation, as authorized by Section 7-103 of the Family Law Article (“FL”) of the Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.). We agree.
The court found that the parties separated in August 2022 and remained separated for approximately two and a half years. The court stated that “Maryland law requires only one ground to be met for an absolute divorce to be granted” and determined that the ground for divorce was met by the parties living separate and apart without cohabitation for six months, without interruption, before the filing of the divorce complaint.
The grounds for an absolute divorce set forth in the FL § 7-103 were amended effective October 1, 2023. The General Assembly eliminated adultery, desertion, conviction of a crime, twelve-month separation, insanity, and cruelty of treatment, and replaced them with only three grounds: sixmonth separation, irreconcilable differences, and mutual consent. See FL § 7-103 (2024 Supp.); Floor Report, H.B. 14 at 2.
In this case, the court granted the divorce on the ground of a six-month separation and that finding was supported by ample evidence in the record. Husband is not challenging the court’s decision to grant the parties a divorce. Therefore, any error in the circuit court’s explanation describing the grounds for divorce was harmless. See Barksdale v. Wilkowsky, 419 Md. 649, 662 (2011) (explaining that error does not warrant reversal unless it results in “likely” or “substantial” prejudice).
2. The Monetary Award
In challenging the monetary award to Wife, Husband argues that the circuit court failed to properly value the parties’ assets and apply the statutory factors required by FL § 8-204. He contends that the circuit court’s order also failed to provide a consistent manner for equalization of the parties’ non-retirement assets.
Wife contends that the trial court properly valued the parties’ marital property, considered the relevant statutory factors, and did not abuse its discretion in making its award.
When granting a divorce, “the court may resolve any dispute between the parties with respect to the ownership of personal property.” FL § 8-202(a)(1). In making a proper division of marital property upon divorce, a trial court must utilize a three-step process. Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372, 405 (2019); FL §§ 8-203–205. First, the trial court must identify which property is marital and nonmarital. Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 405 (citing FL § 8-203(a)). Second, the court must determine the value of each asset. Id. (citing FL § 8-204(a)). Third, the court must decide whether distribution of the marital assets according to title would be unfair, and if so, the court may adjust any inequities in property ownership by granting a monetary award to rectify any inequity. Id. at 405-06; FL § 8-205.
Pursuant to FL § 8-205(b), the court must consider each of the following factors before making a monetary award:
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;
(2) the value of all property interests of each party;
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made;
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the age of each party;
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a) (2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both;
(9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety;
(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and
(11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both.
FL § 8-205(b); see also Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 406; Hart v. Hart, 169 Md. App. 151, 161 n.6 (2006).
The purpose of a monetary award “is to counterbalance any unfairness that may result from the actual distribution of property acquired during the marriage, strictly in accordance with its title.” Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 406-07 (quotation marks and citations omitted). ‘“Ordinarily, it is a question of fact as to whether all or a portion of an asset is marital or non-marital property. Findings of this type are subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard embodied by Md. Rule 8-131(c)[.]”’ Collins v. Collins, 144 Md. App. 395, 408-09 (2002) (quoting Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 229 (2000)). “It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a monetary award and, if so, in what amount.” Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 430 (2003). We review the ultimate decision to grant a monetary award for an abuse of discretion. Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 407; Collins, 144 Md. App. at 409.
2. Valuation of Marital Property
Husband asserts that the circuit court erred in “recreat[ing] the parties’ Amended Joint Statement of Marital and NonMarital Property (“Amended 9-207”),” by preparing its own “9-207 Appendix” which, he argues contained mathematical and typographical errors in the valuation of the parties’ marital property items.
Wife responds that Husband’s arguments challenging the court’s 9-207 Appendix are “flatly incorrect.” Wife states that the circuit court correctly utilized the Amended Property Statement submitted by the parties at the end of trial and docketed on February 11, 2025, which replaced the parties’ original 9-207 Property Statement. Wife points out that Husband failed to include in the record extract the parties’ Joint Amended Property Statement and the trial exhibits.
With respect to the first step in the process outlined above, the circuit court found that all of the parties’ property was marital property. In valuing the marital property, the court accepted the parties’ valuations as to the parties’ retirement accounts, investment accounts, and vehicles as set forth in the Amended Property Statement. Husband complains that duplicate entries on the court’s 9-207 Appendix resulted in an increase in value that far exceeded the actual total value of the parties’ assets.
Our review of the 9-207 Appendix reveals that the circuit court categorized the assets as non-retirement and retirement and further identified them as titled in Husband’s name, Wife’s name, and jointly-titled. Though there appears to be some cross-over in the categories, the court’s 9-207 Appendix does not include a sum total value of the parties’ assets, nor does it contain total values by title. For this reason, it does not appear that the court relied on those values in calculating the parties’ total marital assets. In its opinion, the court stated that it valued each of the parties’ assets consistent with the agreed values presented in the parties’ Amended Property Statement, calculating the parties’ total marital assets to be $576,756.91. We are unpersuaded by Husband’s argument that any errors in the court’s 9-207 Appendix worksheet require reversal. To the extent that the circuit court’s 9-207 Appendix contained duplicate entries, they appeared to be harmless typographical errors, as they were not reflected in the court’s opinion or order of judgment.
B. Application of the FL § 8-205(b) Factors
Husband contends that the circuit court reached incorrect conclusions in its analysis of several of the FL § 8-205(b) factors. He argues that the court’s finding that he had failed to comply with the November 17, 2023 pendente lite order requiring him to complete an alcohol evaluation was erroneous because he had completed the alcohol evaluation and submitted a report to the court prior to trial. He contends that the court’s mistaken belief that he had not complied with the court’s order to obtain an alcohol evaluation “formed a substantive basis for the trial court’s decisions regarding . . . alimony and the monetary award.”
The court took judicial notice of the November 17, 2023 pendente lite order, specifically the provision requiring Husband to obtain a comprehensive drug and alcohol evaluation and provide a copy of the evaluation to the court. The court found that no such evaluation had been presented to the court and no report was offered in evidence during the trial. Husband did not, however, introduce the completed alcohol evaluation into evidence at trial.
The court’s erroneous finding that Husband had failed to complete the alcohol evaluation does not warrant reversal of the monetary award. “In a civil case, the party asserting error must show prejudice.” Md. Dep’t of Health v. Myers, 260 Md. App. 565, 613, cert. denied sub nom. Sanders v. Md. Dep’t of Health, 487 Md. 267 (2024); Miller v. Mathias, 428 Md. 419, 446 (2012) (explaining that “an error that is not shown to be prejudicial does not warrant reversal”). Prejudice can be shown if “the error was likely to have affected the verdict below; an error that does not affect the outcome of the case is harmless error.” Flores v. Bell, 398 Md. 27, 33 (2007).
The varying accounts of Husband’s alcohol use was a central issue in the parties’ divorce. In discussing the monetary and non-monetary contributions of the parties to the well-being of the family, the court found that there had been times during the marriage when, “due to [Husband’s] excessive consumption of alcohol, he has not been able to consistently contribute to the good of the family in the same manner as [Wife].” The court also found that Husband’s “debilitating use of alcohol created significant turmoil in the household[,]” and had contributed to the estrangement of the parties. Based on the court’s “review of the collective evidence,” the court determined that Husband “has ongoing struggles with alcohol that affect his perception, judgment, and behavior” and that it was “tragically clear that [Husband’s] abuse of alcohol has had a devastating effect on this family.”
The court supported its findings by citing numerous facts demonstrating the effect of Husband’s alcohol consumption on the family. In considering the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties, the court accepted Wife’s “detailed observations regarding [Husband’s] frequent mood swings from overly happy to angry, aggressive, assaultive, degrading, and insulting at times, coupled with screaming fits and bursts of rage” and her accounts of finding alcohol containers hidden in Husband’s car and dresser drawers. The court recounted Wife’s description of instances where Husband had driven the family while “highly intoxicated” and struggled with her for his car keys to drive to work
while intoxicated. Husband’s bank statements also reflected his alcohol purchases.Husband acknowledged that there had been times during the marriage when he had consumed alcohol to excess and made “‘poor choices.’” He testified that he had obtained alcohol treatment, and found it helpful, but felt that he was no longer in need of ongoing treatment.
There was ample evidence in the record to support the circuit court’s finding that Husband’s excessive alcohol consumption had negatively affected Wife and the children and interfered with his ability to meaningfully contribute to the well-being of the family. Husband has failed to show prejudice regarding the court ordered alcohol evaluation that would warrant reversal in this case.
We also disagree with Husband’s contention that the circuit court erroneously assigned a value to the Florida property when making a monetary award to Wife, and that the circuit court erroneously found that Wife’s life estate in the marital home had been “extinguished,” contrary to the terms of her life estate interest under Florida law.
The circuit court did not make a finding that Wife’s life estate had been “severed,” as Husband claims, nor did the court assign a value to Wife’s life estate. The court specifically stated that it could not speculate as to the fair market value of the parties’ life estates in the property, which it valued at zero due to a lack of evidence demonstrating the fair market value of the home.3
As one of many equitable factors supporting the court’s decision to make a monetary award, the court considered the circumstances leading to Wife’s decision to move to Maryland with the children and forego her life estate. The court recognized that the parties’ life estates conferred a significant financial benefit and financial security on the parties. Wife’s decision to forego that security was “not one she reached voluntarily or without necessity” as the living conditions in the home were such that “[n]either [Wife] nor the minor children could safely remain in the home any longer.” The court also considered the direct impact that Husband’s action of allowing A. to live in the home with him, completely free of any financial obligation, had on Wife’s life estate. The circuit court properly considered and weighed all relevant evidence, including the evidence surrounding Wife’s life estate, “in balancing the equities between the parties” in order “to avoid any disparate circumstances[,]” as it was required to do under FL § 8-205(b). See Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 350 (1995).
C. Monetary Award Order
Husband argues that the terms of the court’s monetary award order are confusing and contradictory and therefore require reversal. He did not seek clarification of this issue from the circuit court, electing instead to raise it for the first time on appeal.
The court identified the non-retirement assets titled in each party’s name and ordered that the parties equalize their non-retirement assets. The court also awarded Wife a monetary award of $80,000 “to equalize marital assets between the parties[.]” The court further ordered that, “in the event [Husband] satisfies the monetary award judgment . . . by withdrawing funds from an account he has access
to, the monetary award judgment shall be satisfied prior to equalization and not made part of [the] equalization of marital assets[.]”
The court’s order is clear that, should Husband pay the $80,000 monetary award from a non-retirement account titled in his name, that payment is to be made prior to the equalization of the parties’ accounts. The remaining balance of the accounts would then be subject to equalization.
3. The Alimony Award
Husband argues that the circuit court erred in awarding Wife indefinite alimony based on the evidence presented at trial. Specifically, he asserts that the evidence did not support a finding that it would be impossible for Wife to rehabilitate and become self-supporting, nor did it demonstrate that the parties’ standards of living would be unconscionably disparate.
An alimony award will not be disturbed on appeal “unless we conclude that ‘the trial court abused its discretion or rendered a judgment that is clearly wrong.’” Kaplan v. Kaplan, 248 Md. App. 358, 370 (2020) (quoting Brewer v. Brewer, 156 Md. App. 77, 98 (2004)). “We ‘accord great deference to the findings and judgments of trial judges, sitting in their equitable capacity, when conducting divorce proceedings.’” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Malin, 153 Md. App. at 415). Provided “the trial court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and the ultimate decision is not arbitrary, we will affirm it, even if we might have reached a different result.” Malin, 153 Md. App. at 415.
Maryland generally favors fixed-term “rehabilitative alimony” rather than indefinite alimony. Kaplan, 248 Md. App. at 371. But the trial court has discretion to award indefinite alimony in “exceptional circumstances, i.e.[,] ‘if the standard of living of one spouse will be so inferior, qualitatively or quantitatively, to the standard of living of the other as to be morally unacceptable and shocking to the court.’” Id. (quoting Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md. App. 317, 338 (2002)). “Generally speaking, alimony awards, though authorized by statute, are founded upon notions of equity,” and “equity requires sensitivity to the merits of each individual case without the imposition of bright-line tests.” Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 393 (1992).
In determining whether an alimony award is appropriate, and the amount and duration of the award, the court must consider the following factors:
(1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting;
(2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment;
(3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;
(6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(7) the age of each party;
(8) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony;
(10) any agreement between the parties;
(11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including:
(i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce income;
(ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this article;
(iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party; and,
(iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits; and
(12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident of a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of the Health-General Article and from whom alimony is sought to become eligible for medical assistance earlier than would otherwise occur.
FL § 11-106(b). The alimony statute permits an award of indefinite alimony if the court finds either of these two additional factors:
(1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward becoming selfsupporting; or
(2) even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate.
FL § 11-106(c).
Our review of the record reveals that the circuit court carefully considered the evidence in analyzing the relevant FL § 11-106(b) factors in support of its decision to award indefinite alimony. With respect to the first factor, the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partially selfsupporting, the court found that Wife was employed full-time as an overnight stock clerk at Safeway, earning approximately $30,000 per year. The court also considered that the night shift paid a slightly higher hourly rate, the Safeway store was very close to Wife’s home, and working at night allowed her time during the day to meet the children’s needs. The court noted that Wife had continued to look for better employment opportunities, but she had not found any position to date that allowed her to meet her parental demands.
In terms of the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment, the court noted that no evidence had been presented regarding whether Wife had greater earning potential or employment opportunities in massage therapy, should she seek re-training or licensure in that field. In her current position as a grocery clerk, a position she had held throughout the marriage, she was able to work fulltime while also meeting the children’s needs as the primary caretaker.
The court reviewed the economic circumstances of the parties at the time of the award and determined that Wife’s
monthly net income was $3,534 and her monthly expenses were $6,116, leaving her with a monthly deficit of $2,582.
The court found that Husband’s monthly net income was $5,407.92 and monthly expenses of $5,172.90, resulting in a monthly excess of $235.02. The court pointed out that Husband’s bank statement reflected a Publix stock dividend deposit on November 1, 2024 in the amount of $1,190.27, which was not referenced in his financial statement, and it was unclear the frequency with which he received stock dividend income. The court found that Wife had a greater monthly deficit than Husband, which it found was “even more pronounced when [Husband’s] reduced living expenses (by virtue of his life estate) are factored into the equation” and weighed against Wife’s monthly rental payments. The court also noted that Wife required financial assistance from her parents on a monthly basis to help her meet her debts.
In finding significant financial disparity between the parties, the court noted that Wife has faced financial difficulties since the parties’ separation, “while [Husband] enjoys, by comparison, a rather luxurious lifestyle, with extremely low overhead.” The court noted that Husband’s living expenses are minimal, at best, as he was not burdened by a mortgage, noting that his enjoyment of his life estate comes at the exclusion of Wife’s ability to enjoy the same financial benefit. The court further noted that “[Husband] earns significantly more income than [Wife] and has always been the primary breadwinner[,]” and as a result, the economic disparity between the parties is “one evidenced by history and is unlikely to change.”
“Trial court judges are vested with a great deal of liberty to weigh the relevant factors and arrive at fair and appropriate results.” Goshorn v. Goshorn, 154 Md. App. 194, 209 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In analyzing the
different income levels of the parties, the circuit court must determine whether the disparity is likely to change and to what extent. Broseus v. Broseus, 82 Md. App. 183, 195-96 (1990) (upholding award of indefinite alimony where wife earned 34.9% of her husband’s salary, was not self-supporting, and could not be expected to obtain a better paying job without detracting from her parental responsibilities).
We disagree with Husband’s contention that the court did not properly assess the differences in the parties’ income and Wife’s ability to be self-supporting. Wife’s salary was approximately 42% of Husband’s salary. In determining whether the parties’ lifestyles following divorce were unconsciously disparate, “the circuit court cannot merely ‘do the math.’” Simonds v. Simonds, 165 Md. App. 591, 612 (2005); see also Boemio v. Boemio, 414 Md. 118, 14445 (2010) (affirming trial court’s finding of unconscionable disparity based on consideration of factors beyond just income differential, including the parties’ lifestyle before the separation and wife’s supportive efforts in the marriage which allowed husband to advance his career).
In this case, the court’s award of indefinite alimony was based on the parties’ economic circumstances as well as other equitable considerations. Husband’s alcohol consumption, erratic and dangerous behavior, and infidelity essentially forced Wife to leave the marriage and forego her life estate in the marital home and the parties’ comfortable lifestyle for the safety of her and her children. The circuit court properly considered the statutory factors in determining that the parties’ post-divorce standards of living would be unconscionably disparate absent an equitable adjustment in the form of indefinite alimony. We see no error or abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s alimony analysis and its decision to award Wife indefinite alimony.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1 The court also entered awards as to custody and child support. The parties are not challenging those awards on appeal.
2 The court identified the alimony as “permanent alimony.”
3 There is no contradiction between the court’s decision to value the life estates at zero because of a lack of evidence of a specific dollar value and its conclusion that, as a general matter, the life estates conferred a significant financial benefit to the parties.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Harford County Circuit Court’s award of retroactive child support to grandmother who cared for father’s minor child in loco parentis for approximately two years. Although father contends that he did not consent to grandmother’s custody of son in loco parentis and could have avoided paying support if grandmother had returned son to his care, his actions belie that argument.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
Grandmother alleged that, consistent with Son’s wishes and the exigent circumstances existing in Father’s home, it was in Son’s best interest that the court award legal and physical custody to her. In addition, because Father refused allegedly to provide any financial support for Son, Grandmother sought an award of child support, consistent with the child support guidelines, and attorneys’ fees.
Appellant Matthew R. Talley, Sr. (“Father”), appealed timely an order entered by the Circuit Court for Harford County, which awarded retroactive child support to appellee Brenda Simmons (“Grandmother”), whom, the court found, cared for Father’s minor child in loco parentis for approximately two years. For the reasons to be explained, we shall affirm the circuit court’s grant of retroactive child support to Grandmother.
BACKGROUND
In February 2023, Grandmother filed an emergency complaint for custody of her daughter’s seventeen-year-old child (“Son”), whom she said was in the joint legal custody of Father and her daughter, Father’s ex-wife Jessica Talley (“Mother”), and in the physical custody of Father, pursuant to a 2014 consent order.1,2 Grandmother claimed that, following a physical altercation between Father and Son in October 2022, Father “threw [Son] out of his Dundalk home compelling the minor child to seek shelter” with Grandmother, who assumed then full-time care of Son in her home in Harford County. 3
Father refused to sign the necessary documents to enroll Son in school in Harford County, necessitating the involvement of the Baltimore County Department of Social Services. Upon his enrollment in Fallston High School in Harford County, Grandmother said, Son refused to return to Father’s home in Baltimore County. 4
In his answer to Grandmother’s complaint, Father explained that the October 2022 altercation occurred after Father became aware Son was skipping school and lying about it. When Father confronted him, Son “bucked at” Father as if he were going to hit him, so Father subdued Son in a bear hug, which caused Son to fall over a sofa and onto the floor. After they discussed the situation, Son asked Father if he could stay with Grandmother for a few days. To defuse the argument, Father agreed. Father asserted that he did not kick Son out of his home. Acknowledging that he objected to Son’s transfer to Harford County schools, Father explained his reasoning—that Son’s stay with Grandmother was intended to be temporary, and Father had set up already virtual learning for Son in Baltimore County.
Prior to the adjudication of Grandmother’s complaint for custody, the Circuit Court for Harford County notified the parties, by letter dated 11 June 2024, that Son had reached the age of eighteen, and the court, therefore, no longer had jurisdiction to issue a custody order. 5 The court determined that the remaining issues in the matter—resolution of child support arrearages and attorneys’ fees—would proceed to a hearing.
The court heard argument on Grandmother’s claims on 10 February 2025. Therein, Grandmother testified that, after the October 2022 incident between Father and Son, she picked up Son from Father’s Baltimore County residence and took him to her home in Harford County. At the time, Son was “in a terrible state of mind” and sought and obtained a final protective order against Father.
While Son was living continuously with her from then until he left home to join the Army, Father did not attempt to visit or contact him. Grandmother did not prevent Father from doing so. Father never sent Grandmother any funds for Son’s care, which included his year-long therapy sessions, nor supported financially him in any way. Grandmother, acknowledging that she did not have custody of Son, nonetheless asked the court to award her retroactive child support to the date she filed her complaint and attorneys’ fees.
Father testified that no court action, including the final protective order, deprived him of custody of Son. Son’s time with Grandmother was intended to be nothing more than a
temporary “cooldown period” after the altercation. Father said he did not grant Son permission to live with Grandmother for two years and tried everything in his power to get Son to return home to his custody. He stated that he did not visit Son at Grandmother’s home because she would not permit him on her property. Father acknowledged that he had never sent Grandmother any money for Son’s care and support, but said that, on the several occasions when he met with Son in person, he gave Son cash.
The circuit court, ruling that it had the authority to award Grandmother child support without a grant of custody because she had placed herself in a position of in loco parentis while taking care of Son, awarded Grandmother child support in the amount of $920 per month for the thirteen months Son lived with her before attaining the age of majority, for a total of $11,960, based on the credible evidence presented of both Grandmother’s and Father’s income.6 The court did not find that an award of attorneys’ fees to Grandmother was appropriate and denied Grandmother’s claim.
Father filed a timely notice of appeal of the circuit court’s order.
DISCUSSION
In his informal brief, Father claims that the circuit court’s reasoning behind its award of child support to Grandmother, that she operated as a parent in loco parentis for Son, is unavailing because Father did not consent to Grandmother’s maintenance of Son’s care. Father continues that he fought continuously to regain his rightful custody, but Grandmother did not cooperate. In his view, Grandmother would not have required child support had she simply returned Son to Father’s care, as he requested.
Standard of Review
As we explained in Houser v. Houser, 262 Md. App. 473, 490 (2024), aff’d sub nom. Matter of Marriage of Houser, 490 Md. 592 (2025):
The trial court’s decision as to the appropriate amount of child support involves the exercise of the court’s discretion. A court can abuse its discretion when it makes a decision based on an incorrect legal premise or upon factual conclusions that are clearly erroneous. However, where the child support order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, the Court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review.
(Cleaned up.) See also Jackson v. Proctor, 145 Md. App. 76, 90 (2002) (noting that “[w]e will not disturb the trial court’s determination as to child support, absent legal error or abuse of discretion”).
Analysis
The issue before us reduces to a determination of whether the circuit court awarded properly child support to Grandmother, a non-parent third-party, when she was not granted legal custody or guardianship of Son. We find no legal error or abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling and conclude that the court’s
award of retroactive child support was appropriate under the circumstances. We explain.
Prior to this Court’s decision in O’Brien v. O’Brien, 136 Md. App. 497 (2001), rev’d on procedural grounds, 367 Md. 547 (2002), there was “no case in Maryland discussing whether and under what circumstances a third party who has physical custody of a child, but does not have legal custody and is not the child’s legal guardian, has standing to seek and recover child support arrearages from the non-custodial parent.” Id. at 505-06. In O’Brien, we considered the issue and found in favor of the third party.
Colleen O’Brien, the adult sister of Fiona O’Brien, the minor child, assumed physical custody of Fiona following the death of their mother, took responsibility for Fiona’s day-to-day care, and paid for her basic living expenses. Their father made neither monetary contributions to Colleen for Fiona’s support nor took steps to obtain physical custody of Fiona. Colleen asked her father to pay support for Fiona, but he refused. Id at 501-02. Therefore, Colleen asked the circuit court to award her child support and arrearages from her father. Id. The circuit court, however, agreed with the father’s argument that Colleen, a third-party non-custodian, did not have standing to recover child support arrearages. Id. at 503-04.
Colleen appealed. This Court reversed, determining that, even though Colleen was not a natural parent and had not been granted legal custody or guardianship of Fiona, “her in loco parentis status was sufficient to give her standing to sue [her father] for child support arrearages for Fiona” because “[t]o conclude otherwise would run contrary to the guiding principle in all Maryland child custody and support cases: the best interests of the child.” Id. at 508. See Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 323 (1979) (explaining that one acts in loco parentis by intentionally “put[ting] himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without going through the formalities necessary to legal adoption[,]” and in loco parentis “embodies the two ideas of assuming the parental status and discharging the parental duties”).
Limiting the ability of a third party who is functioning as a child’s parent to obtain arrearages by requiring that he or she first obtain a custody or guardianship order, we continued, “would be detrimental to the child’s interests.” 7 O’Brien, 136 Md. App. at 508. We therefore held that, [t]o the extent that the circuit court concluded that Colleen had no legal basis to obtain arrearages, its decision was legally incorrect. To the extent that the court exercised its discretion to deny Colleen’s petition for arrearages, we conclude that it did so arbitrarily and without a sound basis in fact.
Id. at 511. 8
In Prince George’s County Office of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Polly v. Brown, 236 Md. App. 626 (2018), we concluded similarly that, when the grandmother provided care for her minor grandchildren following the death of their mother, the circuit court erred in ruling that it could not award escrowed child support payments to the grandmother “because she had no legal authority over the children.” Id at 635. We explained that “a parent owes the obligation of financial support ‘to the child, not to the other parent[,]’” Id
at 633 (quoting Knott v. Knott, 146 Md. App. 232, 247 (2002)), and that a non-custodial parent remains “‘under a continuing obligation to provide for the support of his children until such time as the order [i]s modified.’” Id.at 634 (quoting Newkirk v. Newkirk, 73 Md. App. 588, 596-97 (1988)). We held, therefore, that the circuit court’s failure to exercise its discretion in awarding child support to the grandmother under the circumstances of the matter constituted reversible error. Id. at 635.
We hold similarly here. The parents of a minor child are “jointly and severally responsible for the child’s support, care, nurture, welfare, and education” in a legal sense. FL § 5-203(b) (1). A parent’s obligation to support a minor child is also a “moral obligation,” a concept that “is well-settled in Maryland.”
Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 459 (1994). “Because the obligation is to support the child, Maryland courts have long recognized that the right to child support is a right held by the minor child[.]” Matter of Marriage of Houser, 490 Md. 592, 607 (2025). The overarching standard remains the best interest of the child.
Although Father contends that he did not consent to Grandmother’s custody of Son in loco parentis and would not have had to pay to support Son if Grandmother had returned simply Son to his care, his actions belie that argument. Father did not move the circuit court for a modification after an alleged custody violation by Grandmother. Although he testified, at the custody hearing, that he contacted the sheriff’s office and Child Protective Services “to get [his] son to come back home[,]” he presented no evidence of any attempt to remove Son from Grandmother’s home by force of law. Regardless of whether Father approved of Son’s living arrangement, he permitted Son to live with Grandmother for approximately two years. During that time, Father did not contribute monetarily to Son’s care, while not disputing that Grandmother undertook that financial obligation. Son was entitled, legally and morally, to support by Father, which Father did not provide. We conclude, therefore, that the circuit court awarded properly child support arrearages to Grandmother as in the best interest of Son.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HARFORD COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1 Mother was incarcerated off and on during Son’s lifetime. The consent order granted Grandmother weekly visitation privileges with Son, although Grandmother said that Father denied her visitation.
2 In fact, the consent order granted sole legal and primary physical custody of Son to Father.
3 Grandmother obtained also a final protective order against Father from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The protective order stated that Father pushed and shoved Son to the ground.
4 Despite Grandmother’s assertion that Son thrived while enrolled in Fallston High School, Son either dropped out of, or was asked to leave, ultimately that school before graduation. He later obtained his GED as a condition precedent for joining the United States Army.
5 See Md. Code, § 1-201(b)(5) of the Family Law Article (“FL”) (“An equity court has jurisdiction over . . . custody or guardianship of a child[.]”); Md. Code, § 1-401(a) of the General Provisions Article (“GP”) (“The age of majority is 18 years[,]” and “an individual at least 18 years old is an adult for all purposes[.]”).
Because the circuit court had no jurisdiction to consider custody, to the extent that Father raises issues related to Son’s custody in his informal brief—including claims that Grandmother enrolled improperly Son in Harford County schools, “basically kidnapped [his] child without [his] consent[,]” and kept Son from his special needs sister who was in Father’s custody—we do not consider them, as they were never before the circuit court. See Md. Rule 8-131 (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]”).
6 Notice of recorded judgment in favor of Grandmother was entered in Harford County on 16 September 2025, and in Baltimore County on 22 September 2025.
7 We also noted that, as in this matter, by the time of the circuit court’s ruling, it would have been impossible for Colleen to obtain either such order because Fiona reached the age of majority. O’Brien, 136 Md. App. at 508 n.4.
8 We pointed out also that at least two other jurisdictions permitted third-party caregivers to seek and obtain child support from the child’s parent. In Saask v. Yandell, 702 P.2d 1327 (Alaska 1985), the child continued to live with his stepfather after the stepfather and the mother divorced. Although the stepfather did not have legal custody or guardianship of the child, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a person who supports and has physical custody of a child has standing to sue for child support arrearages under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (“URESA”). Id. at 1330. We cited also McMullen v. Muir, 517 N.E.2d 1381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986), for its holding that a grandmother who, with the child’s parent’s consent, had de facto custody of the child had standing to sue the parent for financial support or reimbursement under URESA. Id. at 1385.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Legal
Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 3 (2026)
and physical custody; error; argument
Natresa Stuckey v. David Brandford
No. 1298, September Term 2025
Argued before: Graeff, Tang, Eyler, James (retired; specially assigned), JJ.
Opinion by: Tang, J.
Filed: Jan. 8, 2026
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s award of sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties’ three children to father and its termination of father’s ongoing child support payments. In her informal brief, mother does not identify any error made by the magistrate or court in deciding the case. Nor does she offer any argument in support of such contention.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
Social Services v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 420 (1977), the magistrate recommended that Father be awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the children. The magistrate recommended that Mother have access to the children every other Saturday from 10:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m., with pickup and drop off of the children at Father’s home.
Based on the magistrate’s recommendation that the children reside solely with Father, the magistrate found that it would be unconscionable to require Father to pay child support. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended that Father’s ongoing monthly child support payments of $325 be terminated in the child support case. However, the magistrate recommended that he pay any arrears accrued from September 1, 2024, to April 1, 2025, in the sum of $100.00 per month until all arrears are paid.
Natresa Stuckey (“Mother”) appeals an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County that adopted the findings and recommendations made by a family division magistrate. The court awarded David Brandford (“Father”) sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties’ three children. The order also established a visitation schedule for Mother and terminated Father’s ongoing child support payments. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
Father filed a complaint for custody of the parties’ three minor children. Mother filed an answer, requesting joint custody and asserting that she had filed a complaint for child support in a separate proceeding.
A custody hearing was held before a family division magistrate on April 8, 2025. Father was self-represented. He requested sole legal and primary physical custody of the children. He also requested that the court provide the parties with a visitation schedule.
Mother failed to appear at the hearing. The notice of the hearing date sent to her last known address was returned as undeliverable and unable to be forwarded.
The magistrate heard testimony from Father and his mother (the children’s paternal grandmother). After reviewing the required factors set forth in Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 304–11 (1986) and Montgomery County Department of
Mother filed exceptions to the magistrate’s report and recommendations on May 7, 2025 and filed amended exceptions the following day, which the court accepted. In her exceptions, Mother did not specify any errors made by the magistrate, as required by Maryland Rule 9-208(f) (“Exceptions shall be in writing and set forth the asserted error with particularity.”). Instead, she requested shared custody, stating that both parents should have an equal number of days with the children throughout the year. In addition, she explained that she left Father due to the abusive nature of their relationship.
With respect to child support, she requested that Father pay $325 in ongoing child support. She stated that Father’s complete financial records “were not sent in” and asked the court “look into” these records. In addition, she explained that due to a lack of support, she had to “give [her] place up.” Although she was “starting over[,]” she managed to secure a “stable place” for herself and the children.
There is no indication in the record that Mother ordered a transcript of the hearing before the magistrate. See Md. Rule 9-208(g)(1) (requiring the excepting party to order a transcript of so much of the testimony as is necessary to rule on the exceptions, as one option to provide the exceptions court with the record of the proceedings before the magistrate). In the exceptions, Mother indicated that she was submitting an agreed statement of facts instead of a transcript of the hearing, which is allowed under the Rule. See Md. Rule 9-208(g)(3). However, Mother did not include an agreed statement of facts with her exceptions.
The court issued a notice indicating that exceptions to the magistrate’s report would be decided without oral argument. On July 22, 2025, the court entered a memorandum opinion and order dismissing Mother’s exceptions. The court explained
that Mother failed to assert any error by the magistrate; even if she had, she failed to provide either a transcript or an agreed statement of facts, making it impossible for the court to determine whether an error occurred. On July 25, 2025, the court entered a separate order adopting the magistrate’s recommendations.
Mother noted this appeal timely.
DISCUSSION
Mother requests that this Court reverse the circuit court’s order awarding Father sole legal and primary physical custody and terminating his ongoing child support. She further requests that the case be remanded to the circuit court for it to award shared custody.
Mother filed an informal brief pursuant to this Court’s Administrative Order permitting informal briefing in family law cases for self-represented litigants.1 See Md. Rule 8-502(a)(9). The Court-approved form for informal briefs instructs appellants to “refer to the Guidelines for Informal Briefs provided with this form for instructions on how to fill out this form.” Informal Brief of the Appellant Form. 2 The form directs the appellant to “identify your argument in support of the resolution of those issues.” Id. “When referencing facts, identify where the facts can be located in the record (in other words, exhibits, transcripts, pleadings, orders, decisions, etc.). You may cite case law, statutes, or other authorities, but you are not required to do so. You may attach any relevant documents from the record.” Id. (emphasis added).
Subsection (b)(2) of the Guidelines for Informal Briefs states that:3
[T]he appellant must identify issues that explain why the trial court erred or made a mistake in deciding the case and why the decision should be reversed or modified. The issue presented in the informal brief should be stated concisely with a description of the facts surrounding the issue and an argument supporting the resolution of the issue.
(emphases added).
In her informal brief, Mother does not identify any error made by the magistrate or court in deciding the case. Nor does she offer any argument in support of such contention. Instead, she explains
her reasons for leaving Father, her mental health condition, and other personal circumstances. She attached various documents to the informal brief, but these are not part of the record and cannot be considered. See Forward v. McNeily, 148 Md. App. 290, 309 (2002) (stating that documents not included in the circuit court record ordinarily cannot be considered on appeal). Since Mother does not raise any error or argument in support thereof, we are unable to address her claim that the court’s judgment should be reversed. See Guidelines for Informal Briefs, supra n.2 at (b)(3) (“Any issue not raised specifically in an informal brief may not be considered by the Court.”); see also DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 56 (1999) (“[I] f a point germane to the appeal is not adequately raised in a party’s brief, the court may, and ordinarily should, decline to address it.”); Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 552 (1999) (“[A]rguments not presented in a brief or not presented with particularity will not be considered on appeal”).
To the extent that Mother contends that the court erred in dismissing her exceptions and adopting the magistrate’s recommendations, we discern no error. A party seeking to challenge the magistrate’s findings or recommendations must file exceptions with the circuit court. See Md. Rule 9-208(f). “Exceptions shall be in writing and shall set forth the asserted error with particularity. Any matter not specifically set forth in the exceptions is waived unless the court finds that justice requires otherwise.” Id.
As mentioned, Maryland Rule 9-208(g)(1) specifies that a party filing exceptions must order a transcript of the testimony needed to rule on the exceptions. Instead of ordering a transcript, a party may file an agreed statement of facts. Md. Rule 9-208(g)(3). “The court may dismiss the exceptions of a party who has not complied with this section.”
Md. Rule 9-208(g).
The circuit court properly concluded that Mother did not identify any errors in the magistrate’s ruling. Her exceptions primarily requested equal time with the children, ongoing child support, and an investigation into Father’s financial records. Furthermore, the court properly dismissed the exceptions because, even if Mother had asserted a particular error, her failure to order a transcript of the hearing or attach an agreed statement of facts prevented the court from reviewing any alleged error.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.
FOOTNOTES
1 Father did not file a brief or participate in this appeal.
2 Informal Brief of the Appellant Form, https://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/cosappeals/pdfs/ informalbriefappella ntcivil.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UPB-ZT8Q]. Likewise, the accompanying Guidelines expressly require appellants to identify both issues and supporting arguments. Guidelines for Informal Briefs, https://www. courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/cosappeals/pdfs/guidelinesinfor malbriefs.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T3632CN].
3 See Guidelines for Informal Briefs, supra n.2.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s award of primary physical and sole legal custody of the 15-year-old minor to her father. Father was able and willing to provide proper care and attention to the minor child, while mother had neglected her daughter and was unable or unwilling to provide her with proper care.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
case, granting custody to Mother and liberal unsupervised visitation to Father, who lives in Ohio.
In May 2024, after failed efforts to engage with Mother, the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services (the “Department”) filed a CINA petition and requested a writ for Mother to produce her newborn son, A.P., who is her first child in common with A.P.’s father, D.P. The court found A.P. to be a CINA and ordered protective supervision, while A.P. remained in Mother and D.P.’s care.
The Department lacked consistent contact with Mother and D.P. during A.P.’s CINA case. A social worker unsuccessfully attempted to complete home visits in March and April 2025.
B. The Investigation Leading to This Appeal
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court, determined that the appellant, K.F. (“Mother”), had neglected her fifteen-year-old daughter, L.F.-M. (“L.”),1 and was unable or unwilling to provide proper care to L. Under Md. Code, CTS. & JUD. PROC. (“CJP”) § 3-819(e), the court granted primary physical and sole legal custody of L. to her father, R.P. (“Father”). Mother presents one question for our review:
Did the juvenile court have the authority to transfer physical custody of [L.] from [M]other to [F]ather, under CJP § 3-819(e) and close the CINA case?
For the reasons to follow, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
A. Mother’s Previous CINA Adjudications
In 2018, the court found that L. and her five half-siblings were each a child in need of assistance (“CINA”) because of ongoing exposure to domestic violence, Mother’s mental health issues, and Mother’s substance abuse. Mother completed a court-ordered psychological evaluation and was diagnosed with substance abuse disorder, a history of bipolar disorder, and child neglect.
Mother then gave birth to another child, Z.A., who was found to be a CINA in April 2018. Z.A. was subsequently placed with his maternal grandmother.
In October 2019, after Mother had provided proof of attendance in individual therapy and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, the court returned L. and her six siblings to Mother’s care under an order of protective supervision. In December 2019, the juvenile court closed L.’s CINA
In April 2025, the Department received a report of suspected physical abuse of L.’s eleven-year-old twin siblings. The twins reported that D.P. had hit them with a belt. Both children had visible injuries, including broken skin and bruising. One twin reported that D.P. choked her adult sister. D.P. denied the abuse but admitted to fighting the adult sister’s boyfriend. One twin reported that D.P. threw a plate at L. one month prior and assaulted L. a few weeks prior, but L. said those events did not happen.
Later that month, the Department received another report of D.P.’s suspected physical abuse of the twins, including slapping, pushing, and punching. One twin reported that Mother “does coke” and that D.P. “snort[s] white and black powder substances through a straw.” Later that day, the Department interviewed Mother’s relatives, who confirmed that the twins disclosed ongoing physical abuse, neglect, and substance abuse. As a result, the Department removed L. and her siblings from the family home where they had lived with Mother and D.P.
C. The May 2025 Petition and the Court Proceedings
In May 2025, the Department filed a petition in circuit court, alleging that L. and her three younger siblings were each a CINA. The Department’s petition requested shelter care.2 After a shelter care hearing, the court authorized continued shelter care placement of L., finding that it was contrary to her welfare to remain in Mother’s care. The court temporarily placed L. in foster care pending the Department’s background check of Father.
The next month, the court held a CINA adjudication hearing. Without objection, the Department submitted a second amended CINA petition. The parties agreed that if the case had proceeded to trial, the Department would have proven the facts in the petition by a preponderance of the
evidence. The court sustained all allegations in the second amended petition.
The dispositional hearing occurred the same day. The Department and Father asked the court to grant Father custody and close the CINA case, noting that the petition contained no facts showing that Father was unable or unwilling to provide proper care and attention for L.
L.’s counsel argued that it was not in L.’s best interest to be placed in the care of Father in Ohio. L. addressed the court and stated that she wanted to stay in Maryland with Mother, expressing concern about living in Ohio and leaving her friends in Maryland. Mother’s counsel agreed with L.’s counsel, arguing that it was not in L.’s best interest to live in Ohio with Father.
Three days later, the court issued a custody order granting Father custody and Mother supervised visitation. The court emphasized Mother’s failure to testify during the proceedings. The court noted that Mother maintained a relationship and resided with D.P., who had physically abused L.’s siblings, threatened to kill them, and abused drugs. Moreover, Mother reportedly was using cocaine. By contrast, the court observed: “There is no indication of any similar concerns existing in the home of [Father].” The court thus found it was in L.’s best interest to be in Father’s custody.
We supplement these facts in our discussion of the issues.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing CINA determinations, we utilize three interrelated standards of review. In re T.K., 480 Md. 122, 143 (2022). The juvenile court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. Matters of law are reviewed without deference. Id. “Ultimate conclusions of law and fact, when based upon ‘sound legal principles’ and ‘factual findings that are not clearly erroneous,’ are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003)).
DISCUSSION
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s award of custody to Father and argues there was insufficient evidence that L.’s placement with Father was in L.’s best interest. Mother asserts that the court erred in declining to infer that Father was neglectful based on his failure to address L.’s needs while in Mother’s care. In addition, Mother maintains that the court misapplied CJP § 3-819(e).
The statute at issue is CJP § 3-819(e), which “provides an avenue for court action to protect a child who is at risk in the care of one parent, even though the child does not fully meet the definition of being in need of assistance.” In re T.K., 480 Md. at 147-48. The statute provides as follows: If the allegations in the [CINA] petition are sustained against only one parent of a child, and there is another parent available who is able and willing to care for the child, the court may not find that the child is a child in need of assistance, but, before dismissing the case, the court may award custody to the other parent.
CJP § 3-819(e). Applying this statute, we also rely on the Maryland Supreme Court’s decision in In re T.K.
To exercise discretion under CJP § 3-819(e), “the first prerequisite” is that the juvenile court, following an adjudicatory hearing, “sustained allegations in the [CINA] petition that are sufficient to support determinations that: (1) the child has been abused or neglected; and (2) one of the child’s parents is unable or unwilling to provide proper care for the child.” In re T.K., 480 Md. at 147. Satisfying this prerequisite, the court sustained allegations in the CINA petition that Mother abused and neglected L. and that Mother was unable to provide proper care for L. Mother does not challenge those findings on appeal.
The “second prerequisite to a juvenile court’s authority to award custody under [CJP] § 3-819(e)[,]” the Supreme Court stated, is “another parent available who is able and willing to care for the child.” Id. at 149 (cleaned up). This “requires a finding that the parent to whom the court is considering awarding custody — the ‘other parent,’ . . . — is available, willing, and able to provide proper care.” Id
The proponent of transferring custody has the burden of proving that the prerequisites are satisfied. Id. Thus, Father had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is available, willing, and able to provide L. with proper care. Id. at 153.
Contrary to Mother’s argument, facts were not sustained against Father. Indeed, there is a difference between facts sustained, generally, and facts sustained against a party. Indeed, these were the facts sustained as to Father in the CINA petition3:
• L. last saw Father in the summer of 2024,
• L. and Father have a good relationship,
• Father was interested in being a resource for L., and
• per the 2019 CINA Closure Order, the juvenile court had granted Father liberal and unsupervised visitation, including overnights and visitation during summer break.
None of these facts support a finding that Father abused, neglected, or was unwilling to provide proper care for L. Mother argues that the juvenile court should have inferred that Father was neglectful because he did not address L.’s needs while in Mother’s care, as revealed in the previous CINA case. To be sure, “a parent’s past conduct is relevant to a consideration of the parent’s future conduct.” In re Adriana T., 208 Md. App. 545, 570 (2012). But the facts here do not support Mother’s contention.
In the previous CINA case, the following allegations were sustained against Father: he lived in Ohio, he failed to attend a meeting with the Department, and he had a criminal history. As the Department aptly notes, Mother could have presented evidence showing that Father had actual or constructive knowledge of the neglect occurring at her home. Instead, Mother agreed to the allegations in the second CINA petition, which contained positive facts about Father. The juvenile court properly rejected any inference that Father was neglectful because he had failed to intervene in Mother’s abuse and neglect of L.
Moreover, the juvenile court did not err in determining that Father was able and willing to provide proper care and attention to L. Although the Department had mistakenly included in its petition that both parents were unwilling or
unable to care for L., the Department made clear that only Mother was unwilling or unable. Without objection, the Department proffered that Father had completed a child welfare clearance in Ohio and had no child welfare history in Ohio, but the Department was unable to verify if Father had any criminal history in Ohio. Father testified he was employed, working forty hours a week. Father admitted that he was convicted of burglary in Ohio in 2011. Father testified that he had been ordered to pay child support since L. was four years old at $440 per month, but he owed approximately $10,000 in arrearages. He testified he would send money directly to L., but not to Mother, as Father was concerned that Mother did not spend the money on L.
Father, his wife, and L.’s fifteen-year-old sister, T.N., reside together in a two-bedroom apartment. When L. came to live with them in the summer, she shared a bedroom with T.N. Father and his wife had begun looking for a three-bedroom apartment. Father was concerned that L. had not been attending school consistently while residing with Mother.
At the close of the CINA hearing, before disposition, Mother agreed to allow L. to travel with Father to Ohio for her three-month summer visit with him. As a result, Mother effectively conceded that Father was willing and able to care for L. We find no error in the court’s determination that Father was willing and able to care for L.
Lastly, we address Mother’s claim that the court erred in ruling that it was in L.’s best interest to be in Father’s custody. “The standard that must be employed by the juvenile court in CINA adjudication proceedings is preponderance of the
evidence.” In re J.R., 246 Md. App. 707, 752 (2020). Accord CJP § 3-817(c) (requiring same burden of proof). “The principal focus of the CINA statute is to ‘ensure that juvenile courts (and local departments of social services) exercise authority to protect and advance a child’s best interests when court intervention is required.’” In re J.R., 246 Md. App. at 751 (quoting In re Najasha B., 409 Md. 20, 33 (2009)).
Juvenile courts, particularly, are “vested” with this farreaching authority because they: see[] the witnesses and the parties, hear[] the testimony, and ha[ve] the opportunity to speak with the child; [the juvenile court] is in a far better position than is an appellate court, which has only a cold record before it, to weigh the evidence and determine what disposition will best promote the welfare of the minor.
Id. at 751 (quoting Baldwin v. Baynard, 215 Md. App. 82, 105 (2013)).
In essence, Mother asks us to reweigh the evidence before the juvenile court, including Father’s child support arrearages and L.’s wishes. We decline Mother’s invitation to reweigh the evidence before the juvenile court. Indeed, the record shows that the court carefully considered all the evidence and properly determined, “on balance, that [L.’s] best interests would be served by an award of physical and legal custody to [Father.]”
For all these reasons, the juvenile court did not err in awarding primary physical and sole legal custody of L. to Father under CJP § 3-819(e).
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1 To protect the children’s identities, we refer to the parties by their initials.
2 “‘Shelter care’ means a temporary placement of a child outside of the home at any time before disposition.” CJP § 3-801(cc).
3 The first version of L.’s CINA petition included an allegation that Father acquiesced to L.’s circumstances. Based on the agreement of the parties, however, the juvenile court sustained the facts in the second amended petition, which omitted that allegation.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court vacated the Cecil County Circuit Court’s child support award. The evidence and testimony indicate that father’s monthly income is $2,169. Mother’s testimony indicates that her monthly income fluctuates between $2,3102,610 depending upon hours worked. The court nonetheless used an income of $2,600 for both parties in its child support calculation. The court included no explanation for either income figure attributed to the parties.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
Father testified that his current income was comparable to his income in his tax return, and that the landscaping company was his only source of income. Mother testified that when the children were in her custody, she worked 35 to 40 hours per week, earning $15 per hour, and that when the children were not in her custody, she worked seven additional hours per week.
Mother requested that the court award her full custody of the children. In support, she asserted that Father failed to comply with the pendente lite order granting the parties joint custody, including that he had not notified her regarding the children’s doctor’s appointments and that he was in arrears on his child support payments. The court issued a judgment of absolute divorce, awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of the children, and denied Mother’s requests for child support, alimony, and a monetary award. Mother timely noted this appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Evidence Presented and Violations of the Pendente Lite Order
After a trial in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, the court entered a judgment of absolute divorce between appellant, Yadira Cabrera Lopez (“Mother”), and appellee, Salvador Madrigal (“Father”). The circuit court granted the parties joint legal and physical custody of their three minor children, declined to grant a marital award to either party, and denied Mother’s requests for child support and alimony. Mother appeals and asserts several errors by the circuit court, including the court’s denial of child support, alimony, and a monetary award. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court in part and vacate in part.
BACKGROUND
The parties married and had three children. Years later, the parties separated. Father then filed a complaint for absolute divorce, and Mother filed a counter complaint for divorce. The court entered a pendente lite order granting the parties joint child custody and awarding child support to Mother. At trial, Mother represented herself and Father appeared with counsel. Mother asked for alimony, but the court advised Mother that she had not filed the long-form financial statement required by Md. Rule 9-202(e). The court thereafter heard testimony from Mother, Father, and several members of Mother’s family.
Father is a partial owner of a landscaping company. His most recent tax return indicated that he earned an income of $26,024.
Mother contends that the court erred because Mother was “not allowed to present key evidence and witnesses” at trial. Further, she asserts that Father “repeatedly violated the pendente lite order” and “failed to notify [her] of [their] children’s appointments and events[.]” Father responds that the court did not err in considering the evidence presented by Mother and that issues relating to the pendente lite order were heard and considered at trial.
“We ‘review rulings on the admissibility of evidence ordinarily on an abuse of discretion standard.’” Sail Zambezi, Ltd. v. Maryland State Highway Admin., 217 Md. App. 138, 155 (2014) (quoting Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 7 (2005)). In this case, the record reflects that the court heard testimony from Mother and each of Mother’s witnesses, including Mother’s mother, sister, and niece. Additionally, the court received and considered forty-six exhibits, including various images, text messages, and documents introduced by Mother. Mother points to no “key evidence” that she was not allowed to present and no witnesses who were prohibited from testifying. Consequently, we see no abuse of discretion relating to the evidence and testimony permitted at trial.
Further, “[d]ue regard is given to the factual findings of the trial court, and this Court will not re-weigh the evidence.”
Spencer v. State, 422 Md. 422, 434 (2011). This is because, as we have noted, the trial court “‘sees the witnesses and the parties, hears the testimony, and … is in a far better position than is an appellate court, which has only a cold record before
it, to weigh the evidence and determine what disposition will best promote the welfare of the minor’ child.” Reichert v. Hornbeck, 210 Md. App. 282, 304 (2013) (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003)).
Here, the record reflects that the court properly considered Mother’s testimony that joint custody was improper due to Father’s violations of the pendente lite order. The court noted Mother’s contention that “[Father] has not allowed her to have video calls and hasn’t told her about appointments[,]” and nonetheless determined that joint custody was appropriate. The court did so after considering Mother’s testimony, Father’s testimony that joint custody “has been beneficial for the children,” and the factors set forth in Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 304-11 (1986) and Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 420 (1978).1 In sum, the record reflects that the court properly weighed the evidence, including Mother’s testimony regarding Father’s violations of the pendente lite order, and it “is not the function of [this Court] to determine the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence.” Owens v. State, 170 Md. App. 35, 101-02 (2006).2
II. Child Support
Mother asserts that the court erred in denying her request for child support because Father “earns substantially more than” she does. Father disagrees and asserts that the court properly denied Mother’s request for child support.
As a general matter, “appellate courts will accord great deference to the findings and judgments of trial judges, sitting in their equitable capacity, when conducting divorce proceedings.” Boemio v. Boemio, 414 Md. 118, 125 (2010). “Where a trial court uses the guidelines to award child support, that determination will not be disturbed but for a clear abuse of discretion.” Matter of Marriage of Houser, 490 Md. 592, 605 (2025). “Even under this deferential review, however, a court’s discretion is always tempered by the requirement that the court apply the correct legal standards.” Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 463 (2021). The court abuses its discretion when “no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court,” or “when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Wilson-X v. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 403 Md. 667, 677 (2008) (cleaned up).
Although the record does not appear to support Mother’s assertion that Father earns more than she does, it does appear that the income attributed to Father is incorrect. The evidence and testimony indicate that Father’s monthly income is $2,169. Mother’s testimony indicates that her monthly income fluctuates between $2,310-2,610 depending upon hours worked.3 The court nonetheless used an income of $2,600 for both parties in its child support calculation. The court included no explanation for either income figure attributed to the parties. Accordingly, we remand for the court to re-calculate child support or to explain its rationale for applying the figures used. On remand, it is up to the circuit court to determine whether the record before it is sufficient to resolve this issue, or whether it is necessary to hear fresh testimony or argument by the parties. See MD. R. 8-604(d) (1) (“Upon remand, the lower court shall conduct any further proceedings necessary to determine the action in accordance with the opinion and order of the appellate court).
III. Marital Property
Mother asserts that the court “failed to ensure a fair or equal distribution” of marital property under Md. Code, Family Law § 8-205. Father responds that the court properly declined to divide marital property or to make a monetary award.
“Trial courts are required to go through a three step analysis in determining whether to make a marital property award: (1) determining if the property is marital; (2) the value of the marital property; and (3) decide whether a monetary award is appropriate and equitable.” Caccamise v. Caccamise, 130 Md. App. 505, 515 (2000). The question of whether an asset is marital property is one of fact. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 521 (2008). Accordingly, “[f]indings of this type are subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard embodied by Md. Rule 8-131(c); we will not disturb a factual finding unless it is clearly erroneous.” Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 229 (2000). This Court has stated that a finding is “not clearly erroneous if there is competent or material evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion.” Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 200 (2020). Indeed, “the clearly-erroneous standard is a deferential one, giving great weight to the trial court’s findings.” Id. (cleaned up).
In the case before us, the record reflects that the court considered the parties’ property at length. Mother and Father agreed that they each had several household furnishings in their possession that constituted marital property. Mother asserted that the parties’ marital property also included real property located on Augustine Herman Highway in Cecil County, several vehicles including various trucks and a skid loader, and two horses. Father asserted that marital property also included Mother’s 2008 Chevrolet Silverado. Further, he contended that they rented but never owned the Augustine Herman Highway property, that the horses died or were given away, and that the vehicles were either sold, repossessed, or belonged to the landscaping company.
Ultimately, the court determined that the parties each had $700 in home furnishings from the marriage, and that each party would retain the marital property in their possession. The court found that both parties agreed that one horse had died and that Mother did not dispute Father’s testimony that he gave away the second horse. Further, the court considered each of Father’s six vehicles which Mother alleged were marital property and determined that two were sold or repossessed and that the remaining four were owned by Father’s landscaping business. The court credited Mother’s testimony that the 2008 Chevrolet Silverado was gifted to Mother from her mother, and thus, that it was not marital property. Finally, the court noted that the land records indicated that the Augustine Herman Highway property was not owned by either of the parties, and thus, that it was not marital property. We see no reason to conclude that these findings were unsupported by competent and material evidence. Gizzo, 245 Md. App. at 200.
In short, the record reflects that the court properly went through the three-step analysis and determined which property was marital, the value of the marital property, and whether a monetary award was appropriate. Mother does not dispute any of the court’s factual findings regarding
any specific item of property or the court’s determinations regarding which property constituted marital property. Nor does she cite any support—legal or factual—for her contention that the court failed to “ensure a fair or equal distribution” of marital property. Accordingly, we cannot say that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the court or that the court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Wilson-X, 403 Md. at 677. Due to the interrelated nature of the court’s decisions regarding child support and monetary awards, however, and because we vacate the court’s child support determination, we also vacate the court’s monetary award determination and remand for further proceedings. St. Cyr v. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. 163, 198 (2016) (noting that because “a court’s determinations as to alimony, child support, monetary awards, and counsel fees involve overlapping evaluations of the parties’ financial circumstances[,]” that “‘when this Court vacates one such award, we often vacate the remaining awards for reevaluation.’”) (quoting Turner v. Turner, 147 Md. App. 350, 401 (2002)). As noted above, the court may resolve these issues on the record before it or based upon fresh testimony or argument. See MD. R. 8-604(d)(1).
IV. Alimony
Finally, Mother contends that the court’s denial of alimony was erroneous because the court did not “adequately consider the[] disparities” between the parties. Father responds that Mother’s alimony claim was properly denied.
Decisions regarding whether to award alimony “will not
be disturbed upon appellate review unless the trial judge’s discretion was arbitrarily used or the judgment below was clearly wrong.” Boemio, 414 Md. at 124. As the circuit court correctly observed, Md. Rule 9-202(e) provides that “[i]f spousal support is claimed by a party and either party alleges that no agreement regarding support exists, each party shall file a current financial statement in substantially the form set forth in Rule 9-203(a).” The rule further provides that “[t]he statement shall be filed with the party’s pleading making or responding to the claim.” MD. RULE 9-202(e).
In the record before us, the court noted at the outset of the divorce hearing that Mother had not filed the long-form financial statement required by Md. Rule 9-202(e). In its ruling, the court denied alimony while noting that Mother “did not offer any evidence related to an alimony claim, including the factors that the [c]ourt must consider or any financial statement or financial documentation as required by the Maryland Rules.” Mother does not dispute the court’s finding that she failed to file the long-form financial statement or failed to offer evidence supporting her alimony claim. As such, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s request for alimony.
Finally, because the court denied alimony due to Mother’s failure to provide evidence in support of her alimony claim, as well as noncompliance with Md. Rule 9-202(e), rather than “overlapping evaluations of the parties’ financial circumstances[,]” we need not disturb the court’s alimony determination under these facts. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 198.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CECIL COUNTY AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART. JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO CHILD SUPPORT AND MONETARY AWARD VACATED; JUDGMENT OTHERWISE AFFIRMED. CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. APPELLANT TO PAY TWO-THIRDS OF COSTS AND APPELLEE TO PAY ONE-THIRD OF COSTS.
FOOTNOTES
1 Mother does not challenge the court’s custody determinations.
2 None of this concerns Mother’s allegation that Father is in arrears on his child support payments, which is scheduled for consideration by the circuit court on January 13, 2026.
3 Mother testified that she earns $15 per hour and works 35-40 hours per week when she has custody of the children and “seven additional hours” when she does not have custody of the children. The court ordered that the parties have weekon-week-off custody. Assuming that each month, Mother works 35 hours per week on the two weeks she has custody of the children, and seven additional hours (or 42 hours per week) on the two weeks she does not have custody, she would earn $2,310 per month (35 x $15 = $525, 42 x $15 = $630, $525 x 2 + $630 x 2 = $2,310). Alternatively, assuming that each month, Mother works 40 hours per week on the two weeks she has custody of the children, and seven additional hours (or 47 hours per week) on the two weeks she does not have custody, she would earn $2,610 per month (40 x $15 = $600, 47 x $15 = $705, $600 x 2 + $705 x 2 = $2,610).
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s award of physical and legal custody of the two young children to mother, award of $892 in monthly child support to mother and award of $5,000 in attorney’s fees to mother.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
in a civil ceremony in Rockville, Maryland. Two sons were born during the marriage, one in 2014 and one in 2017.
In 2022, Mother filed a complaint and supplemental complaint for absolute divorce in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Father filed a countercomplaint.
On June 22, 2023, following a three-day custody trial, the circuit court issued a written order awarding Father primary physical custody and the parties’ joint legal custody of their two children. The court set out a visitation schedule with Mother to have visitation every Tuesday after school until 8:00 p.m., and every other weekend from Friday after school to the following Monday morning. The court included a holiday schedule and a summer schedule, which generally alternated weekly visitation for each parent. Additionally, the court ordered Father to pay Mother $422 a month in child support and $20,000 in attorney fees.
Following a two-day modification of custody hearing, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted Yakoubou Ousmanou (“Father”) and Ahmadou Maryam Roukayatou (“Mother”) shared physical and legal custody of their two young children. The court also awarded Mother $892 in monthly child support and $5,000 in attorney’s fees, and it denied Father’s motion for contempt.
On appeal, Father presents the following questions for this Court’s review, which we have rephrased slightly, as follows:
1. Did the circuit court err when it modified the custody order in the absence of a material change of circumstances?
2. Did the circuit court err in ordering joint legal custody, rather than giving Father sole legal custody or tiebreaking authority?
3. Did the circuit court err in its child support calculation?
4. Did the circuit court err in denying Father’s motion for contempt?
5. Did the circuit court err in not ordering Mother to have the children regularly attend religious instruction when they were in her care?
6. Did the circuit court err in ordering Father to pay attorney’s fees to Mother in the amount of $5,000?
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2012, Father and Mother were married in a religious ceremony in Cameroon. Two years later, they were married
On December 15, 2023, Father filed a petition for contempt and a motion to modify the custody order. He sought, among other things, sole legal custody, a recalculation of child support to reflect Mother’s new employment, a directive to have the children regularly attend religious instruction when in Mother’s care, and attorney’s fees. Mother filed a counterpetition seeking sole legal custody and primary physical custody, child support, and attorney’s fees.
On March 15, 2024, the circuit court granted the parties an absolute divorce. At that time, the parties resolved their financial issues by consent.
A two-day trial on the parties’ modification motions and Father’s contempt petition was held on October 29 and 30, 2024. Father, Mother, and her mother (“Grandmother”), among others, testified at the trial.
Father testified that he had worked for more than four years, mostly remotely, for Harford County Public Schools as a Senior Manager of Research and Program Evaluation. His last paystub was admitted into evidence. The children attended Maryvale Elementary School, a Montgomery County French immersion public school. Father testified that he paid $240 a month for Kumon, an academic tutoring program. Father suggested, however, that it might not be necessary for the older child, and there were other options for the younger child.
At the time of the initial court order, the children had been enrolled in Sunday school at the Islamic Society of Germantown (ISG), but they did not attend every Sunday. In September 2023, Father enrolled the children at the Islamic Center of Maryland (ICM), which the children attended every Sunday when they were in Father’s care.
Father testified that, in the beginning of 2024, he enrolled the children on his health insurance plan. He never informed Mother, however, even though she had carried the children on her health insurance plan since 2017.
Father testified that he wanted Mother to have more limited physical custody of the children, only every other weekend from Friday to Saturday evening. The court admitted texts and email exchanges between the parties regarding Mother’s alleged violation of the custody order, and as a reflection of how the parties were getting along at the time of and during the original custody order.
Mother testified that, in April 2023, a couple of months before the original custody order, she was living in the basement of a friend’s home that did not have accommodations for her children. At the end of August 2023, a couple of months after the original custody order, she signed a lease for a twobedroom apartment. She recently renewed the lease, which was admitted into evidence. Her apartment was within walking distance of Father’s house, and the bus stop for the children’s school was between their homes. At the time of the court’s original custody order, she worked as a paraeducator and began work at 8:00 a.m. At the time of the modification hearing, Mother worked full-time as a special education teacher, and she began work at 9:00 a.m., so she was able to get the children to their school bus prior to work. Her 2023 tax return was admitted into evidence.
Mother testified to the many difficulties she and Father had when the children transitioned from one parent to the other. Tuesday night dinners were stressful because it was not enough time for her and the children to catch up, and the children were exhibiting separation anxiety when it was time to return to Father’s house.
With respect to Sunday school, Mother testified that Father enrolled the children at ICM, which is approximately 30 minutes from her home. When the parties were together, the children did not attend school every Sunday. Since separated, she had not taken them to ICM every Sunday when they were in her care because she felt that it was important for the children to spend time with her. Additionally, Father did not inform her about the children attending soccer or boy scouts through the ICM. Mother testified that the children had been enrolled on her health insurance plan since 2017, and she discovered during Father’s testimony that he had enrolled the children on his health insurance plan in 2024. Mother paid for Kumon over the summer.
At the time of the initial custody order, Mother did not have immediate family living nearby, but in September 2023, her mother (“Grandmother”), who is now a permanent United States resident, relocated from Cameroon and lived with her full-time. Grandmother testified regarding how she helped Mother with childcare. She testified that it was difficult to get the children to separate from Mother when Mother’s custody time ended because their time together was very short.
On February 4, 2025, the circuit court issued an oral ruling from the bench. The court ordered that the parties have shared physical custody, alternating each week, with a set holiday visitation schedule. The court stated that this gave more stability for the children, with the least amount of disruptions as possible because it reduced the number of
transitions between the parents. The court stated that both parties were good parents, but they needed to stay out of the other parent’s business when the children were with that parent. It ordered the parties to use a parenting app to resolve difficulties in communication.
The court ordered shared legal custody, stating that, if the parties were unable to reach an agreement, they were required to participate in one, two-hour mediation before filing a motion in court. The court further ordered the parties to communicate through a parenting app. It ordered Father to pay Mother $892 a month in child support and $5,000 in attorney’s fees. The court denied Father’s contempt petition. The circuit court subsequently issued a written order reflecting its oral ruling.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Father, an unrepresented litigant, raises six contentions of error on appeal. Before addressing them, we discuss the applicable standard of review.
We review decisions of the circuit court to modify custody using three interrelated standards of review. We review factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard, legal questions without deference, and we shall not disturb the ultimate conclusion of the circuit court unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003). Because the circuit court sees the witnesses and the parties and hears the testimony, it “is in a far better position than is an appellate court, which has only a cold record before it, to weigh the evidence and determine what disposition will best promote the welfare of the minor.” Id. The above standards of review also apply to monetary awards. See Kaplan v. Kaplan, 248 Md. App. 358, 385 (2020) (standard of review for child support awards); Henriquez v. Henriquez, 185 Md. App. 465, 475-76 (2009), aff’d, 413 Md. 287 (2010) (standard of review for attorney’s fees).
I. Physical custody
Father contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in modifying the terms of the initial custody order because there had been no material change of circumstances to warrant a change.1 Mother disagrees, as do we.
When a circuit court is presented with a request to modify custody, the court must engage in a two-step process. Velasquez v. Fuentes, 262 Md. App. 215, 246 (2024). The circuit court first must determine whether there has been a material change in circumstances. Id. “A material change of circumstances is ‘a change in circumstances that affects the welfare of the child.’” Id. (quoting Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. 146, 171 (2012)).
If the court finds a material change of circumstances, then the “court proceeds to consider the best interests of the child as if the proceeding were one for original custody.” Id. “The burden is [] on the moving party to show that there has been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the final custody order and that it is now in the best interest of the child for custody to be changed.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gillespie, 206 Md. App. at 171-72).
Father’s claim of error is based on the first step of the analysis; he contends that the “court failed to make the threshold finding of a material change in circumstances.” He contends that Mother’s “trivial relocation and vague assertions of improved caregiving” were insufficient to create a material change of circumstance where the children were “thriving” in his sole physical custody. Father argues that Mother’s new apartment was less than a mile from where she had been living, and there was no evidence that the children were being harmed under the initial custody order.
Based on our review of the record, the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that there had been a material change of circumstances. Mother testified that, at the time of the original custody order, she lived in the basement of a friend’s home. Since that time, she had moved to a two-bedroom apartment. Her mother was living with her full-time and helping her with childcare. Additionally, because Mother had changed jobs, she could get the children on the bus before work. Mother testified that the children were suffering from anxiety when they transitioned from Mother’s to Father’s care because they were unable to fully “catch up” and relax before having to transition back to Father’s care. Because Mother now has an apartment to accommodate the children, as well as more available time due to her change in employment, and because Grandmother can now help Mother with childcare, there was a material change in circumstances. Father’s claim to the contrary is devoid of merit.
II. Legal custody
Legal custody confers the “right and obligation to make long range decisions involving education, religious training, discipline, medical care, and other matters of major significance concerning the child’s life and welfare.”
Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 296 (1986). Father contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in ordering joint legal custody, asserting that the court should have given him tie-breaking authority or sole legal custody because the evidence showed that co-parenting was impossible due to Mother’s “intentional obstruction” of the court’s orders. Mother argues that the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering joint legal custody.
The court stated that it was torn on the issue of custody. It stated that both parents were “capable of communicating with each other, but they’ve struggled somewhat in that regard.” The court determined that joint legal custody was appropriate because both parents had a lot to offer and “the children [were] entitled to the benefit of both parents’ input into the important decisions that need to be made, particularly now as they begin to get a little bit older and decisions about education start to come forward.” It declined to award tie-breaking authority, stating that it believed “that in these situations where parents are having these kind of communication issues, that giving one parent that tiebreaking authority basically winds up being that parent makes the decisions in all the situations. And I don’t want that. I don’t think that’s what’s best for these children.”
As Father notes, the capacity of the parents to communicate and reach shared decisions is the most important factor in determining whether an award of joint custody is appropriate. Taylor, 306 Md. at 304. Father’s argument that there was no cooperation between the parents here, however, is belied by the record. Although there was evidence that Father made some decisions, such as enrolling the children in religious education in a place farther from Mother’s home and obtaining health insurance for the children without notifying Mother, there also was evidence that the parents cooperated in making the decision to enroll the children in a French immersion school and finding medical care.
The court here clearly put thought into its decision and found that the “parents are capable of communicating with each other,” although it acknowledged that “they’ve struggled somewhat in that regard.” To help with communication issues, the court ordered the parties to communicate via a parenting app, and it ordered the parties, if they could not agree on something, to engage a mediator for a one, two-hour session before filing a motion with the court. The court believed that these added communication components would require the parents to “work a little bit and try to reach an agreement.” Under the evidence presented, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering joint legal custody.
III. Child support award
After ordering the parties to submit child support guidelines, the court stated that it would “calculate the child support to be awarded from one parent to the other based upon 50/50 shared custody.” The court then completed its own guidelines worksheet and ordered Father to pay child support in the amount of $892 a month.
Father contends that the circuit court erred in its child support calculations. He lists three errors in that regard: (1) failing to consider his annual $10,000 annual “marital buyout” of the parties’ house and monthly tutoring payments; (2) failing to consider his health insurance contributions; and (3) relying on inaccurate income for both parties.
Mother argues that there is no merit to Father’s arguments. She asserts that “the court properly calculated the child support guidelines based on the parties’ documented incomes (their pay stubs, tax returns, and W-2s),” and it correctly excluded Father’s payments based on Mother’s interest in the former martial home.
Maryland Family Law § 12–204 provides a schedule and guidelines for child support. The amount owed by each parent is adjusted in proportion to each parent’s income minus expenses, such as childcare, health care, and medical expenses. Md. Code Ann., Family Law (“FL”) § 12-204 (a), (e), (g), (h) (2025 Supp.).
The record here reflects that the court completed a guidelines worksheet using the amount of monthly income for each party as set forth by that party in their respective proposed guidelines, i.e., $5,750 for Mother and $11,281 for Father. Father contends that this amount failed to take into account an increase in Mother’s income shown by her 2023 pay records. Mother testified that her 2023 W-2 partly included her lower para-educator salary and her current
annual income at the time of the hearing was approximately $69,000, which is the amount the court used in its child support calculations. There was no error in this regard.
The court’s worksheet also shows that the court did not include in Mother’s income the $10,000 a year that Father paid to Mother to buy out her interest in the martial home.2 The court did not err in doing so.
FL § 12–201(b)(3)(i-xvi) defines “actual income” to include: (i) salaries; (ii) wages;
(iii) commissions; (iv) bonuses;
(v) dividend income;
(vi) pension income;
(vii) interest income;
(viii) trust income;
(ix) annuity income;
(x) Social Security benefits;
(xi) workers’ compensation benefits;
(xii) unemployment insurance benefits;
(xiii) disability insurance benefits;
(xiv) for the obligor, any third party payment paid to or for a minor child as a result of the obligor’s disability, retirement, or other compensable claim; (xv) alimony or maintenance received; and (xvi) expense reimbursements or in-kind payments received by a parent in the course of employment, self-employment, or operation of a business to the extent the reimbursements or payments reduce the parent’s personal living expenses.
Additionally, a court may consider the following items as actual income: severance pay; capital gains; gifts; or prizes. See FL § 12-201(b)(4)(i-iv).
A payment made to buy out interest in the martial home is not considered income under the language of FL § 12-201(b) (3) or (4). Accordingly, the court’s failure to include the buyout in Mother’s actual income for determining child support was not an abuse of discretion.3
With respect to Father’s contention that the circuit court erred in excluding the amount he paid for health insurance for the children, we note that FL § 12-204(h)(1) provides: “Any actual cost of providing health insurance coverage for a child for whom the parents are jointly and severally responsible shall be added to the basic child support obligation and shall be divided by the parents in proportion to their adjusted actual incomes.” In this case, however, Father obtained health insurance for the children while they already had existing coverage under Mother’s plan, without any notice or discussion with Mother. Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to include Father’s expense in the child support calculations.
We turn next to Father’s contention that the circuit court erred in not including tutoring expenses in its child support determination. As this Court has explained, the circuit court can “supplement the Guidelines obligation only for certain categories of expenses: child care; extraordinary medical expenses; the cost of attendance at a special or private elementary or secondary school; and transportation expenses.” Horsley v. Radisi, 132 Md. App. 1, 26 (2000).4
Although a court has discretion to depart from the guidelines in a particular case, id. at 29, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to include these expenses here, particularly when Father admitted they may not be needed. Father’s contentions regarding the child support ruling are devoid of merit.
IV. Contempt
Father contends that the circuit court erred in failing to find Mother in contempt for repeated violations of the court’s original custody order. This argument is not properly before us.
In Maryland, “a party that files a petition for constructive civil contempt does not have a right to appeal the trial court’s denial of that petition.” Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard Cnty., 371 Md. 243, 246 (2002). “[O]nly those adjudged in contempt have the right to appellate review. The right of appeal in contempt cases is not available to the party who unsuccessfully sought to have another’s conduct adjudged to be contemptuous.”
Becker v. Becker, 29 Md. App. 339, 345 (1975). Because the circuit court denied Father’s petition for contempt, we will not consider his appellate argument regarding the ruling denying his contempt petition.
V. Religious education
Father contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to issue a directive ordering Mother to take the children to religious instruction at ICM Sunday School when the children are in her physical custody. He asserts, citing to Bienenfeld v. Bennett-White, 91 Md. App. 488, cert. denied, 327 Md. 625 (1992), that “Maryland law requires that, in custody matters, a child’s established religious and moral formation be protected absent evidence of harm.”
Bienenfeld does not stand for the proposition cited. In that case, the mother was restricting the children’s access to the father because of her views regarding their children’s religious upbringing. Id. at 508. The holding in that case was that the court did not abuse its discretion in considering the mother’s views on the children’s religious upbringing to the extent that it posed a threat to the children’s relationship to their father, and therefore, the children’s emotional well-being. Id.
Here, the evidence showed that both parents intended to raise their children as Muslim. The court did not abuse its discretion in permitting each party to provide for their children’s religious upbringing in their own way during the time they had the children.
VI. Attorney’s fees
Father contends that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $5,000 to Mother for attorney’s fees.5 He argues that the award was improper because of Mother’s “litigation misconduct and noncompliance” and his own “verified legal expenses totaling $8,371.50.” Father further argues that the court made no determination that the fees were reasonable.6
The awarding of attorney fees in the context of custody
and visitation proceedings is governed by FL § 12-103. This statute provides, in pertinent part, that the court may award to a party costs and counsel fees after considering: “(1) the financial status of each party; (2) the needs of each party; and (3) whether there was substantial justification for bringing, maintaining, or defending the proceeding.” FL § 12-103(a), (b).
Although FL § 12-103 “does not expressly mandate the consideration of reasonableness of the fees, … evaluation of the reasonableness of the fees is required.” Sczudlo v. Berry, 129 Md. App. 529, 550 (1999). In Lieberman v. Lieberman, 81 Md. App. 575, 601–02 (1990), this Court guided trial courts to consider the following four factors in determining whether the amount awarded for attorney’s fees was reasonable: “(1) whether the [award] was supported by adequate testimony or records; (2) whether the work was reasonably necessary; (3) whether the fee was reasonable for the work that was done; and (4) how much can reasonably be afforded by each of the parties.” A court’s discretionary decision to award counsel fees is afforded deference on appeal. Lemley v. Lemley, 109 Md. App. 620, 633 (1996), cert. denied, 344 Md. 567 (1997).
Here, Mother produced invoices for legal fees incurred prior to the hearing on the motion to modify in the amount of $8,354. The records delineate the tasks that Mother’s attorney performed in preparing and litigating her case, and the time each task took, and the hourly rate charged. Mother testified that she paid her most recent fees with a loan from a friend, and her legal invoice showed that she still owed fees at the time of the hearing.
In rebuttal, Father testified regarding the attorney’s fees he had incurred, i.e., more than $40,000 paid to his prior attorney, and $5,000 owed to his attorney for the custody hearing.
Father stated that he was in debt. The court questioned why Father failed to offer evidence of his attorney’s fees during his case in chief. Father testified that Mother should pay attorney’s fees to him because she failed to comply with court orders, he was already paying her $10,000 for the house, and he did not “even have that $10,000.”
The court then set a time for written closing arguments. It asked the parties to submit what fees had been incurred related solely to the issues presented in the motions before the court. The court asked the parties to specify how much each party was requesting in dollars, and it would double check the end number.
In its award of attorney’s fees to Mother, the court stated that it had considered all the statutory factors. It noted that the previous child support order and custody order required Father to pay Mother $20,000 in attorney’s fees. The court stated that it had reviewed the parties’ financial statements and all relevant information presented at trial. The court gave significant weight to the disparity in income between the parties, noting that Father earned almost double what Mother earned as a special education teacher. The court stated that both parties acted in good faith, and neither party unduly increased the expense of the action. After reviewing the requisite factors, the court ordered Father to pay Mother $5,000 in attorney’s fees. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling in this regard.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1 We note that Father makes this argument with some ill-grace, given that he initiated these proceedings by filing a motion to modify custody, which, as he points out and we discuss, is appropriate only if there has been a material change in circumstances.
2 When the circuit court initially granted the parties an absolute divorce, the parties had reached a consent agreement on some financial issues. Both parties waived their right to alimony, and Father agreed to pay Mother $85,000, representing Mother’s interest in the marital home, to be paid $10,000 on April 30, 2024, and $10,000 at the end of the year, every year until it was all paid.
3 When Father calculated Mother’s income, he calculated Mother’s annual salary based on her paystubs from January and February 2024 ($3,024.50) which equaled $78,637. Father then added $10,000 to Mother’s yearly salary to account for the buy-out payment and determined that Mother received $7,386 monthly.
4 “If the parties’ combined monthly adjusted income is under $30,000 (or $360,000 annually), the circuit court must apply the guidelines.” Sims v. Sims, 266 Md. App. 337, 384 (2025). This case was governed by the guidelines.
5 Father did not raise, in his questions presented, an issue regarding the award of attorney’s fees. And he did not raise this as a separate argument section until his reply brief. Nevertheless, he did mention the issue in the initial brief, as part of the argument summary and request for relief, and appellee responded to the issue. Accordingly, we will address it.
6 Father did not argue below that the attorney’s fees submitted by Mother were not reasonable. Accordingly, this contention is not preserved for this Court’s review. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (appellate court ordinarily will not review an issue “unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]”).
