Atlantic Council SCOWCROFT CENTER FOR STRATEGY AND SECURITY
ISSUE BRIEF
The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. The Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense (FD) practice shapes the debate around the greatest defense challenges facing the United States and its allies, and creates forwardlooking assessments of the trends, technologies, and concepts that will define the future of warfare. Through the futures we forecast, the scenarios we wargame, and the analyses we produce, F D develops actionable strategies to help the United States navigate major power conflict and defend forward, alongside allies and partners. As the character of war rapidly changes, FD assesses the operational concepts and defense-industrial tools necessary to effectively deter and defend against emerging military challenges.
US Strategy and Force Posture for an Era of Nuclear Tripolarity APRIL 2023
KEIR A. LIEBER and DARYL G. PRESS
T
he term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond. 1
US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 98.
2
The New START treaty limits deployed strategic warheads at 1,550, but it counts each strategic bomber as a single “warhead.” Because bomber aircraft can carry multiple weapons, US and Russian nuclear forces can be slightly above 1,550 and still be compliant with the treaty. The treaty also does not address nuclear forces with a range below 5,000 kilometers. While Russia announced in February 2023 that it would suspend participation in New START inspections, both parties continue to appear to be in compliance with the treaty’s central limitations on deployed accountable strategic forces.