ARMS RACING UNDER NUCLEAR TRIPOLARITY: EVIDENCE FOR AN ACTION-REACTION CYCLE?
ISSUE BRIEF
ISSUE BRIEF
Arms Racing Under Nuclear Tripolarity:
Evidence for an Action-Reaction Cycle? DECEMBER 2022
The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. The Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense (FD) practice shapes the debate around the greatest defense challenges facing the United States and its allies, and creates forward-looking assessments of the trends, technologies, and concepts that will define the future of warfare. Through the futures we forecast, the scenarios we wargame, and the analyses we produce, FD develops actionable strategies to help the United States navigate major power conflict and defend forward, alongside allies and partners. As the character of war rapidly changes, FD assesses the operational concepts and defense-industrial tools necessary to effectively deter and defend against emerging military challenges.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
DR. MATTHEW KROENIG
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Are the United States, Russia, and China in or on the cusp of a three-way nuclear arms race? With China’s ongoing nuclear expansion, questions of nuclear strategy—such as nuclear arms racing—must be reassessed under new, three-way dynamics. Some international relations theories predict that an arms buildup in one state will cause a reciprocal buildup in others, leading to a spiral of tightly coupled actions and reactions. In contrast to this theory, nuclear weapons developments in the United States, Russia, and China since the Cold War have largely not been motivated by nuclear arms building in the other states. Theater nuclear weapons may be a limited exception to this finding. Yet with China’s plan to expand its nuclear arsenal to at least one thousand warheads by the end of this decade, there is a risk of a strategic nuclear arms race. To maintain its nuclear strategy, the United States will likely need to expand its nuclear forces in the coming years.1 Russia and China’s response to this expansion will determine whether a nuclear arms race takes place. This spiral is not a foregone conclusion, especially since China does not have a history of pursuing nuclear parity. Even if a nuclear arms race does emerge, however, the United States would be better off dealing with its consequences than accepting the risks of deterrence failure. This is the first in a series that the Atlantic Council will publish in 2022 and 2023 on tripolar nuclear dynamics.
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For more on strategic weapons force-sizing under the conditions of nuclear tripolarity, see Matthew Kroenig and Mark J. Massa, “Nuclear Force Sizing under Tripolarity,” Atlantic Council, forthcoming.
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