A US framework for assessing risk in critical mineral supply chains
“ TRADE FRAGMENTATION INCREASES COSTS AND IMPEDES INVESTMENT IN CRITICAL MINERAL MINING AND PROCESSING. ”
Donald Trump. These measures exemplify Beijing’s willingness to use critical minerals as a tool to influence or respond to US policies.13
China’s influence across the minerals supply chain has shaped how, where, and whether new, non-Chinese supply chain assets are developed. China’s ability to adeptly manage price volatility, keep critical minerals markets over-supplied, and secure offtake contracts at a lower cost offer Chinese-led projects considerable advantages compared with market participants from other countries. As a result, many new private-sector projects led by the United States and its allies struggle to compete with those led by China.14 Beijing also offers political support to its projects to alleviate investment uncertainty and conducts strategic diplomacy to make new mining projects successful. Non-Chinese investors often find themselves unable to compete and fail as a result.
Critically, Beijing’s dominance across mineral supply chains is bolstered by an equally robust industry of end-use manufacturing, including energy technologies, battery storage systems, and increasingly its own domestic defense manufacturing base. These publicly supported industries strengthen the linkages among nodes of the supply chain by establishing concrete demand signals from upstream actors, securing offtake and alleviating thin margins in midstream mineral processing, and enabling closed-loop supply chain management opportunities that can insulate Chinese companies from volatility elsewhere in the global market.
Fractured global trade and resource nationalism: Rising trade fragmentation makes supply chain resilience more challenging. Between 2010 and 2022, the total number of policies around the world placing restric-
tions on imported goods grew from approximately 250 to nearly 2,000.15 Global trade increasingly looks like trade within blocs (e.g., the West, BRICS).16 Foreign direct investment (FDI) follows a similar pattern: FDI is increasing among countries that are geopolitically aligned, rather than geographically approximate.17 Increasing trade tensions in 2025 have made this more challenging, with even traditional trading partnerships now under stress.18
For mineral supply chains, these trends are problematic. Trade fragmentation increases costs and impedes investment in critical mineral mining and processing. Lowered trust among traditional allies limits the willingness to bundle investments to tackle high upfront costs. It also deteriorates the required economies of scale, which might be unlocked through shared partnerships that are needed to displace Chinese market dominance.
Resource nationalism is both a symptom and a risk. According to Verisk Maplecroft’s Resource Nationalism Index, forty-one countries constituting 41 percent of global mineral output now fall in the two highest-risk categories, the result of increasing protectionism, rising export controls, and greater state ownership of mineral resources.19 Though these policies are often well intentioned and designed to minimize exploitation to ensure mineral wealth drives economic development, resource nationalism nonetheless increases uncertainty and risk premia on new projects, undermines the reliability of supply chain partnership, and increases the geopolitical leverage of mineral-rich countries.
Conflicts and chokepoints: Conflicts—such as wars, terrorism, and insurgencies—can reduce trade flowing through key logistics