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What is Soviet- Attitude to San Francisco.? ...Russia's Doctrinaire Outlook the Chief Obstacle Economic Reconstruction Through Free Enterprise? • Suspicion Based on Fears of Isolationism •
The following analysis of the Soviet attitude at the United Nations Confer ence at San Francisco is by Professor N. S. Timashe8, who was born to Petersburg,Russia,and was at the time of the revolution associate professor of jurisprudence at the Polytechnic Institute at Petrograd. Forced to leave Russia in 1921 ,he taught at various European Universities ;he is now associate professor of Fordham ( U.S.A.) University' s Department of Political Philosophy and Social Science. At San Francisco, Russia will be present in the garb of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is officially a State embodying the principles of Marxist philosophy. IIer social order is en• tirelt different from that prevailing in all the other States that will participate in the conference. IIer leaders exercise not only the functions of a government, but also those of standard hearers of a new doctrine which, they believe, is to conquer the world. This fundamental fact explains the particular role of the Soviet Union in the oar and in the preparation for peace. For the Soviet Union, this war is not the same as for her allies; it is rather a parallel war. It is tort that the Soviet Union, lust as each of the Allies, has fought primarih for independence; but this is about all they have had in common. then, should the Soviet Union foster Democracy? From her view• paint, Demncracv in a neighbouring State is hettrr than Fascist dictator• ship, but Communist dictatorship is first of all. In Finland, such n die• tatnrsh;p seems to have teen out ' of the question; therefore, the Soviets have not ititcrfered with the Finnish clec•timts. Thrsc elections, by the way, cave exactly the same result as the only free electinnG he1,9 in Russia since the f nmmunisr revolution: only ?5 per rent. fthe votes were cast for the Cnmmt:nists at the rlrctions to the Russian Con-titurnt Assembly in 1917 sort to the Finnish Parliament in 19!.i Pttt in Pnlanrl, Rumania, Bulgaria and 1'ugnslayia, Communist dictatorship, ender the disguise of semi-rlrmncrntic inctirittion proved to l,r possible. and it has been imposed
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on them, in flagrant contradiction to the Yalta promises. In the realm of economics, the Soviet Union repudiates entirely the system of free enterprise. Therefore her leaders cannot be guided in their acts by regard for it. For the time being, they do not want free enterprise destroyed in the most advanced industrial countries, because they expect these nations to help them reconstruct the Western half of European Russia. But they do not go beyond this. It is obvious that the best solution of the problems of the Danubian basin and the Balkans is the formation of one or two federations. But the Soviet ]eade,s destroyed hope of this remedy by imposing their veto on Polish-Czech and Greek-Yugoslav com•crsations in this direction. They knots that if the area between Russia, Germane and Italy remains in the state of atomisation created by the peace treaties of 191S. no real economic reconstruction of Europe is Possibl e . But should they discuss that reconstruction on the basis of the system of free enterprise? This rliccr,^ence of views on the basic problems of post-war reconstruction has been mahifcsted in the peculiar ronrhtrt of the Soviet leaders since the rleSnitise formation of the Grand :11liance, which can be dntert approxi• matcic Rom the signature of the a\ngloS n•iet sort American Soviet treaties of \lay and Tune, 191?. The veteran de• ntnc•racies expected that the Soviet Un ion would hchat•c ":tc a full-fledged ally." But how frequent sort strong have been the disappointments, especially after each of the meetings in Jioscnty, Teheran, and Yalta! The reluctant attitude of the Soviet hnirnt tntsanl the San Francisco confcrrnce, which has been so nmspicurnts in iltc past few weeks, is merely another indication of the general situation. \\' ithin the past (etc weeks, it has been disclosed that the Soviet Cninn demanded an exorbitadt privilrec, three votes in the Assembly, under the pretext that, on February 1, 1011. her constituent republics each recch•ed the right to. have its own dip• lnmatir service and army.
'That the nett armies and —,diploma es are directed from Moscow with the same- firmness as musicians by a good conductor, is not revealed. By her igency to the reconstruction of intra Its the Polish Government, the Soviet l'nian has in practice robbed Poland of an>• representation at San Fran , cisro, while by the untimely denunciation of the pact with Turkey, she has aroused the suspicions not only of that country, but of all her neighbours. Does this mean that the Soviet Union wants the conference to be unsuccesshil? Probably not. But her !enders cannot ascribe to the conference, and to the organisation for general security to be created by it, the same value as the other countries. These leaders feel that, by the nature of things, they will be isolated in an organisation the other participants of which hold an ideal incompatible with theirs. This was the reason for their demands on voting procedure in the Council, which almost exploded the Dumbarton Oaks conference. It is the reason why they consider the forth• coming organisation as only a second line of defence, the first being formed by their firm position in the neighbouring lands organised on the pattern of semi-Communist dictatorship, and by treaties witn such nations as Prance, which not only are sensitive to the eventual revival of German aggressiveness but are not in full agreement with Great Britain and the United States. Gumming up, one may say that the position of the Soviet leaders is by necessity ambiguous; they want a machine ry of general security to prevent a nett aggression against Russia, but that• are also suspicions of any machintry which could in any luau be transformed into a Grand Alliance directed against the Soviet Union. For the time being, their desire for pencral security will probnbl v̀ prevail and, if they are in doubt, their inrlina• tine to come to terms with the other r^atinnc will be simn^thcnrd by si,cni• ficatrt developments within Russia. Thera, since 1931, the historical procecs has been recerserl in that many rlemcnts of national tradition attacked fmm 191; to 193.3 had to he restored and re-enforced. 1n this tradition, the [tiro of rrt¢anised prove is important. Let its rnnc4ler these (arts: in 1Rl:i, after the defeat of Napoleon, the }Inly Allianc^, an organisation of European powers for the preservation of peace, war imposed mt the Allies by Emperor Alexander of Russia, who enim•ed the full and enthusiastic support of public opinion. In 1599, the Plague Peace Conference was convoked on the initiative of Russia. Among the Rus-
sian intelligentsia, pacifist trends, sometimes in very extreme form, obviously prevailed„ while among the peasants and workers tsar has never been popular. ^In the course of the past decade, the Soviet leaders have learned an important lesson: no dictatorship is strong enough to impose on a people that attitude of sacrifice without which any . war is lost before it has really begun. Therefore,• the desire of the Russian people to live at peace with other nations cannot be overlooked by the leaders. This desire indeed is not absolute; there are reasons to believe that the whole Russian nation stands firmly behind the Soviet Government with respect to Russia's western Etontier as traced in 1939-40. This is the limit, however, and any aggression beyond these boundaries would be mat by the passive resistance of which the Russians have proved to be unsurpassed masters.
Living With the
Church
July 1—Sixth Sunday attar Pentecost. Feast o4 Most Precious Blood of Our Lord ( Red): Mass proper, 2nd. prayer of the Sunday. Creed. Preface of the Cross. Last Gospel of the Sunday. July 2— Visitation of the Blessed Virgin ( White) Mass proper. 2nd. prayer for peace. Creed. Preface of the Blessed Virgin. July 8--St. Leo II., Pope and Confessor ( White): \lass proper. 2nd. prayer of the Octave of SS. Peter and Paul. 3rd. prayer "Concede nos." 4th. prayer for peace. Creed. Preface of the Apostles. July 4--Sixth day within the Octave of SS .Peter and Paul ( Red) Mass proper. 2nd. prayer of the Sunday. 3rd. prayer for peace. Creed. Preface of the Apostles —OR— Mass ( Green). No Gloria. 2nd. prayer of the Octave. 3rd. prayer for peace Creed Preface of the Apos• rtes July 5—St. . Anthony Mary Zaccaria, Confessor ( Red): \fuss pmper. 2nd prayer of the Octave. 3rd, prayer for peace. Creed. Preface of the Apostles. July 6— Octave of SS. Peter and Paul (Red): Mass proper. 2nd. prayer for peace. freed. Preface of the Apostles. July 7—SS. Cyril and Methodius, Bishops and Canfesoos ( White): Mass proper. 2nd, prayer for peace.
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