Macro Pulse

Trade Statistics – June ‘25

Transport Dynamics, Border Posts, and the Missing Rail Link

Transport continues to define the flow and cost structure of Namibia’s trade. In June 2025, sea transport carried 56.7% of exports, largely bulk commodities such as uranium and fish. Air transport accounted for 23.6%, reflecting the movement of high-value goods such as gold and diamonds, while road transport handled 19.7% of outbound trade, mainly to regional partners. On the import side, road remained dominant at 60.5%, underscoring Namibia’s reliance on South African and regional supply chains, followed by sea (35.4%) and air (4.0%).

By trade gateway, Walvis Bay port remained the main artery, handling the bulk of mineral exports and fuel imports. Hosea Kutako International Airport played a crucial role in facilitating high-value exports, particularly gold and diamonds, while border posts such as Ariamsvlei, Noordoewer, and Oshikango remained critical overland gateways for trade with South Africa and Angola. These hubs underscore Namibia’s position as both a global commodities exporter and a regional trade facilitator.

Yet, despite progress at the port and airport level, Namibia’s rail network remains the weakest link in its logistics chain. TransNamib’s limited capacity and outdated rolling stock force most cargo onto the road network, raising transport costs, eroding competitiveness, and accelerating wear on national highways. This imbalance is compounded by fiscal choices: over the past decade, the government has consistently allocated far larger budgets to roads than rail, funding road maintenance and expansion while the rail sector has been left chronically underfunded. The result is that heavy cargo from hinterland countries such as Zambia and the DRC, which could efficiently transit through Walvis Bay by rail, often bypasses Namibia altogether in favour of South African routes.

Encouragingly, steps are being taken to address these gaps. The Ministry of Works and Transport recently announced the creation of a Namibian Railway Qualification Framework (NRQF), which will align local rail skills and training with international standards. This initiative aims to professionalise the sector, improve safety and operational efficiency, and build a skilled workforce capable of managing a modernised rail network. However, training reforms will need to be paired with capital investment if rail is to play its intended role in boosting trade competitiveness.

Here, South Africa’s Transnet offers a relevant example. Confronted with similar bottlenecks, Transnet began outsourcing specific freight corridors to private operators, bringing in capital and technical expertise while retaining overall state control of the network. Namibia could adopt a similar approach, inviting private participation on priority corridors such as the Walvis Bay Grootfontein line and the Tsumeb, Otavi and Otjiwarongo mining belt also in the south the Ariamsvlei Luderitz line. Concession models or PPP frameworks would enable new investment into track upgrades, locomotives, and rolling stock, relieving pressure on TransNamib while rapidly expanding cargo throughput.

Rebalancing infrastructure spending is also critical. Redirecting even a portion of the billions currently allocated to roads into rail modernisation would have transformative effects. A stronger rail system would lower transport costs for exporters, extend the lifespan of Namibia’s roads by reducing heavy truck traffic, and strengthen Walvis Bay’s competitiveness as a gateway of choice for regional trade. In doing so, Namibia would not only improve its own trade efficiency but also attract hinterland volumes from landlocked neighbours seeking alternatives to congested South African ports.

Ultimately, addressing the “missing rail link” is not just a matter of logistics it is a structural trade policy issue. Without rail reform, Namibia’s external trade will remain constrained by high road costs, border post congestion, and dependence on South African infrastructure. With it, Namibia has the opportunity to reposition itself as a strategic logistics hub for Southern Africa under the AfCFTA, rivaling Durban and Maputo, and anchoring its trade growth on a more resilient and competitive foundation.

Implications of U.S. Tariffs on Namibia and the SWIFT System

The recent announcement of a 15% tariff on Namibian exports to the U.S. and a 30% tariff on South African goods has implications that go beyond trade flows. They also affect the mechanics of how money moves across borders, particularly through the SWIFT system the backbone of international payments.

SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) is not itself a bank, but a secure messaging platform used by more than 11,000 financial institutions worldwide. It enables banks to send payment instructions, settle cross-border trade, and communicate in a standardised format. In practical terms, almost every Namibian dollar earned through exports eventually triggers a SWIFT message routed through correspondent banks, often in South Africa or Europe, before final settlement in U.S. dollars, euros, or other major currencies.

For Namibia, the most immediate implication of U.S. tariffs is a likely decline in SWIFT traffic with U.S. counterparties. Higher tariffs make Namibian goods less competitive in the American market, particularly for mineral exports such as uranium and agricultural products like grapes and beef. Lower export volumes translate directly into fewer U.S.-dollar receipts being settled through SWIFT. While the U.S. is not Namibia’s largest customer, its strategic importance lies in the currency dimension the U.S. dollar remains the dominant trade settlement currency worldwide, and any reduction in dollar inflows can make payment cycles more complex and costly for a small, open economy like Namibia.

The knock-on effects through South Africa are even more significant. Namibia relies heavily on South African banks for U.S.-dollar clearing, since most Namibian banks do not hold direct correspondent accounts in New York. If South African exporters see a sharp drop in their U.S.-bound sales under the new tariffs, their banks will generate fewer dollar inflows. This weakens the very channels Namibia relies on, potentially leading to slower settlements, higher transaction costs, and tighter liquidity for cross-border trade payments. In effect, Namibia’s financial exposure to U.S. tariffs is magnified by its dependence on South Africa’s financial system.

Over the medium term, these tariffs will accelerate a reorientation of Namibia’s trade and financial flows. Exporters of uranium, copper, beef, and grapes are likely to redirect goods toward Europe, Asia, and intra-African markets under AfCFTA. Financially, this implies less SWIFT activity linked to U.S. institutions and more traffic with European, Asian, and regional banks. If trade with China and other BRICS members deepens, there is also the possibility of greater use of alternative systems such as CIPS (China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System), which settles transactions in renminbi outside of SWIFT. While this diversification would improve Namibia’s resilience in the long term, it introduces short-term complexity and higher operational costs, as banks will need to build new correspondent relationships outside of their traditional South African hubs.

The currency angle is another critical factor. With fewer U.S. dollars flowing into SACU, regional dollar liquidity will tighten, potentially putting pressure on Namibia’s currency peg to the rand. If dollar flows become constrained, Namibia may increasingly need to settle transactions in euros, pounds, or yuan. This would provide diversification but at the cost of greater operational complexity and potentially higher hedging requirements for businesses.

From a trade perspective, the risks are clear: reduced competitiveness in U.S. markets and indirect financial stress from South Africa’s losses. But there are also opportunities. The disruption could accelerate Namibia’s efforts to diversify both its export destinations and its financial settlement systems. Walvis Bay, in particular, is well positioned to attract rerouted trade flows as a neutral logistics and financial hub, provided Namibia invests in rail, port, and banking infrastructure to support these new corridors.

In short, the tariffs are more than just a commercial barrier they are a trigger for structural change in both trade patterns and financial flows. For Namibia, this means fewer U.S.-dollar transactions through SWIFT, tighter liquidity, and higher settlement costs in the near term. Yet it also provides a chance to build new corridors with Europe, Asia, and Africa, reducing dependency on South Africa and aligning with emerging multipolar financial systems. Whether this disruption proves to be a setback or a turning point will depend on how quickly Namibia adapts its trade strategy, financial infrastructure, and currency management to a shifting global environment.

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